

THE CHINESE PERCEPTION  
OF THE SPECTRUM OF THE  
SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL CONFLICT

Jess Thompson Goodman

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# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

## Monterey, California



# THESIS

THE CHINESE PERCEPTION  
OF THE SPECTRUM OF THE  
SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL CONFLICT

by

Jess Thompson Goodman

March 1975

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projected as are its strategic implications for American national security planners and naval strategists.





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of the Spectrum of the  
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by

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Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy  
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ABSTRACT

The intent of this thesis is to provide those interested with a compendium of the quintessential elements of the Sino-Soviet territorial conflict from its origin through March of 1975. An attempt has been made to use the most up-to-date and authoritative source materials available with the majority of the citations dated since 1974. The conflict is examined in depth and its expected future course is projected as are its strategic implications for American national security planners and naval strategists.



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## I. HISTORICAL BASIS OF THE SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL CONFLICT

### A. INTRODUCTION

The main purposes of this thesis have been to instruct the author on national security aspects of the Sino-Soviet territorial conflict and to attempt to project the future of that conflict. The main hypothesis is that Peking will increasingly emphasize international negotiations with Moscow as the People's Republic of China improves its nuclear capability, defensive preparations, and logistical capabilities vis a vis the Soviet Union. An alternative hypothesis to be tested is that the People's Republic of China will use all means short of general war to regain "lost territories" from the Soviet Union. Both hypotheses are evident in the writings of many of the Sinologists and Russophiles cited in the list of references. An intent of the thesis is to provide the reader with a compendium of the quintessential elements of the conflict from its beginning to the present with emphasis on the events of the past quarter of a century. An attempt has been made to select the most authoritative and up-to-date primary and secondary source materials from among the myriad of data available on China and Russia. A popular definition of the term "conflict" is: "1. A prolonged battle; a struggle; clash. 2. A controversy; disagreement; opposition. 3. Psychology. The opposition or simultaneous functioning of mutually exclusive impulses, desires, or





tendencies. 4. A crashing together; collision." [The American Heritage Dictionary of the American Language 1973 p. 279] In the strategic sense, John M. Collins defines "conflict spectrum" as "A continuum of hostilities that ranges from subcrisis maneuvering in cold-war situations to the most violent form of general war," [Collins 1973 p. 265] and it is this definition that applies throughout this study. For a more in-depth definition of conflict, see Thomas C. Schelling's Strategy of Conflict (London: Oxford University Press, 1960) or any issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution since its inception in March of 1957.

The author agrees with former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Nathan Twining, who once said "Nobody is an expert on Russia. There are just varying degrees of ignorance" [Schurman 1957 p. vii], and believes that the sentiment is even more apropos to China today. Professor John K. Fairbank offers two valid reasons for Americans to study China: the pragmatic - based upon the fact that our last three wars have involved us with Chinese culture and that modern Communist-nationalism has militant potential (China's tradition of profound isolationism notwithstanding, missiles know no boundaries); and the academic - because China's history represents perhaps a third of organized human experience, it is simply very interesting [Fairbank 1974 p. 218]. The author agrees with both reasons and will attempt to show the first reason as being of increasing long-range significance to the naval strategic planner. Thomas Robinson has



observed that "At present, the Soviet Union is reported to have the most powerful concentration of military force of the face of the earth deployed adjacent to China's northern borders..." [Robinson "Soviet Policy in Eastern Asia" Problems in Communism November-December 1973] and Professor William Ebenstein has stated that "Today, the Sino-Soviet conflict is viewed everywhere as posing the most important potential threat of nuclear war between any two major powers in the world, possibly engulfing all continents." [Ebenstein 1973 p. 106]

In the center of Eastern Asia is the world's oldest extant civilization, the Chinese, whose continuing stability and ethnic unity, until recently, was unmatched by any society. Today, however, the People's Republic of China is among the least stable or predictable actors on the international stage. Professors Clyde and Beers predict that: "...it may well be that the political and social history of the world in the century ahead will be determined as much by the temper of China as by the behavior of any major state." [Clyde and Beers 1971 p. 2] Others, distinguished in the fields of political science and international journalism, echo similar sentiments by such commentaries as: "...the great cleavage between Peking and Moscow is likely to be recorded as one of the two or three most significant events of the twentieth century." [Professor Robert Scalapino "How Peking Views the World" Monterey Peninsula College Lecture Series 18 October 1963] "When historians in the year 2000 look back





on the final quarter of this century, they will see that it was the present Sino-Soviet relationship that shaped their world." [Sulzberger 1974 p. 6]

The term "China," not a native Chinese name, was originally found in Sanskrit about the Christian era and later in various modified forms employed by other Asiatic peoples. The origin of the term is still a matter of debate [Oxford English Dictionary 1971 p. 351]. One of the obvious and most common opinions is that it is from the Chinese Ch'in dynasty of 225-204 B.C. "Sino" indicates something Chinese and is from Late Latin Sinae, the Chinese, from Greek Sinai, from Arabic Sīn, China, from Chinese (Mandarin) Ch'in, the dynastic name of the country previously cited. The archaic and poetic form of China is the word "Cathay" from Medieval Latin Cataya, Kitai, from Old Turkic Qitay, Qitan, name of an Altaic Turkic tribe that ruled China as the Liao Dynasty (A.D. 907-1101). The Chinese themselves call their land Chung-kuo, the central country, or as the name often appears in Western literature, The Middle Kingdom [American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1973 pp. 234, 209, 212]. For an occidental observer to gain insight into how the Chinese perceive the world around them, he must remember that they have been developing an integrated oriental cultural heritage for more than 3,000 years, whereas both the United States and Russia are multinational in origin and have existed for only about 200 and 1100 years respectively.



The Russian State emerged on the east European plain after years of invasion, conquest, and sporadic attempts at settlement by Central Asian nomads, Scythians, Goths, Huns, Avars, and other tribal groups during the period 1000 B.C. to A.D. 800. As Kirchner notes the origin of the Slavs is not clear, but they emerged in the area of the Ukraine during the eighth century where a Scandinavian prince named Rurik organized the first Slavic state in 856 in Novgorod on Lake Ilmen. In 882 Rurik's successor, Oleg, consolidated the northern Novgorod dominion with the commercial dominion to the south at Kiev and is regarded as the founder of Russia. These Scandinavians who settled Russia were also known as Varangians or Russ (meaning rowers). By the tenth century they had loosely organized their principalities at Novgorod, Turov, Polotsk, and Kiev into a great state. Because of their small size, the Varangians were soon assimilated into the Slavic culture and only their form of local government was retained. Their influence on the future destiny of the country was negligible [Kirchner 1955 pp. 8-9]. Thus one can observe the derivation of the name "Russia." "Russia comes from the Medieval Latin Russi, Russians, from Old Russian Russ', Norsemen, the Norse founders of the Russian principalities, from Old Norse Rothsmenn, seafarers, from rōthr, to row [The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1973 p. 1137]. It is interesting to note that "Russia," traditionally thought of as a land power (at least until the 1970's), has a nautical origin.



For the next three centuries Russia's main tasks consisted of internal consolidation, trade, and territorial expansion. The Varangian Grand Prince established a lively commerce with Constantinople by trading the furs, grain, honey, and slaves he received in tribute from his provinces. As a result, the Byzantine culture and religion spread throughout Russia. By the end of the tenth century, Grand Prince Vladimir of Kiev was converted to the Byzantine or Greek orthodox form of Christianity. Vladimir thus made Christianity the religion of Imperial Russia. Byzantine artists erected and decorated churches in a style which established the style of later Russian art.

#### B. WESTWARD EXPANSION BY THE MONGOLS

Reither asserts that the Varangian state began to crumble with the invasion of the steppes by an Asiatic horde called the Polovtzy who had been forced westward by drought in the Gobi during the twelfth century. The Polovtzy severed the trade routes between Russia and the Black Sea and pushed the Russians north into Poland, Lithuania, and the Moscow and Novgorod areas. The monarchy was abandoned and a republic established in its place. Novgorod developed a prosperous commerce in the Baltic area [Reither 1952 p. 206].

In the thirteenth century, Kirchner notes, the Mongul nomads of the steppes of central Asia were united under the leadership of Genghis Khan who set out to conquer the world. They seized Turkestan from the kingdom of North China and





conquered the Turkish empire of Kharezm. They menaced first the Polovtzy, who, despite their frequent invasions of Russia, served as an important buffer state against Genghis Khan's Tartars and therefore, received Russian support. In 1223, at the Battle of the River Kalka, the combined armies of Russia and the Polovtzy were routed, but in spite of their victory the Tartars retreated. After the death of Genghis, the Russian lands were granted by his successor to Batu Khan, a grandson of Genghis. The Tartars then resumed their invasion of Russia. Vladimir, Pereslavl, and Chernigov were captured in 1238, and Kiev in 1240. Of all the important Russian centers, Novgorod alone was temporarily spared because the thick forests and dense swamps impeded the advance of the equestrian Tartars. Alexander, the Duke of Novgorod successfully defended his province against the Swedes in 1240 and the Teutonic Knights in 1242, but finally recognized Tatar sovereignty in 1245 after exhausting his resources against invading Lithuanian armies from the west. The Tartars maintained sovereignty in Russia for almost two hundred and fifty years. In 1380, the Muscovite ruler Dimitri made the first effective attempt to throw off the Tatar yoke by scoring a politically useful, but militarily useless, victory over the Tartars on the Don. Dimitri, called "Donskoy" for this victory on the Don, thus seriously damaged Tatar prestige but could not break Tatar dominance because of the rise of another great conqueror, Tamerlane; nevertheless, Dimitri



further promoted the growth of Muscovy by establishing the law of primogeniture, thus eliminating the system of dividing the country between heirs of the leader [Kirchner 1955 pp. 25-26, 30]. This law initiated stability in the house of the princes of Muscovy. For almost two hundred years, from 1389 to 1584, Moscow was ruled by only five princes. This continuity coupled with the improving economic position of Moscow due to its strategic location and growing taxable population caused the city to persistently rise in relative power. The introduction of the latest artillery during this period, ever since a weapon of great importance to the Russian army, did much to swing the balance of power vis-a-vis the Tartars in Moscow's favor.

As Clubb has observed, final victory over the Mongol yoke was delayed until the time of Ivan III (1462-1505), known later as Ivan the Great, who ranks as the founder of the Russian empire. At his wife Sophia's insistence, he claimed the title of "Tsar" (believed to be derived from Cesar) which implied supreme worldly and spiritual power. The Russian empire, thus, began to take the form of a nation which, in its claim to divine legitimacy and orthodoxy, bore a resemblance to that Oriental Middle Kingdom which assumed that the occupant of the Dragon Throne at Peking was the legitimate ruler of all mankind [Clubb 1971 p. 8]. There is a consensus that the formal political sovereignty of the Tartars was ended in 1480 at the so-called battle of the





River Ugra. Although Russian and Tarter armies faced each other on the Ugra, no battle was fought; so the confrontation resulted in a stalemate. Ivan had previously undermined Tarter power by negotiations with unruly elements within the Golden Horde and, with the onset of winter, the Tartars retreated. No longer was tribute paid to the Golden Horde. The Turks then seized the Crimea and the Golden Horde disappeared in less than twenty years. Some Tartars remained, however, as a danger to the Russian state for another century [Kirchner 1955 p. 35, Lydolph 1970 p. 7, Mellor 1964 pp. 85-86, and Reither 1952 p. 208].

Clubb notes that with the help of the Don Cossacks (from the Russian kazak meaning freebooter or adventurer), Ivan IV (1547-1584), "The Terrible," defeated and annexed the Kazan Tartars in 1552, followed by the annexation of the Astrakhan khanate in 1556. The Russian people were thus able to populate the lower Volga region, enabling the Russians to safely open the route to Siberia. But the Crimean khanate continued to exist and in 1571 it captured and destroyed all of Moscow except for the Kremlin. The Russian struggle with Ottoman Turks, who ruled the Crimean Khan, would continue for centuries. Having little success in expanding his empire westwards because of strong opposition by Sweden and Poland, Ivan turned to expansion in the Inner Asian borderlands. Coincidental with Ivan's rule was the rise of the specter of the "foreign menace" which combined with threats to internal order to make Russian rule more despotic [Clubb



1971 p. 9]. Kirchner records that Ivan created a special private police force, the Oprichnina, which was not identified with the state, but with the will of the sovereign. The Oprichnina became the chief tool of autocracy; its illegality, ruthlessness, and irresponsibility caused it to be feared and hated by the people and the regular administration. It was a historical precursor of the Soviet Secret Police or K.G.B. [Kirchner 1955 p. 9].

### C. EASTWARD EXPANSION BY RUSSIA

In 1558, Tsar Ivan made a land grant on the Upper Kama River, west of the Urals, to an ambitious merchant named Grigore A. Stroganov and his brothers. According to Russian legend the name Stroganov (from the Russian strogat, "to shave off") originated when a distant ancestor of the Stroganovs by the name of Spiridon (who, incidentally, was the first to introduce the abacus to Russia) for some unknown reason was sentenced by his fellow Tarter tribesmen to having his flesh shaved off layer by layer with a sharp knife until he died [Shinkarev 1973 p. 37]. The Stroganovs built a strong commercial base and petitioned the tsar in 1574 for a grant of land east of the Urals as far as the Tura and Tobol Rivers (tributaries of the Ob). Even though the area actually constituted the western half of the domain ruled by the Tatar khan Kuchum, Ivan gave them title to these lands and more. The Stroganovs had thus to win from Kuchum the domain they had been granted. They succeeded by enlisting



aid from the Don Cossacks. In 1579, one Yermak Tunofeevich and his band of Cossacks, all of whom were being pursued by tsarist forces, were enlisted by the Stroganovs to push Kuchum westward in return for a promise of rich fields for cultivation. In 1582, Yermak occupied Sibir (from which Siberia got its name). Yermak then requested a pardon and military support from the tsar. Ivan IV was so pleased that he sent a detachment of 500 men and a richly ornamented cuirass to Yermak. In 1585 Yermak was attacked and in an effort to escape, plunged into the Irtysh where, according to Russian legend, he drowned as a result of the tsar's present, the cuirass, that he wore. Ivan the Terrible died in 1584 and, because he had killed his able eldest son Ivan in 1580, succession was passed to his weak offspring Fedor. But the real power behind the Throne was in the person of the tsar's brother-in-law, Boris Godunov, under whose strong influence Moscow continued its eastward expansion into Siberia so that by 1586 Tyumen was founded on the Tura River. Kuchum was finally defeated and killed in 1598 and, in that same year, Tsar Fedor died without a legal heir ending the Rurik dynasty. Godunov then ruled as "Tsar Boris" until his death in 1605 which ushered in the "Time of Troubles" marked by a struggle for succession and by revolts of the distressed peasantry [Clubb 1971 pp. 11-12].

In 1613 the yemski sobor (territorial assembly) elected the weak-willed Mikhail Romanov as tsar. Nevertheless, he reconstructed the army, established peaceful relations with





Sweden, and continued Russian expansion into Siberia. Along the way into Siberia the Russians constructed ostrogs (fortified strongpoints) at Mangazeya, on the lower reaches of the Taz River (a tributary of the Ob) and at Yenisei in 1619 while encountering only minor resistance from such petty forest tribes as the Nentsy, Khanty, and Kets. The Buryal Mongols, however, offered stiffer resistance to the Russian advance, but by 1628 the Cossack sotnik (commander of a hundred) Petr Beketov succeeded in making the Buryats pay tribute. The Cossacks also encountered the Turkic Yakuts to the east, but Beketov succeeded in founding, in 1632, the ostrog Lensk (later named Yakutsk) on the middle of the Lena. By 1636 the Russians discovered the Amur River and in 1639 arrived at the Sea of Okhotsh on the Pacific [Clubb 1971 pp. 12-13, 21].

Up to this point the Russian government had taken no part in these explorations. Its interests were confined to strategic considerations of security from new nomad invasions. Consequently, the initiative remained in the hands of lawless bands who followed the explorers and who had little honor and no love of country. The farther they were from Russia, the greater their lawlessness. Excessive taxes, torture, abduction, murder, and cannibalism were among the crimes these Cossacks perpetrated upon the natives. Not only were the Cossack soldiers feared but also the traders who arrived after them to speculate in land, provisions, and saltmines.



In 1637 a Siberian Department was founded in Moscow with various administrative units spread throughout Siberia, but it was centralized in 1670 at Tobolsk. The officers of these units, however, were notoriously corrupt and robbed both the natives and the government they represented. Their harsh treatment of local peoples resulted in the flight of many natives to China [Kirchner 1955 p. 49]. A Russian description of this same period parallels Kirchner's recollection of Russian brutality by the Tsar's military governors and adds that: "The collectors frequently tried to collect from the local people more furs than were legally required under the yasak (tax), and merchants -- often with the help of alcohol -- shamelessly cheated the locals and violated their national traditions and rights." Shinkarev goes on to describe how the Russian government finally placed sanctions of death and torture (for example, tearing off nostrils) on those officials who sought illegal self-enrichment [Shinkarov 1973 pp. 47-51].

In 1635, Abahai (1592-1643), the leader of 400,000 Jurchen people who occupied the borderlands separating the Chinese and Russian empires, changed the name of his people from Jurchen or Chienchon Jurchens, as was the Chinese usage, to "Manchus," the rationale of which is unknown. Then, in May, 1636, with forty-nine Inner Mongolian princes in attendance, Abahai declared himself emperor of the Ch'ing (pure) dynasty. Abahai died in 1643 and succession passed





to his ninth son, Fu-lin, then only five years of age. Fu-lin's uncle, Dorgon, occupied Peking in 1644, and Fu-lin ascended the Dragon Throne as emperor Shun-chich, signaling the end of the Ming and the beginning of the Manchu dynasty which was to last until 1912. Consequently, an automatic addition to the Chinese empire was the Manchu's homeland, the Northeast (the Chinese term it Manchuria) [Clubb 1971 p. 20].

In 1648, the Cossack staman Semyon Dezhnev, starting from the mouth of the Kolyma River, made his way around the Chukotsh Peninsula south through the Bering Strait which was named eighty years later upon the arrival of Vitus Bering. In 1649, Erofei P. Khabarov headed an expedition which ran into settlements of Daur along the Amur River who were subjects of the Manchu emperor. He wisely withdrew leaving behind a small garrison. Returning the following summer with reinforcements, he found his garrison under seige by the Daur. An evening clash with Khabarov's force resulted in the Daur prince fleeing and Khabarov occupying the town. When Moscow heard of the richness of this area months later, a force of 3,000 troops under the command of Prince Lobanov-Rostovski was dispatched to the Amur sector. . Meanwhile Khabarov was consolidating his position and in September, 1651, occupied a village belonging to the Olchei tribe. The Olchei, oppressed and pressured to pay yasak and supply the Russian detachment, appealed to the Manchus for help. In



March, 1652, a Manchu detachment of 2,000 men attacked the Russian ostrog but were repulsed. This clash is significant because it is the first major battle between Russian and Chinese forces. Additional Sino-Soviet battles occurred in 1654 with the Russians winning again, 1658 in which the Manchus won, and in the 1680's with no clear victor [Clubb 1971 pp. 22-23].

#### D. ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

As early as 1650, Tsar Mikhail had attempted to establish diplomatic contact with Peking by sending Erofei Zabolotski to China for the purpose of regularization of relations between the two countries, but he and his party were murdered by their Buryat escort. Similarly, a second mission in 1653, led by the Cossack Tetyak E. Chichigin was wiped out by Dyucher guides. A third mission in 1654 headed by Fedor I. Baikov succeeded in reaching Peking but failed because of Baikov's refusal to follow the kowtow as prescribed by Manchu officials. A fourth mission in 1658, headed by the merchant Seitku Ablin, succeeded in exchanging gifts, but he received no audience with the emperor. They returned with 360 pounds of Chinese brick tea which was to become one of the most prized of Russian imports from China. In 1670 a fifth Russian mission, that of Ignati Milovanov, was made to China, which resulted from an approach from the Manchu side to return a renegade Evenki prince named Gantimur (who had fled to the Russian side in 1667) as a quid pro quo for engaging in



Chinese trade. A letter from this mission to Kang-hsi proposed that the emperor submit to the tsar; needless to say, this approach failed. Russia did not turn over Gantimur, conditions for trade remained inauspicious, but Moscow relieved the originator of the letter, Daniel Arshinski, of his post as the voevoda of Nerchinsk. In May, 1676, Russian Ambassador Spathar-Milescu arrived in Peking and agreed finally to perform the kowtow, gaining the first official audience with the emperor. The issue of Gantimur, however, was still critical in the mind of Kang-hsi. Spathar-Milescu was informed by a local Jesuit that, if Gantimur were not handed over, China would make war on Russia. On September 1, 1677, the Russian ambassador and his mission were ordered to depart Peking immediately [Clubb 1971 pp. 19-27].

Meanwhile, by 1673 a mongul leader named Galdan had won authority over most chieftains of the Dzungarian khanate and had decided to unify Mongolia in order to form a buffer state in Inner Asia between China and Russia. He planned to confront both Manchu and Russian imperialism from a position of strength and then play them against each other. In the final analysis he failed because he poisoned himself in May, 1697, after his army had suffered a devastating defeat by the Manchus. However, he succeeded in playing a key role in Russo-Manchu relations in two ways: first, a pattern was established that when the Monguls were quiet, Peking tended to be arrogant toward the Russians, but when the Monguls threatened China, the Manchu Court assumed a





conciliatory stance; second, the fact that the Russians could align themselves with Galdan was the one bargaining lever they had in negotiating at the Russo-Manchu conference at Nerchinsk (also, Nipchu) in August, 1689 [Clubb 1971 pp. 27-33].

Finally, on 27 August 1689, Russia and the Manchu Kingdom signed the Treaty of Nerchinsk after an exchange of embassies and after two weeks of negotiations. It was significant as the first international agreement made by a Chinese emperor with a European power on the basis of formal sovereign equality and as the first formally established common frontier between China and Russia. Although Russia had negotiated from a position of military inferiority (it was the time of a century and a half of Manchu Dynasty power ascendancy), she managed to acquire some 93,000 square miles of Chinese territory. This Chinese-Russian border along the Amur basin was to remain unchanged for almost 170 years when on 28 May 1858, the Treaty of Aigun was signed [Tai 1973 p. 30].

The Bur Treaty was signed on 20 August 1727 between the Chinese and Russian empires. Two additional protocols (12 October at Abagatuy and 27 October on the Bur River) were exchanged which superseded it. Also on 27 October 1727 Tsarist Russia and Manchu China signed the Treaty of Kiakhta. The above mentioned protocols and the Treaty of Kiakhta defined a large portion of the border, most of which is now the boundary between the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia.



By way of the two agreements of 1727, Manchu China lost almost 40,000 square miles between the upper Irtysh and the Sayan Mountains, as well as south and southwest of Lake Baikal. The delimitation remained valid for over 125 years [Tai 1973 p. 32]. Following the Opium War (1840-1842), which verified declining Manchu power, China was infested with internal disorders and foreign intervention. Russia took advantage of this by gradually repenetrating the Amur valley in violation of the treaty of Nerchinsk.

In search of an ice-free port on the Sea of Okhotsk, Tsar Nicholas I sent a Captain Nevelskoi to explore the coast of Siberia. Tai observes that, on his own initiative and without instructions, he built a post on the Amur which he named Nikolaevsk in clear violation of the Treaty of Nerchinsk. By the end of 1853 Nevelskoi and his expedition occupied the most important harbors in the Gulf of Tartary and established posts in Sakhalin, this time with the blessing of Nicholas I [Tai 1973 p. 33]. By 1856, the Russians were entrenched along the entire course of the Amur and the Manchus had to recognize this de facto military occupation because they were hard-pressed to put down the Taiping Rebellion (1850-64) [Clyde and Beers 1971 pp. 85-87]. The Russians took advantage of the Manchu problems with the Taiping and Nienfei (1853-68) rebels by negotiating the Treaty of Aigun on 28 May 1858 which gained for Russia the northern part of the Amur River valley, an area of 185,000 square miles [Tai 1973 p. 36].





In June, 1858, another Russo-Chinese treaty was signed in Tientsin. By this treaty the Russian negotiator, Admiral Evfimi Putyatin gained commercial rights similar to those enjoyed by England and other Western powers as a result of the "most-favored nation" clauses of Chinese treaties in which Russia had not participated, such as the Treaty of Nanking in 1842. Russia could now trade with China by land and sea using the same ports open to Western powers such as Shanghai, Canton, Amoy, et al. Russia also gained the right to send envoys to Peking and establish consuls in the open ports. The consuls were given extraterritorial jurisdiction over Russian citizens violating Chinese laws. A new Russian envoy, General Nikolai Ignatiev, attempted to get the Aigun Treaty ratified but when China became obstinate, he effectively broke diplomatic relations with Peking in May, 1860. But at this point, history played into Russia's hands. Peking was weak and in disorder because of British and French incursions and the Taiping rebellion. While China quickly ratified the Treaty of Tientsin with Russia, ratification of similar treaties with Britain, France, and the United States was delayed. This resulted in an Anglo-French attack in 1860 in which Tientsin and Peking were captured and the emperor's beautiful Summer Palace destroyed. As Swartz observes, this is when General Ignatiev returned to Peking to accomplish "one of the most skillful feats of diplomatic double-dealing in history." Following Admiral Putyatin's suggestion that he gain Russian advantage of China's military



weakness vis-a-vis the British and French, Ignatiev both showed the British Commander a detailed map of Peking highlighting the north gate as the weakest spot in its defenses and offered his good offices to the Peking government to serve as mediator. For his services his price was that Peking ratify the Treaty of Aigun, allow new Russian consulates in many cities, and extend the Russian-Chinese boundary line along the Ussuri River to Korea. After the Chinese paid this price, Ignatiev persuaded the British to withdraw because Peking was "unsafe in the winter." Once allied troops had left, he was free to deal with the Chinese on his terms and succeeded in getting the Treaty of Peking signed on 14 November 1860. This treaty nullified both the Treaty of Nerchinsk and the Treaty of Kiakhta and added an additional 133,000 square miles of Chinese territory east of the Ussuri to Russia. It also established the basic boundary in existence today between Manchuria and the Soviet Far East in which China surrendered claim to almost 350,000 square miles of territory by agreeing that the boundary between Sinkiang and Russian Central Asia be set along the line of permanent pasture markers which the Chinese had set up to limit pasture use by the Kazakh nomads [Swartz 1973 pp. 49-51].

On 7 October 1864, The Tarbagatai Protocol, hastily concluded because of a Moslem revolt in Sinkiang, delimited the new Chinese-Russian boundary in Central Asia. After the



Taiping Rebellion in the east was crushed, the Manchus turned against Yakub Beg and the revolting Moslems in the west, crushing them by 1878 and reestablishing firm administrative control of Sinkiang. The Chinese then demanded that the Russians leave the Ili River valley but were not strong enough to force their removal. This resulted in the Treaty of Livadia of September 1879. In return for a Russian promise to withdraw from the Ili area, China agreed to cede about 30 percent of the Ili territory to Russia, including most of the strategic area between Dzhingaria and the Tien Shane. This treaty cost Sinkiang a substantial part of its most fertile valley. The Chinese envoy who negotiated this treaty, Ch'sing-hou, was thrown into prison and sentenced to be decapitated by the Manchu court in Peking for his stupidity in this matter. He was later pardoned and another treaty, the treaty of St. Petersburg (or Ili), was signed on 14 February 1881 after the Manchu court refused to ratify the Treaty of Livadia. As a result Russia was ceded only a small area of Sinkiang (15,000 square miles) but China did agree to pay Tsarist Russia nine million rubles "occupation costs". [Tai 1973 p. 41].

Tai notes that because the Treaty of St. Petersburg was vague in delineating specific boundaries in Sinkiang, additional protocols were signed between 1882 and 1893 — at Ili in August 1882; at Goulimton in October 1882; at Kashgar in November 1882; at Tarbagatai in September 1883; at Novi-Margelan in May 1884; at Kashgar in May 1885; and at





Tarbagatai in December 1893. The result was that China never quite lost Sinkiang to the Russians, but it never eliminated Russian influence in the area either. The Chinese-Russian boundary today in Sinkiang has remained the same as that negotiated from 1882 to 1893 [Tai 1973 p. 44].

During the late nineteenth century Russia launched a drive for political, military, and economic influence in Manchuria and Korea in competition with Japan. In 1896, the Russians got a weak China to enter into a defensive alliance against Japan and to agree that Russia could build the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria as a shortcut link between Russia proper and the Soviet Maritime Province (Vladivostok); in 1898 they obtained additional concessions to extend this railroad into southern Manchuria and to give Russia a territorial lease on the warm water port of Dairen, on the naval base of Port Arthur, and on the Liaotung Peninsula — the same strategic areas denied Japan by the Russian-led Western intervention as one of the most significant prizes in defeating China three years earlier. As a result of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 5 September 1905 following the defeat of Russia by Japan, Russia was compelled to cede to Japan the southern half of Sakhalin Island, the Liaotung Peninsula, the South Manchurian Railway, the naval complex of Port Arthur and Dairen and, generally, its predominant influence in Manchuria [Tai 1973 pp. 44-45].



With the collapse of Manchu China on 1 December 1911, the Mongols declared Outer Mongolian independence and asked for Russian support and protection. The Russo-Mongolian Treaty of 3 November 1912 recognized the "autonomy" of Outer Mongolia. This agreement was followed by a secret military agreement in 1913. Later, in 1921 the Soviet Union declared Outer Mongolia "independent," quietly annexing it on 13 October 1944 as part of its territory under the name of an autonomous region of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. Russian interference in Outer Mongolia almost caused war with the new (1911) Chinese Republic, but this was averted in an accord of 5 November 1913 in which the Russians admitted Chinese suzerainty over Outer Mongolia. Later, this was formalized in the tripartite Russo-Chinese-Mongolian treaty of June 1915 at Kiakhta [Tai 1973 p. 46].

The following quotation from the "Foreign Relations 1917" section of the Soviet Year-Book 1928 evinces an apparent change in Russian foreign policy as a result of the revolution:

On November 22, 1917, a manifesto to all the Moslems of Russia and of the East was published, in which Soviet Russia declared its renunciation of the Colonial policy of the previous Russian Governments.

In order to do away with secret treaties and base its international relations on the principle of open diplomacy, the Soviet Government began on November 10, 1917, the publication of all secret treaties entered upon by previous Russian Governments. [Santalov and Segal, ed. 1928 p. 29]

In a moment of revolutionary zeal, the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs in the Soviet Union, L. M. Karakhan, issued





a declaration on 25 July 1919 repudiating all "unequal" treaties and renouncing all Soviet claims to territories "ravenously" taken from China by the tsars. It said in part:

We are marching to free the people from the yoke of military force, of foreign money, which is crushing the life and the people of the East, and principally of the people of China...The Soviet Government has renounced all the conquests made by the Tsarist Government which took away from China Manchuria and other territories. The population of these territories shall decide for themselves to which country they would like to belong. [Tai 1973 p. 47]

China thought then she would have her lost-territories returned. This belief was reinforced when the Soviet government issued the Karakhan Manifesto to Peking. It declared:

The Government of the Russian Socialist Republics declares null and void all treaties concluded with China by the former Government of Russia, renounces all seizures of Chinese territory and all Russian concessions in China, and restores to China, without compensation and forever, all that had been predatorily seized from her by the Tsar's Government and the Russian bourgeoisie. [Tai 1973 p. 50]

The Soviet regime never followed through on these pledges. Under General Hsu Shu-tseng, the Chinese tried to reestablish their control over Outer Mongolia in 1919 while the Russians were preoccupied with both World War I and their own revolution. He was opposed in 1921 by the last remnants of the White Russian Army under Baron Roman Nikolaus von Ungern-Sternberg who invaded Outer Mongolia and seized the capital of Urga. This was used as a pretext for the invasion of Mongolia by the Soviet Red Army which expelled the White Russians and recognized Mongolian independence. In effect



Outer Mongolia became the first Soviet satellite (the capital of Urga was changed to Ulan Bator meaning "Red Hero").

In the early 1920's the new republic of China was deeply divided between the Peking government (North) ruled by reactionary warloads and the revolutionary Kuomintang (Nationalist) regime in Canton (South), led by Sun Yat-sen while Manchuria was in the hands of Marshall and Warload Chang Tso-lin. Soviet leaders decided to deal with them all separately in a divide-and-rule strategy. Not until 1928 did Chiang Kai-shek, successor to Sun Yat-sen, succeed in unifying China under one government. In the Sun-Joffe Declaration of 26 January 1923 the Soviets agreed to lend support and advice to the Kuomintang in its efforts for national unification (not revolution), although; only two years before, the Soviet Union had organized a revolutionary Chinese Communist movement. On 31 May 1924 a new agreement between the Soviet Union and Peking was signed which declared null and void all previous Chinese agreements with Tsarist Russia (at least on paper), which agreed on a new delimitation of the Sino-Soviet boundary (this was never implemented), and which recognized Outer Mongolia as a "component of the Chinese Republic" under Chinese sovereignty, while the Chinese acknowledged Moscow's de facto dominance there. On 15 March 1925 the Chinese government ratified the Mukden agreement which reiterated the substance of the 31 May 1924 agreement [Tai 1973 pp. 51-52]. The 1928 edition of the Soviet Union



yearbook lists only two Sino-Soviet "Treaties, Agreements and Conventions concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Foreign States, which came into force prior to January 1, 1928, and which are still valid," namely: on 31 May 1924 at Peking "A Treaty on the General Principles for Regulating Questions between the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Republic" and also on 31 May 1924 at Peking "An Agreement Concerning the Temporary Administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway." [Santalov and Segal, ed. 1928 p. 43]


To avoid confrontation with Japan in 1935, the Soviet Union sold the Chinese Eastern Railway to the Japanese puppet state of Manchuko. However, as a result of the Yalta agreement of 11 February 1945, Stalin succeeded in getting this back as well as: a guarantee of the status quo of Outer Mongolia; the cession of the southern half of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands to the Soviet Union; and the restoration of Russia's former rights in Manchuria before the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Nationalist China later confirmed the Yalta stipulations on Outer Mongolia and Manchuria through the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945 [Tai 1973 pp. 54-55]. For a visual depiction of Russian Expansion into Asia through 1945 see Map 1. For the Chinese view of disputed borders see Map 2.

#### E. COMMUNIST CHINESE AND RUSSIAN INTERACTIONS

When the People's Republic of China was established on 1 October 1949, the Soviet tradition of expansion into the








Russian expansion into Asia. *Atlas Istarii SSSR*, Moscow, 1954-1955, Vol. I, pl. 19 and 28, Vol. II, pl. 5, 13 and 18.  
 [Source: Mellor 1964 p. 87]

Map 1



# CHINA'S LOST EMPIRE







Chinese borderlands ceased as a result of Communist China's forceful territorial consolidation and accompanying strong countermeasures against them. This determined resistance to Soviet expansionism was the basis for the covert dissension between the two brotherly Communist giants between 1949 and 1954 which was cited earlier. One day after the People's Republic of China was formally inaugurated on 1 October 1949, it was officially recognized by the Soviet Union. During the following year negotiations between these communist states were cordial and resulted on 14 February 1950 in the signing of: (1) a treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance; (2) an agreement providing that after the signing of a peace treaty with Japan, and in any case not later than the end of 1952, the Soviet Union would transfer free of charge to the Chinese Government all its rights in the joint administration of the Manchurian (Changchun) Railway, together with the property belonging to the railway, and would withdraw its troops from the Port Arthur naval base, whose installations would be handed over to China; and (3) an agreement on the granting of long-term credits to the amount of \$300,000,000 by the U.S.S.R. to China, to enable China to obtain industrial, mining, and railway equipment from the U.S.S.R. From 1950 through 1953, Russia supplied China with military aid amounting to \$2,000,000 by U.S. estimates. The modernization of Chinese armed forces with Soviet aid included about 1,000 MIG-15 aircraft plus the



technology to produce additional aircraft, heavy artillery, tanks, and submarines. This spirit of cooperation continued into 1955 culminating in the Atomic Cooperation Agreement of May, 1955 in which the U.S.S.R. agreed to provide Soviet nuclear scientists and technology until China was able to keep its atomic piles working without further Soviet aid [Keesing 1969 pp. vii-6].

In 1955 China embarked on a program to assert its influence in Asia. Peking sponsored the Bandung Conference of Asian Powers and made clear to Moscow, which did not participate, China's view that Russia was not an Asian power. This was the first time China had advanced this idea. Public polemics over China's Asia-for-the-Asians policy were to occur ten years later [Salisbury 1969 p. 115]. After the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February of 1956, the two countries commenced drifting apart ostensibly as a result of their differences on foreign policy. At this congress, without consulting Mao Tse-tung, Khrushchev departed from the previous Soviet party line under Stalin by expounding the theory of "peaceful coexistence" between communist and non-communist nations, rejecting Lenin's theory of the inevitability of war with capitalism and by holding that there were several roads to socialism other than merely war. Although these positions were not publicly criticized by the Chinese at the Congress, they were to become points of bitter controversy between the Sino-Soviet Communist Parties and marked



the beginning of what is probably the most important conflict within international communism today.

In 1957 Mao launched the "Hundred Flowers" campaign. The name comes from the ancient Chinese saying, "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend." It represented a momentary relaxation of Chinese Communist thought control. Intellectuals spoke out on all phases of the Communist transformation of China. Once the relevance of Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese revolution was challenged and anti-Communist demonstrations occurred at several universities, the criticism was again forbidden and those who had spoken it were punished. 1958 saw still another ambitious program launched by Mao — the attempt to create a modern industrial state in an extraordinarily short time frame known as the "Great Leap Forward." It was a crash program of intensive exploitation of Chinese labor by revising production goals upward drastically and stretching the workday to fourteen hours or longer. One announced goal was to surpass Britain's industrial production in 15 years. In their spare time workers would operate "backyard furnaces" smelting scrap iron, plant trees, and build water control projects. People were organized into large 10,000 acre, 5,000 household agricultural communes. For a time this regimentation resulted in a fury of human activity having few parallels. By 1959 it was evident that the program had failed to meet its spectacular goals. Wheat had to be





imported from Canada and Australia by 1960 and by 1962 peasants were given private plots to farm as they wished. This resulted in a partial economic recovery. Thereafter Peking moved cautiously and more conservatively in further economic development [Clyde and Beers 1971 pp. 449, 451-453].

From 1956 to 1960 Sino-Soviet verbal blasts increased with China referring to the Soviets as "revisionists frightened out of their wits by imperialist blackmail of nuclear war" and the Soviets calling the Chinese "sectarian dogmatists." Then, on 16 July 1960, the Soviet Government decided to withdraw all Soviet technicians working in China. This unilateral decision aroused greater resentment in China than any other single action of the Soviet Government, with the possible exception of the repudiation of the agreement on nuclear weapons. It struck a crushing blow at China's economy at a time when the country was suffering from the effects of the Great Leap Forward and from a series of natural disasters described by Peking Radio as "without parallel in the past century, including drought, typhoons, floods, and plagues of locusts and other insects" [Keesing 1969 pp. vii-6].

#### F. RECENT SINO-SOVIET BORDER CLASHES

The 4,150 mile Sino-Soviet boundary has been shown to be an area of severe friction since the seventeenth century. It is the longest two-nation border and will be shown to



be one of the most probable areas for war in the world today. The Sino-Soviet ideological dispute which began covertly in the early fifties has degenerated into a nationalistic clash based upon territorial issues. The dispute came into the open on 8 March 1963 when the overt controversy over the Sino-Soviet border was actually an unforeseen by-product of the Cuban missile Crises of October 1962. Briefly, the Chinese criticized the Soviets on two points: stationing the missiles in Cuba in the first place ("adventurism") and removing the missiles to avert a possible nuclear collision with the United States ("capitulationism"). Khrushchev addressed himself to these charges in a report to the Supreme Soviet on 12 December 1962. He argued for pragmatic action rather than that dictated by ideological absolutes (e.g., that China had not "liberated" Hong Kong or Macao was not "capitulationism" on China's part but rather simple common sense. Thus it had been with Cuba). Soon thereafter the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) in an open letter to the Chinese Communist Party also took issue with the Chinese position on the Cuban crisis: "Our Chinese comrades...are even today, correctly, not following the adventurous policy in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao that they advocate for others. Why this double-standard approach?" [Doolin 1965 p. 19]. Chinese Communist leaders reacted sharply to these counterarguments and replied to the statements of the CPUSA thusly:





Inasmuch as some persons have mentioned Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao, we are obliged to discuss a little of the history of imperialist aggression against China.

In the hundred years or so prior to the victory of the Chinese revolution, the imperialist and colonial powers — the United States, Britain, France, Tsarist Russia, Germany, Japan, Italy, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal — carried out unbridled aggression against China. They compelled the governments of old China to sign a large number of unequal treaties — the Treaty of Nankiang of 1842, the Treaty of Aigun of 1858, the Treaty of Tientsin of 1858, the Treaty of Peking of 1860, the Treaty of Ili of 1881, the Protocol of Lisbon on 1887, the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895, the convention for the Extension of Hong Kong of 1898, the International Protocol of 1901, etc. By virtue of these unequal treaties, they annexed Chinese territory in the north, south, east, and west and held leased territories on the seaboard and in the hinterland of China. Some seized Taiwan and the P'eng-hu Archipelago (Pescadores Islands), some occupied Hong Kong and forcibly leased Kowloon, soon put Macao under perpetual occupation, and so forth.

...You are not unaware that such questions as those of Hong Kong and Macao relate to the category of unequal treaties left over by history, treaties which the imperialists imposed on China. It may be asked: In raising questions of this kind, do you intend to raise all the questions of unequal treaties and have a general settlement? Has it ever entered your heads what the consequences will be? Can you seriously believe that this will do you any good?" [Doolin 1965 pp. 30-31]

Tai notes that territorial claims against the Soviet Union were based on the premise that Imperial Russia had stolen about 600,000 square miles of land in Siberia and Central Asia from a weak Manchu China by unbridled aggression in the nineteenth century under unequal treaties. The Soviet Union has often replied to China's territorial demands with hawkish indignation and denounced it as "merely the Hitler-type raving of the Mao clique" in Peking. At



the same time, Moscow has warned Peking that "very dangerous consequences could arise from any attempt to recarve the map of the world" [Tai 1973 p. 75]. During the Sino-Indian War in 1962, the Soviet Union again caused great offense in China by agreeing to provide the Indian Air Force with MIG fighters and a plant to produce more aircraft. Polemics became increasingly hostile through 1964 with Moscow Radio broadcasting propaganda into China seventy hours a week and Peking Radio broadcasting anti-Soviet propaganda into Russia sixty-three hours a week [Keesing 1969 p. 75]. For a selected list of current Sino-Soviet polemics the reader is invited to Appendix A.

At first the Sino-Soviet split was low-key and by proxy with Peking attacking Tito's "revisionism" (meaning Moscow) and Moscow condemning China's ally, Stalinist Albania; each side by implication condemning the deviation of the other. During the subsequent build-up of Sino-Soviet hostility, Mao found himself facing an internal crisis indirectly related to the Moscow versus Peking conflict. His failure to bypass the Soviet Union on the way to communism caused dissension among the Chinese Communist Party leadership. This dissension was aggravated in 1965 when the United States intervened in Vietnam causing the Soviets to call for a united Communist front in the war. This tack appealed to dissident leaders in the Chinese party but posed a direct conflict to Mao's opposition to Moscow. Thus, Mao triggered an all-out attack



against the Soviet Union and against party opposition in Communist China in the form of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966-1968. Using the Red Guards as shock troops, he commenced an effective purge of all opposition party leaders throughout China [Clyde and Beers 1971 pp. 445-448]. Clashes along the Sino-Soviet frontier increased during the years of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution with its Chinese claim to Communist primacy and its ideological attacks on "revisionist" Russia. Mao's position is that his radical type of communism is superior to Moscow's more moderate, "revisionist," and less violent brand. When Khrushchev was removed from power in 1964 there was a temporary improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. But, by 1966 Pravda openly accused Chinese leaders of attempting to promote war between the Soviet Union and the United States. On the other hand, China's Marshal Chen Yi suggested in an interview published in a Brazilian paper that the Soviet Union had thirteen divisions on the Chinese frontier which had been moved from Eastern Europe and was planning to attack China in alliance with the United States. The intensity of hostilities increased with the mutual expulsion of students and journalists in 1966 and the mutual expulsion of Soviet and Chinese diplomats in 1967 [Keesing 1969 p. 75].

China's irredentist claims to its lost territories is one of the chief irritants in Sino-Soviet relations. Chinese





textbook maps now show the territory before and after Russian territorial gains. China desires the return of this land for its expanding population, but the Soviets have shown no recent propensity to return tsarist conquests. This dilemma resulted in the massing of nearly forty Soviet divisions and about fifty-five Chinese divisions along the border and numerous armed clashes between Soviet and Chinese frontier guards. Military incidents along the Sino-Soviet border commenced as early as 1959 and steadily grew in intensity as political relations between the two nations deteriorated. Although blame for these incidents was a constant topic of verbal polemics on the part of both countries, Robinson holds that the evidence suggests that the PLA was not always to blame for the border flare-ups prior to 1969, nor was it following any preconceived plan dictated from Peking. Despite Russian protests of complete innocence, they are believed to have caused at least some of the incidents [Robinson, T. W. "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and March 1969 Clashes" The American Political Science Review December 1972 p. 1178]. By the end of 1969, the two nations were on the brink of all-out war.

On the morning of 2 March and again on 15 March 1969 armed clashes took place on the usually uninhabited Daman-sky (or, Chenpao) Island between units of the Russian Army and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of the People's Republic of China. Russia admitted dozens of its troops were



killed and China said it sustained a large (but unspecified) number of casualties.

According to the Institute for Strategic Studies' The Military Balance, 1960-1969, the normal, long-term disposition of Soviet and Chinese forces along the border up until 1969 was approximately equal in total numbers of troops. Logistically, the Russians were in a better military position because the Trans-Siberian Railway has spurs all along the border. Except in the Northeast, China has no comparable rail line. While the Chinese have a larger population, the Russians have better hardware, training, and mobility of forces; consequently, they can quickly transport and concentrate more firepower at a given spot than the Chinese who depend mainly on transportation by foot. Given full mobilization and the transfer of military resources from Western Russia, the Soviets could probably field as many fully trained and equipped soldiers as the Chinese.

According to Pravda, border incidents usually involved incroachments by Chinese soldiers and civilian fishermen who would cross into Soviet territory to fish, farm, dig canals, put up buildings, and interfere with the navigation of Soviet ships and boats. On the other hand, China felt it had a right to free action in the area. In a Peking interview with Japanese Socialist Party members on 10 July 1963, Mao stated: "About a hundred years ago the area to the East of Baikal became Russian territory and since then





Vladivostak, Khabarovsh, Kamchatka, and other areas have been Soviet territory. We have not yet presented our account for this list" [Doolin 1965 p. 44].

As stated earlier, communist China has always thought that this border territory had been bargained away from China by the tsars of Russia in the 1800's, so it refuses to recognize the validity of this territorial loss. Although border talks between the two powers took place in 1964, no concrete results occurred. China would demand return of real estate but Russia would defend the status quo. From the breakdown of border negotiations on 15 October 1964 until March, 1969, the Chinese charged that the Soviets "provoked" a total of 4,189 border incidents. Most of these probably refer to routine border patrol, reconnaissance, and efforts to evict Chinese from "Soviet areas without killing." The following description in Pravda, 12 March 1967, gives the Russian view of a typical incident:

This is the situation (quoting Vitaly Bubenin, commander of the border guards at Damansky): A fisherman comes, sticks a pole with Mao's portrait on it in the snow and begins to dig a hole. We explain that it is forbidden to cross the border. We escort him back. The next day 20 fishermen come. Three have nets and each one has a booklet of quotations. They wave them around so that the fishing will be better. We escort them back to the border. They organize a rally and beat drums. They are loaded on trucks and head for the Soviet shore. Our fellows stand in a chain. The trucks race at them, intending to frighten them. Nothing happens and away they go. They come with streamers. Quotations are attached to sticks and there are iron pipes on top of the sticks. Again our men form a wall. Their people put the quotations in their pocket and start



swinging the sticks. Never mind, we drove them away. Pvt. Lavrov was sent to the hospital... [Robinson, T.W. "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and March 1969 Clashes" The American Political Science Review December 1972 p. 1183].

To accurately determine exactly what happened during the 2 March 1969 clash is difficult because no observers were present, and most of the participants are dead, but, Robinson pieces together the following scenario (edited for brevity) from a large number of Soviet sources such as Pravda, TASS, Izvestia, etc.:

Damansky Island is situated on the Ussuri River, which forms the boundary between the Soviet Union and China. The nearest Soviet settlement is Nizhae Mikhailovskiy, about 5 miles south, and the nearest Chinese settlement is Kungszu, just south of the island. The Chinese claim the island was once a part of the Chinese bank, became separated by erosion of the river, and during low water in late summer can be reached on foot from the Chinese shore. The island itself is, by testimony of both sides, uninhabited, although Chinese fishermen apparently do some logging on it. About one mile in length, about one-third mile wide, it is flooded during the spring thaw.

The Soviets maintain two border outposts in the area, one just south of the island, which until March 2 was commanded by Senior Lieutenant Ivan Ivanovich Strelnikov, and the other just to the north, commanded by Senior Lieutenant Vitaliy Dmitriyevich Bubenin. The Chinese border post, named Kungszu after the local Chinese settlement, appears to be located on a hillock directly across, but not on the Chinese, side of the river in winter forcing vehicles to detour about two miles before they can move onto the ice toward the island. In March the river is frozen nearly solid so it is possible to drive multi-ton vehicles over the ice. Because no factual reports are available from the Chinese, this analysis is likely to be slanted toward the Soviet side. Despite these limitations, it is possible to reconstruct what probably went on.





On the night of March 1-2, about 300 Chinese troops (a mixed group of frontier guards and regular PLA soldiers) dressed in white camouflage crossed the ice from the Chinese bank to Damansky Island, dug foxholes in a wooded area overlooking the southernmost extremity, laid telephone wire to the command post on the Chinese bank, and lay down for the night on straw mats. Sometime early in the morning the man on duty at Strelnikov's outpost reported activity on the Chinese bank. Around 11:00 a.m., a group of 20 or 30 Chinese began moving toward the island, shouting Maoist slogans as they came. Seeing them Strelnikov and an undetermined number of his subordinates climbed into two armored personnel carriers, a truck, and a command car, and set off for the southern extremity of the island to meet the Chinese. Arriving on the island (or perhaps remaining on the ice covering the river-arm to the west of the island) a few minutes later, Strelnikov and seven or eight others, including his deputy, Senior Lieutenant Buinevich, dismounted and moved out to warn the oncoming Chinese, as they had several times previously. Following a procedure developed for such occasions, the Russians strapped their automatic rifles to their chests (reports differ; some say they left their weapons behind). The time was now about 11:15 a.m. The Russians linked arms to prevent the Chinese from passing. Chinese reports imply that an altercation took place. The Chinese now arrayed themselves in rows and appeared to be unarmed. But when the Chinese had advanced to about 20 feet from the Russian group, the first row suddenly scattered to the side, exposing the second line of Chinese, who quickly pulled sub-machine guns from under their coats and opened fire on the Russian group. Strelnikov and six of his companions were killed outright. Simultaneously, from an ambush to the Russians' right, the 300 Chinese in foxholes also opened fire, catching the entire Russian unit by surprise. Mortar, machine gun, and anti-tank gunfire also commenced at that moment (it was now between 11:17 and 11:20 a.m.) from the Chinese side. The Chinese apparently then charged the Soviets, and hand-to-hand fighting ensued. The Soviet unit was apparently overrun, and the Chinese (according to Soviet charges) took 19 prisoners and killed them on the spot. They also carried away Soviet equipment, which they later put on display. Evidently the Russian survivors were able to fight back, however, now under the command of Junior Sergeant Yuri Babnski.

Seeing the battle, Senior Lieutenant Bubenin and nearly his entire border post north of Damansky set





out for the scene. Racing up in an armored car, he succeeded in gaining the right flank of the Chinese and thus forced them to divide their fire. But he also found himself in the middle of the island and in the middle of the ambush that the Chinese had prepared for Strelnikov (the latter had not proceeded that far). Bubnin's vehicle was hit and disabled, and he himself was wounded and shell-shocked. He managed to get into another armored car and direct the battle from it. A series of melees ensued, with charges by both sides. Finally, the Russians state, they pinned down, for a time surrounded, and then forced the remaining 50 to 60 Chinese to retreat to their side of the bank. The Chinese took all their wounded with them, although they left behind some equipment. The entire battle lasted about two hours, and the Russians were so short-handed that civilians had to be pressed into service as ammunition bearers. Although both sides claimed victory, neither Russian nor Chinese forces remained permanently on the island after the battle was over, although the Soviets periodically moved off and on at will. [Robinson, T.W. "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and March 1969 Clashes" The American Political Science Review December 1972 pp. 1187-1189].

Robinson notes that the 15 March 1969 clash was different in many respects. There was no element of surprise, it involved larger numbers of troops, and it lasted much longer. The Chinese used more than a regiment of 2000 men in the battle. The outnumbered Russians used the tactics of the American Army in the Korean War, allowing the Chinese to advance and then counterattacking with large numbers of tanks, armored cars, and infantry in armored personnel carriers. After over nine hours of fighting the battle was over with the Russians losing about 60 men and the Chinese 800. The disparity is attributed to better Soviet tactics and armament. Whereas, the Chinese probably ambushed the Russians on 2 March, the Russians either fired first or led the



Chinese into a trap during the 15 March clash. At least one of their reasons must have been revenge. Robinson draws the following conclusions regarding the clashes: (1) Border problems were not significant to either Russia or China until political relations began to deteriorate for other reasons; (2) the Chinese thwarted the success of the 1964 Border Talks deliberately for reasons not connected with the border itself; and (3) the controversy may have been a spin-off from the "active phase" of the Cultural Revolution and merely a tool to unify the Chinese people behind Mao against Russia [Robinson, T.W. "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and March 1969 Clashes" The American Political Review December 1972 pp. 1178-1189].

Additional, but less severe, Sino-Soviet clashes took place on 8 July 1969 near Khabarovski and on 13 August 1969 near the western border of Sinkiang. On 10 September 1969, TASS charged China with 488 border violations between June and mid-August 1969.

A sampling of recent American editorial opinion shows grave concern that the split between Russia and China is greater than ever. Indeed, a preemptive strike on China by Russia is cited as distinctly possible. For example, Joseph Alsop concludes that China is deadly serious about the danger of Soviet attack. He cites usually conservative British intelligence sources as taking the position that the Soviets will attack probably by 1975 and that Soviet





military leaders have urged the unrestrained use of atomic, chemical, biological, and any other sort of warfare against China. Alsop also states that during mid-1973 war preparations by Soviet divisions have been brought to an extraordinary state of readiness, and that the CIA had recently revised upward its estimates of Soviet spending on military preparations on China's northern border from six billion to forty billion dollars to include construction of thirty new Soviet jet airfields, all built within range of the Chinese border on former cow-pastures and mainly in areas presenting grave logistical difficulties [Alsop "Russia's Militant Military" San Jose Mercury 24 September 1973 p. 33]. In addition, C. L. Sulzberger notes the Chinese fear of Soviet attack. In an October 1973 editorial he wrote:

...Peking today distinguishes greatly between American and Soviet 'imperialism.' As the Chinese confided to the French this year: 'The first is defensive; the second is offensive.' What this of course means is that there is no longer fear of an American attack but great worry about a Soviet attack. [Sulzberger "Whither China" San Jose Mercury 14 November 1973 p. 33]

In November of the same year he wrote: "Should Russia attack while the present government rules, it risks major defeat unless it just stands off and atomizes Chinese cities. In that case it stands to lost some of its own towns, international respect, and possibly touch off global war." In the same article he "guesses" that the Kremlin will try to reassert its influence in China during the next few years, not by military invasion, but by secret supporters planted



in the People's Republic and committed to the installation of a pro-Soviet regime in Peking after the natural demise of the Peking gerontocracy (at the time Chou was over 75, Mao was soon to be 81, and three of the five party vice chairmen were in their seventies) [Sulzberger, "Whither China" San Jose Mercury 14 November 1973 p. 33]. He later reiterates this theme throughout his book, The Coldest War Russia's Game in China.

Soviet leader Leonid I. Breznev's visit to India in November of 1973 was widely touted in Soviet media as a step toward closer relations between Russia and India and as a move toward Moscow's concept of Asian collective security which was unveiled at a world Communist meeting in Moscow in 1969. This is contrary to China's Asia-for-Asians concept expressed at the Bandung Conference and is regarded by Peking as a Soviet stratagem aimed at isolating and encircling China. Dispatches from New Delhi indicate India wants large new Soviet credits for the new Indian five-year economic plan as well as advanced Soviet missiles and fighter aircraft in return for making available permanent port facilities for the Soviet naval squadron in the Indian Ocean [Smith, H. "Brezhnev to Test Soviet Strategy on India Visit" Sunday Peninsula Herald 25 November 1973 p. 2A].

Russia is also exploring warmer ties with the Taiwan regime much to the chagrin of Peking. Paul Wohl notes that an article in the Novosti press information bulletin number



forty-four of October, 1973, admits the de facto existence of Taiwan and states:

The effects of the stepped-up activity of Peking on the international plain...have been largely upset by Taiwan's economic offensive... the volume of Taiwan's foreign trade in 1972 exceeded the volume of the foreign trade of the Chinese People's Republic by \$800 million. All this shows conclusively the stability of the economic and political situation of Taiwan in today's world. This state of affairs could become one of the most important factors in the future diplomatic struggle about the status of the island [Wohl "Moscow Jabs Peking with Taipei Praise" Christian Science Monitor 10 December 1973 p. 1].

In the United Nations Communist China's presence is marked largely by fierce verbal warfare with Russia. While hitting hardest at the Russians, they content that Washington is conspiring with Moscow for world dominion ["Chinese, Russians at U.N. Fend Unceasingly" Monterey Peninsula Herald 6 November 1973 p. 14]. Contrary to the expectations of most western diplomats, however, Red China's behavior in the U.N. since they replaced the Nationalist Chinese on 25 October 1971 has been marked by conservative, pragmatic, and cautious restraint. As of October, 1974, the People's Republic has used their veto only twice — against Bangladesh U.N. membership (August, 1972) and against reference to the Palestinians in an anti-terrorist admendment (September, 1972). Christian Science Monitor correspondent David Anable maintains that more than half the point of Peking's membership was in simply arriving — in defeating United State's opposition and ousting Taiwan. Thereafter the need to work with other U.N.





members has forced Peking to soften tough doctrinal positions evolved during the height of the Cultural Revolution. The Russians regard China's incessant attacks on them with lofty distaste. At first, according to one Moscow diplomat, the Soviet delegation responded in kind. Now they shrug off Chinese onslaughts with comments such as "When the dog barks, the wind carries the sound away." China's verbal championship of developing nations has not aligned these nations solidly behind Peking. David Anable quotes a Western diplomat as saying "The common belief was that China and Russia were competing for the leadership of the third world. But the reality is that they are competing for the affection of the third world" [Anable "China at the U.N.: A Smiling, Silken Dragon" Christian Science Monitor 16 October 1974 p. 4].

Monitor correspondent Joseph C. Harsch holds that the Sino-Soviet rift adds to the stability of these third world nations. Writing about Russian-Chinese relations he stated:

...But their partnership broke down four years after the signing of the SEATO Pact (September, 1954). The decisive year was probably 1958 when the Chinese wanted Russian military help in an attack on Matsu and Quemoy islands.

...The Asian scene today is dominated not by the American military presence around the rim of Asia, but by the fact of Moscow-Peking rivalry and their conflict of interest. Thanks to that condition, Washington has been able to pull its armed forces back from Southeast Asia, reduce its forces in Korea, and largely fall back to offshore islands. That in turn has been reflected in reduced Chinese encouragement to Hanoi. Peking, it is to be presumed, would rather have Vietnam remain divided than to



risk having a united Vietnam come under dominant Soviet influence. [Harsh "Soviet-China Rift Keeps Southeast Asia Stable" Christian Science Monitor 6 September 1974 p. 1].

Until his death in a Trident jet crash in Mongolia in 1971 while fleeing the country in the wake of an abortive coup, General Lin Piao was a top contender for power in Peking and was Mao's chosen successor. He echoed the Maoist concept (circa 1960) of a simultaneous political and, if necessary, military, struggle with both the U.S. and Russia. However, after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and their continuous military buildup along the Chinese border, both Mao and Chou favored establishing a viable relationship with the U.S. as a hedge against Russia. Having now gained a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council and having been visited by the President of the U.S., China presumably feels less threat of attack by the Soviet Union, no matter how serious Moscow's concern over both Peking's policies and its growing nuclear power. In the fall of 1973, an extensive propaganda campaign was launched by virtually all Chinese publications to criticize Lin Piao and Confucious. The campaign seems to be aimed at demonstrating how reactionaries throughout Chinese history from the Mandarins at the Manchu court down to the Communists' own disgraced Defense Minister, Lin Piao, combined the worship of the ancient sage Confucious with the advocacy of foreign influences. Monitor correspondent John Burns believes that despite the themes of Chinese nationalism and self-initiative





which underscore the campaign, Peking will opt to continue international trade (especially technology) and benign diplomatic relations with the West so long as the enmity with Moscow continues [Burns "China's Links with West Stir Internal Contention" Christian Science Monitor 15 August 1974 p. 2].

Two incidents in early 1974 underline Peking's concern about Russian subversion within China which has been the theme of several discussions later that same year between high-ranking officials of the Peking regime and foreign (Canadian) correspondents. First, in April of 1974, five Soviet embassy staff members were expelled after allegedly being caught with a Soviet-trained Chinese spy and second when a Soviet military Mi-4 (NATO code name "Hound") helicopter with a crew of three was captured in the northern tip of China's Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region near where the Chinese, Russian, and Western Mongolian borders meet. Moscow claimed the helicopter became lost while on a mercy mission over Soviet territory, but the Chinese said it was carrying arms, ammunition, reconnaissance equipment, and documents which prove that it was on an espionage mission. The Soviets have repeatedly demanded the release of the crew, but the Chinese have defiantly stated that the crew members will be dealt with under "Chinese law" citing the precedent of American airmen captured in China during the Korean War who were tried and given long prison sentences. In previous



cases of Russians accused of espionage in China the Soviets were expelled and never brought to trial. From early 1969, Peking's public position has been that China faces the danger of sudden attack by the Soviet Union and must take all necessary precautions against it. The first hint of a significant departure from this position came at the Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in August of 1973 when Chou En-lai spoke of the Soviet Union making a feint in the east by massing troops along the Chinese frontier while preparing for an attack in the west against NATO forces in Europe. By October of 1974 high government officials in Peking were telling Canadian journalists that Peking no longer believes that China is in imminent danger of Soviet attack. They admit that border clashes are still likely but not full-scale war. They also stress that the Soviet troop buildup on their borders poses a bigger threat to the United States and Japan than to China [Burns "Peking Sees Risks Fading" Christian Science Monitor 7 October 1974 p. 2].

In a Chinese message of Revolution Day greetings cabled to Moscow on 7 November 1974, Peking offered to negotiate a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, settle territorial differences, and pull back their military forces from along the frontier. Elizabeth Pond observes that the message was published in Pravda on 9 November but the following diplomatic overture was deleted:



Above all, mutual understanding achieved in September, 1969, at the meeting of the premiers of the two states — that an agreement should be signed on nonaggression, non-use of force, maintenance of the status quo on the frontiers, the prevention of military conflicts and clashes, the separation of forces in disputed regions, and the solution of all frontier questions through talks — should be adhered to." (The meeting referred to was between Soviet Premier Kosygin and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai at the Peking airport after the 1969 border clashes.) [Pond "Thaw in Sino-Soviet Relations" Christian Science Monitor 12 November 1974p. 4]

A similar non-aggression-pact ploy has been tried by the Soviets in 1973, but the Chinese turned it down flat. The significance of the new Chinese offer was that its usual demand that the Russians publicly renounce their nineteenth-century "unequal treaties" was absent. The quandry the Russians faced was: If they refused China's package, they would appear to be uninterested in working for peace, but if they accepted it, they would have to withdraw their military forces from the tense border. In the past Moscow has refused to withdraw its troops from any territory regarded as legally Russian ["Diplomacy: Alphonse and Gaston" Newsweek 18 November 1974 p. 55].

Another straw in the wind of change in "the Middle Kingdom" came in late 1974 when Peking's second most important daily newspaper, The Kwangming Daily, published an article entitled "The Lesson of the Fall of the Chin Dynasty." It represents the most candid revelations in a decade regarding both Mao Tse-tung's illness and dissent within the Communist leadership. The article warned that harsh and





repressive measures were required against internal enemies lest the "socialist" system in China perish. It criticized the "inherent limitations" of the present leadership as being too great for them to take the proper action of purging and executing the large numbers of counter-revolutionaries. The virulent attack was directed not only against Mao, but also Chou En-lai who had been hospitalized for months and Chou's heir apparent, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping. The article confirms that the 80 year-old Mao is suffering from Parkinson's disease and states he has lost his clarity of mind and alertness toward his enemies. The article uses historical analogy to identify Mao with Chin Shih Huang-ti, the "first emperor" who unified China in the third century B.C.; Chou as Li Ssu, the emperor's great prime minister; and Vice Premier Teng as Chao Kao, a high-ranking courtier who was banished by the emperor and then restored to power -- just as Teng was discredited by the Cultural Revolution and later rehabilitated. The article further states that just as Li Ssu concealed the death of the first emperor, Chou has kept Mao's incapacity a secret [Elegant "China Paper Says Mao Incapacitated" Monterey Peninsula Herald 2 November 1974 p. 1].

Covering key events and clashes in Sino-Soviet relations from antiquity to the present, the preceding study and data are designed to provide a general historiographic basis and paradigm upon which to develop the stated hypotheses of this thesis. Reprise will be made to significant data.



## · II. CHINESE SECURITY POLICY AND THE SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL CONFLICT

The term "security" instead of "foreign" policy in this chapter is based upon the premise that the first priority of virtually any nation's policy, whether national, international, or "foreign," is survival. As security is basic to survival, security policy seems a more descriptive term to apply to the foreign relations of the People's Republic of China as it aspires to a more dominant, if not the dominant role in the international movement toward communist-dominated world-socialism.

### A. CHINESE SECURITY POLICY GOALS

Professor Ojha cites three common frameworks which are used by scholars to study Chinese security policy, namely: historical continuity, or the traditional perception of a Chinese World Order; ideology, or that of the Marxist dialectic, either to seek insatiable expansionism or, the opposite extreme, inability to maintain a permanent state or crisis, combined with economic development, will emasculate ideology thus permitting China to behave more responsibly in world affairs (this latter theme is very close to the main hypothesis of this thesis); and finally, China's psycho-cultural attributes and/or Mao's own psychological make-up which would explain China's international relations in terms of reaction to Western exploitation during the nineteenth





century or that Mao, as many other revolutionary leaders, began by rebelling against his father. While the above approaches are helpful, Ojha holds that they lead to static analysis which might explain present behavior but makes deviate behavior inexplicable by definition. Thus, his book seeks to explain change in Chinese perceptions of the world beginning with the failure of Chinese syncretism to meet the nineteenth-century challenge of the West [Ojha 1971 pp. ix ff.]. This chapter will touch on each of these four approaches particularly as they relate to Chinese security policy and the Sino-Soviet territorial conflict.

#### 1. Traditional Chinese World Order

The traditional Chinese view of the world order was Sinocentric with China or Chung-kuo (Central State or Middle Kingdom) being the center of the universal empire and therefore culturally superior to the outer concentric zones of barbarians. This Chinese superiority was based upon the Confucian emphasis on the power of example and upon cultural vice material power. Thus, the Chinese emperor, in the unique position as the "Son of Heaven," ruled all mankind with benevolence and generosity as long as proper respect was shown to him and he retained the "Mandate of Heaven." This respect and the acceptance of Chinese suzerainty took the forms of paying "tribute" (usually native produce) and by performing the "kowitz," a symbol of submission consisting of three kneelings each involving three prostrations before the Son of Heaven. The emperor himself performed the kowitz to his



parents and at the altar of Heaven. Thus, in dynastic China, the rituals of the kowtow and tribute served the emperor as evidence that he did hold the "Mandate of Heaven" and as a medium of diplomacy in which China maintained contact with the outside world. As for the barbarians, these rituals became the instruments and prerequisites for conducting commerce with China until the 1800's when the concept of equality among states, the lure of profits in trading with China, and superior military and naval force caused China to submit to the Treaty System of the occidental states [Clyde and Beers 1971 p. 67].

Various scholars have conceptualized geo-political models of the traditional Chinese World Order. Among these are John K. Fiarbank, The Chinese World Order (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968); O. E. Clubb, Twentieth Century China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964); and C. P. Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of Their Place in the World (London: Oxford University Press, 1964). One of the most concise descriptions is contained in Norton Ginsburg, "On the Chinese Perception of a World Order" [Tsou, ed. vol. II 1968 pp. 73-91]. Professor Ginsburg describes a four zonal model consisting of Zone I or China Proper; Zone II or the Inner Asian Zone consisting of Manchuria, Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan, both eastern Tibet and Tibet Proper, Korea, Indo-China, plus the "Periphery" regions of the Trans-Amur territories in eastern Siberia, the eastern parts of Soviet Middle Asia, and other tribute-bearing states extending from




Afghanistan to the Ryukus; Zone III or the Outer Asian Zone ranging from Persia on the west through India, Indonesia, most of the Philippines to Japan on the east; and Zone IV or the Outer Zone which comprised the "Great Beyond" (see Map 3).

## 2. Communist Chinese World Order

Ginsburg suggests that the traditional Chinese World Order cited above still has relevance to what Communist Chinese leaders perceive as their objectives in security policy but that the course of history has made a return to the traditional spacial system impossible. Therefore, he suggests a "current" Communist Chinese World Order which is normative and which might represent the Chinese perception of what a world order today ought to be like. Ginsburg is aware that this approach requires more speculation than scholarship, but believes it should be pursued nonetheless, given the importance of the issues at stake. His "current" model would combine Zone I and the Periphery of Zone II in the traditional model to form the modern Chinese state. The new Zone II would now include Korea, Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, the Himalayan states, and possibly Afghanistan, as well as the northern irredentist territories which lie within the Soviet Union. Zone III would include the rest of South Asia, and possibly Malaya and Japan. Zone IV would be divided into two parts: the developed capitalist and (retrograde) socialist areas and the underdeveloped and unstable areas (see Map 4).








[Source: Tsou 1968 p. 77]

Map 3





Map 4 [Source: Tsou 1968 pp. 84-85]





### 3. Options for the Future Chinese World Order

Based upon his model of a Communist Chinese World Order, Professor Ginsburg reaches the following conclusions:

a. Because not all of China's boundaries have been delimited (that is marked or mapped), let alone demarcated (that is marked out on the ground, where possible), "a continuing problem in China's foreign policy will be border disputes, whatever other relations may exist between China and contiguous countries."

b. "Another continuing force in China's foreign policy would derive from attempts to restore Chinese hegemony not over Southeast Asia, but over those territories of Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union which formerly were part of traditional Zone II."

c. "The restoration of Taiwan to China is an essential and particularly sensitive issue of China's foreign policy, but it is strategic-spacial in nature, not ideological."

d. "One of the major objectives of China's recent foreign policy appears to be a clarification of these relationships and the aligning of these countries (that is, countries in both the Inner and Outer Asian Zones of the traditional model such as Burma, Pakistan, Japan, etc., that have been drawn out of China's orbit) in accordance with the Chinese perception of their place in a Sinocentric, Asian-oriented power system; thus, the policy of establishing detentes with them whenever possible."



e. "Rooted in historical relationships, the Japanese enigma continues to be a crucial problem in China's foreign policy."

f. "The objectives of China's foreign policy might be attained, at least minimally, by a divided Vietnam in which the South need not be communist but would be free from foreign troops and foreign interference in internal affairs." [Ginsburg in Tsou, ed. vol. II 1968 pp. 73-91].

Ginsburg goes on to amplify paragraph f above by explaining that the failure of the Chinese to provide more tangible support to North Vietnam and the Vietcong, even at the risk of loss of face in Asia, was predicated not only upon the facts that China's supply lines in Southeast Asia were much more dangerously extended than in Korea and that the U.S. might conduct reprisals on the Chinese mainland, but also because a strong and unified Communist Vietnam located on the edge of China might create further difficulties for China in her dispute with the Soviet Union. This theory also explains the Chinese attitude toward wars of national liberation, that is, to encourage them everywhere by all means possible except in those Asian areas where Chinese domination is desired. Thus, intervention by foreign troops in the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America would pose no direct threat to China but might serve to distract and weaken the intervening powers while China continues her own internal economic development.



Ginsburg's purpose, just as Ojha's, is to suggest alternative explanations of Chinese security policy other than the traditional approaches of ideology, economics, or factors exogenous to China. His position is that strategic-political imagery and objectives, based in part upon historical circumstances and tradition, warrant additional investigation. Others echo this view (see Philip R. Winters, "Policy and the Political Geographer," Naval Institute Proceedings, December, 1969, pp. 57-62, and John K. Fairbank, China Perceived. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974, pp. 205 ff.).

Professor Fairbank's brief essay "China's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective" (Foreign Affairs, April, 1969, pp. 449-463) warns that ignorance of traditional Chinese security policy can cause U.S. policy makers to impute occidental values upon oriental culture with, sometimes, disastrous results, to wit: Vietnam. He begins by noting that although China has had two millennia of foreign relations, the longest of any state in history, Imperial China had no foreign office per se but split foreign relations into such topics as border control, frontier trade, tribute, etc. Fairbank acknowledges that tradition is but one element of modern Chinese foreign policy, but believes it is the missing element in American understanding of that policy. He identifies three major traditions of Imperial Chinese foreign policy, the first two of which are of particular interest to the naval strategist: the strategic primacy of Inner Asia, the disesteem of sea power, and the doctrine of China's superiority.





The first tradition evolves from the dichotomy in ways of life between the agrarian Chinese within the Great Wall and the Mongolian tribal nomads who pastured their flocks beyond it. While China's maritime frontier was occasionally penetrated by sea-raiders, no major invasion ever came by sea. However, Inner Asia, encompassing the arc running from Tibet and Sinkiang around to Mongolia and Manchuria, has been conquered and ruled by non-Chinese emperors for more than half of the last thousand years. This explains Communist China's present-day preoccupation with her land frontier in the Sino-Soviet territorial conflict.

As for the second tradition, the disesteem of sea power, Fairbank cites its roots in Confucian philosophy which held that merchants, and especially nomad maritime traders, ranked lowest of the four social classes (scholar-officials, farmers, artisans, and merchants) because they did not labor with their minds or muscle, but only moved things about. Due to the loss of revenue from barbarian conquests in North China, the Southern Sung dynasty (1127-1279) helped to develop the first great oceanic commerce in world history between the Near East and Far East through South and Southeast Asian waters. Chinese merchant junks and warships (some as big as 400 feet in length, with four decks, a dozen watertight compartments, crews of 400 men, and equipped with compass and grenades and rockets made from gunpowder, both of which were Chinese inventions) in fleets as large as 28,000 men in 62 vessels, went to India, Aden, Africa, and the Persian Gulf



up until the 1430's and all before the European explorations of Columbus, deGama, and Albuquerque. Yet, after the 1430's, Chinese maritime expansion ceased due in part because China had reached the zenith of a stabilized economic state, but more because of the threat of Mongol expansion on her land frontiers of inner Asia. This overriding demand for land power in the fifteenth century eclipsed China's opportunity for additional maritime expansion. The trend for rapid increase in Chinese sea-power can be expected to accelerate again in the future if China can resolve her border differences with the Soviet Union.

Finally, the tradition of China's cultural superiority, while suffering setbacks as a result of the Mongol's use of naked power, has survived down to present Communist leadership. Fairbank suggests a new term for it as it applies to China today -- "national culturism" which he equates to an amalgam of philosophical-religious ethnocentrism, the classical tradition, individualism, and nationalism, all combined.

His study of historical Chinese security policy leads Fairbank to the following conclusions:

a. Policies designed to bring China into the "international order" may be a long time in getting results because of her size, self-sufficiency, and implacable self-esteem combined with a new political awareness of the past century's humiliations and revolutionary euphoria.



b. Nuclear missiles have taken the place of the aborted tradition of Chinese sea power as the decisive weapon of China's arsenal today.

c. Because of the sheer mass and growing complexity of the Chinese body politic, a heavy emphasis upon some kind of traditional Chinese bureaucracy will remain, notwithstanding Mao's efforts to instill "permanent revolution" against any ruling class.

d. Fears that the overseas Chinese would serve as a Maoist fifth column movement have not proved valid because internal nationalism in numerous countries of Southeast Asia, North Vietnam included, has proved itself a barrier to Chinese expansion.

e. Because China has traditionally been land-based and bureaucratic, not maritime and commercial, her expansion can be expected to be roughly equal to the degree that she is provoked.

Professor Morgenthau reinforces this last theme with the conclusions he reaches regarding future U.S. Chinese policy:

First, the policy of peripheral military containment on the Asian mainland ought to be gradually liquidated. This policy is not only irrelevant to the interests of the United States but actually runs counter to them.

Second, both the policy of isolating China and the policy of ending that isolation are essentially irrelevant to the issue at hand. One may aggravate, and the other ameliorate, the international climate; but they have no relevance, one way or the other, to the basic issue of containment.





Third, since the expansion of Chinese power and influence, threatening the Asian and world balance of power, proceeds by political rather than by military means, it must be contained primarily by political means. To that purpose, it is necessary to strengthen politically, socially, and economically the nations of Asia that are within China's reach, especially Japan, without exacting in return political and military alignments directed against China. We ought to pursue a similar policy with regard to the uncommitted nations outside Asia in which China in the recent past has attempted to gain a foothold.

Fourth, we ought to be clear in our minds that if we continue the present policy of the peripheral military containment of China, we will find ourselves in all likelihood, sooner or later, at war with China. If we want to avoid such a war, we must change our policy. If we do not want to change our policy, we must be ready to go to war. That is to say, either we bring the means we are willing to employ into line with our objectives, or we cut down our objectives to the measure of the means we are willing to employ.

Fifth, the ultimate instrument for containing China is the same that has contained the Soviet Union: the retaliatory nuclear capability of the United States. It must be brought home to China, as it was brought home to the Soviet Union, that in the unlikely event it should embark upon a policy of Asian or world conquest, it is bound to be at war with the United States" [Morgenthau 1969 pp. 205-206].

## B. CHINESE APPROACHES TO NEGOTIATION

In 1961 W. Cleon Skousen outlined the dangers involved in seeking rapprochement or detente with either Russia or Communist China in his book The Naked Communist. He ended a chapter devoted to tracing the high probability that communist states will commit their military power in pursuit of their goals whenever they are convinced that they oppose a weaker force with the following prophetic quotation from



Dimitry Z. Manuilsky, the Soviet Representative who presided over the security council of the United Nations in 1949:

War to the hilt between communism and capitalism is inevitable. Today, of course, we are not strong enough to attack...To win we shall need the element of surprise. The bourgeoisie will have to be put to sleep. So we shall begin by launching the most spectacular peace movements on record. There will be electrifying overtures and unheard of concessions. The capitalist countries, stupid and decadent, will rejoice to cooperate in their own destruction. They will leap at another chance to be friends. As soon as their guard is down, we shall smash them with our clenched fist!" [Skousen 1961 p. 208].

A more up-to-date version of detente by the Russian dissident, Aliksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, is:

There seems to be little doubt, as many now realize, that what is going on in the U.S.S.R. is not simply something happening in one country, but a foreboding of the future of man, and therefore deserving the fullest attention of Western observers.

No, it is not any difficulties of perception that the West is suffering, but a desire not to know, an emotional preference for the pleasant over the unpleasant. Such an attitude is governed by the spirit of Munich, the spirit of complaisance and concession, and by the cowardly self-deception of comfortable societies and people who have lost the will to live a life of deprivation, sacrifice and firmness.

Although this approach has never helped preserve peace and justice and those who have followed it have always been crushed and abused, human emotions have proved stronger than the most obvious lessons, and again and again, an enfeebled world draws sentimental pictures of how violence will deign to assume a gentler nature and will readily abandon its superior strength, so that meanwhile everyone can continue to live a carefree existence [Strategic Review Winter, 1973 ibc].

The Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral of the Fleet Sergei G. Gorshkov, also reinforces and updates Manuilsky's theme of the element of surprise from the Soviet Navy's vantage point:



...the old well known formula -- 'the battle for the first salvo' -- is taking on a special meaning in naval battle under present-day conditions (conditions including the possible employment of combat means of colossal power). Delay in the employment of weapons in a naval battle of operations inevitably will be fraught with the most serious and even fatal consequences, regardless of where the fleet is located, at sea or in port [Gorshkov 1974 pp. 131-132].

# 1. Imperial China's Approach to Negotiations

China established their first foreign ministry in

1861. Before that foreign relations were conducted by an Office for Barbarian Affairs. [Taylor, "Envoys to the Great Within," Peking's Approach to Negotiation 1969 p. 44].

Traditional Chinese diplomatic practice was based upon maintaining a rigid boundary between the "Middle Kingdom" and everything outside of it. The ritual of tribute was reserved for foreign princes only and not Chinese officials from provinces in the Middle Kingdom. This had the effect of demonstrating the subordinate nature of all foreign princes to the "Son of Heaven." When foreign countries failed to send tribute, force was not used to reinstate it as the failure did not represent an overt challenge to the system. John E. Wills, Jr., holds that Chinese diplomatic tradition was, in its more practical aspect, oriented toward the prevention of conflict, toward the maintenance of the status quo, and toward bureaucratic boundary maintenance [Wills in Fairbank, ed. 1968 p. 252].

Because foreigners were considered inferior beings who did not understand the "correct" (Chinese) human relationships, they were not to be allowed to corrupt internal Chinese







order. The ploy of playing one barbarian against the other and diplomatic efforts to prevent foreign states near China's borders from uniting to form a threat to the Middle Kingdom were common techniques used for barbarian control. Chinese emperors preferred excluding potential foreign troublemakers thereby preventing an internal crisis vice reacting to or suppressing it after it had begun. Many Chinese rulers showed little interest in military conquest and expansion but preferred the status quo on their boundaries, bureaucratic structure, and superior culture.

Fairbank states that "China entered the modern world not by abandoning her imperial tradition but by adapting it to meet the problems of the mid-nineteenth century. This adaption made the 'treaty system' in its early stages an outgrowth of the 'tribute system.'" [Fairbank, ed. 1968 p. 257]. Thus, from the Chinese viewpoint, the treaty system of the mid-1800's was not merely a foreign imposition to bring China into the Western world but a means of accommodating the West and giving it a proper relationship in the Middle Kingdom.

In his analysis of the Chinese perception of the world order, past and present, Benjamin I. Schwartz asks the question -- to what extent will such a perception continue to affect Chinese political behavior in the future? He holds that China's ability to syncretize all its conquerors with the sinocentric Chinese perception of a world order is open to question. He notes the objections of those who believe



that the ultimate fact is the fact of power, that is, when Chinese power prevailed, it could impose its will on surrounding peoples but when it was weak, the Chinese perception of the world had little effect upon these peoples. This same trend of thought is often used to explain North American intervention in Latin American affairs, that is, when the United States is relatively strong vis a vis other world powers, it can afford a "big stick" foreign policy, but when it is weakened by say the depression of the 1930's, it shifts to a "good neighbor" policy. For a detailed discussion of this theme as well as intervention in general see Edward J. Williams, The Political Themes of Inter-American Relations, (Belmont, California: Duxbury Press, 1971), pp. 69-101. Nevertheless, Schwartz concludes that the Chinese perception of the world order existed with remarkable strength and persistency through the nineteenth century. He states that the Chinese perception of world order was fundamentally undermined in the twentieth century and that we should be skeptical of assertions that it is the causal factor of present or future Chinese policy, for example, that Mao's vision of a world communist movement centered at Peking is merely the latest version of the barbarian world being transformed by Chinese culture. He dates this concept precisely at the time of the overt outbreak of the Sino-Soviet conflict which caused a resurfacing of the old Chinese perception of world order with Mao now acting as the Son of Heaven. Swartz concludes that the Western multistate system



of world order conforms more closely to the realities of world politics today than anything derived from Chinese history and that Peking, in championing intense nationalistic fervor within the communist bloc against Soviet hegemony, is likewise destroying the very transnational authority of the world communist movement to which she aspires [Schwartz in Fairbank, ed. 1968 pp. 276-288].

## 2. Communist China's Approach to Negotiations

Admiral C. Turner Joy, as the Senior Delegate and Chief of the United Nations Command Delegation to the Korean Armistice Conference of July 1951 to May 1952, was one of the first Americans to experience the phenomenon of formal negotiations with the Communist Chinese. The following brief quotation from chapter three of his book How Communists Negotiate (New York: Macmillan Company, 1955) succinctly explains his view of Peking's approach to negotiations:

Among men who adhere to logic, an agenda is understood to be only a list of topics to be discussed, concerning which agreed conclusions are later required. For example, Americans meeting to discuss arrangements for a baseball game might adopt an agenda as follows:

1. Place the game is to be played.
2. Time the game is to start.
3. Selection of umpires.

Communists, however, would submit an agenda like this:

1. Agreement that game is to be played in Shanghai.
2. Agreement that game be played at night.
3. Agreement that umpires be Chinese officials.

Admiral Joy's observation underlines two fundamental goals of Chinese negotiating technique — to "load" the agenda with a set of conclusions and to "stack" the agenda by





listing these conclusions in the order most beneficial to the Chinese position. Arthur H. Dean, Representative of the United States as Special Ambassador and chief negotiator at the post-armistice Panmunjom meetings reinforces Admiral Joy's view with the following observations:

The battle of the agenda is fundamental to Communist negotiators because they believe they can humiliate the other side and win or lose a conference in this first battle over the order of discussion of items...if you once agree to the Communist order you cannot go on to the next item until you have yielded to the Communist wishes on the first [Dean in Peking's Approach to Negotiations 1969 pp. 16-17].

Robert B. Ekvall, U.S. Interpreter at the 1955 Geneva Ambassadorial Talks, cites another peculiarity of Chinese negotiators, namely, a compulsion to have the last word. He notes that they are never willing to accept an offer by the other side, even if it conforms to their wishes, but insist upon rephrasing the offer so that it represents their distinctive interpretation [Ekvall in Peking's Approach to Negotiations 1969 p. 29].

The Deputy U.S. Representative at the post-armistice Panmunjom meetings, Kenneth T. Young, describes Communist Chinese negotiating style as being permeated with the static ideology of Mao which arms the Chinese with a complete strategy or Tao. He holds that the " 'immutable' Maoist theory of contradictions and practice of struggle determine the world outlook, objectives, and tactics" of Chinese negotiators. Also, because of his discipline, reliance upon Maoist dogma, and belief in his own infallibility, the Chinese



negotiator can be expected to rely upon doctrinal preconceptions and ideological behavior patterns of a closed mind that "knows all the answers" rather than to demonstrate any degree of conceptual thinking, logical analysis, or willingness to use the diplomatic concepts of mutual confidence, truthful exchange, or fair dealing. Young maintains that Peking is willing to negotiate with the United States, even though its capitalist system is viewed as the mortal enemy of socialism, because of the necessity of reconciling ideology with national interest. As will be shown in the next chapter, the national interests of both Russia and Communist China are served by their importing of advanced technology and agricultural methods and produce from the West. Also, uncertainty as to the reaction of the United States in the event of a Sino-Soviet war tends to ameliorate the chances for such a war and thus serve the national interests of all involved. Young agrees with Professor Franz Schurmann that periods of peace and possibly collaboration with China are possible and comparable to its united front with the Kuomintang between 1936 and 1946. Even Mao says that the Chinese Communists conducted negotiations with the Kuomintang many times during the revolutionary civil wars and that they did not refuse to negotiate even on the eve of nationwide liberation. Young also agrees with A. M. Halpern, an authority on Chinese security policy, that Communist Chinese diplomacy is formed with long-range objectives in mind such as the complete destruction of imperialism, rather than to accrue any short-term immediate



advantage. Within the framework of long-range goals Young concludes that Chinese Communist security policy sanctions limited negotiations and temporary coexistence to gain specific tactical targets, namely:

1. To facilitate diplomatic undertakings which extract concessions from the 'enemy,' thus enhancing the position of the Chinese People's Republic and the socialist camp, while weakening and hastening the defeat of 'imperialism.'

2. To promote commercial, financial, technological and cultural exchange which will assist the internal development and international standing of the People's Republic of China.

3. To disengage from some situations which are embarrassing or untenable for Peking because of the counteractions or initiatives of Washington and other Western governments.

4. To promote dissension among the 'imperialists' or weaken their flank by negotiating arrangements with the allies of the United States or other countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and even Europe [Young in Peking's Approach to Negotiation 1969 pp. 51-56].

Arthur Lall, the Chief Indian Negotiator at the Laos Conference of 16 May 1961 to 23 July 1962, makes the following observations concerning Peking's approach to negotiations:

- a. Peking prefers large delegations for important negotiations. For example, at the Laos Conference the Chinese delegation numbered some fifty men and women. Also, at Geneva in 1954 and Bandung in 1955, they were represented by "enormous" delegations.

- b. Chinese delegates always operate in groups and never alone.





c. All Chinese negotiators proudly proclaim themselves as Communist Party members and "cadres" (the 1954 edition of the New Phrases Dictionary published in Shanghai defines a cadre as: "...a worker in a state institution. Persons who work in state institutions or a department of production, capable of unifying and leading the masses to carry out Party and government policies and directives, to implement duties and programs promptly under the leadership of the Party and higher-level government institutions are cadres.").

d. Training of Chinese Communist cadres is impressively thorough and includes professional, political, cultural, and theoretical education.

e. Most of the leaders of the Chinese delegation were members of the Chinese intelligentsia and had attended Western schools. For example, Marshall Ch'en Yi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was educated in Paris. Chang Hau-fu, the senior vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, studied at the Tsinghua University in Peking and at Columbia in the United States. Huan Hsiang, then Charge d'Affaires in London, had been a student at the London School of Economics and the two interpreters, Ch'en and Chi, were both graduates of Harvard.

f. The Chinese delegates seemed preoccupied more with China's internal affairs than foreign affairs. Lall believes this is due to the fact that all senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Peking are required to spend four months of each year doing manual work in the



countryside. He also thinks this explains why the Western press often mistakes the absence of a Chinese dignitary from Peking as meaning that he has fallen from power.

g. China carefully cultivates cooperative relations with the smaller states in her neighborhood such as Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Nepal, Pakistan, and Afghanistan but her relations with the bigger powers in her area, such as the Soviet Union, Japan, and India, have worsened because they are regarded as real or potential rivals.

h. Peking has developed a faculty for using the same words to cover a long spectrum of meanings which helps to maintain flexibility in negotiations but makes meaningful negotiations more difficult for others. As one example, he cites Mao's misuse of the word "annihilation" in the following quote: "...Only complete annihilation (of the enemy) can replenish our own forces to the greatest possible extent. It is now not only the main source of our arms and ammunition but also an important source of our man-power."

[Lall 1968 pp. 1-39]

Lall ascribes the following basic characteristics to the Chinese negotiator:

He is well educated and highly trained to analyze situations and events in terms of practical Chinese Marxism, and in this sense he is a staunch Communist. He also is generally prone to analyze whenever confronted with an issue; he is highly China-oriented -- often jingoistically so -- and is fundamentally more concerned about the needs and aspirations of China than anything else. Since he has not yet developed a realistic world perspective, it is easier for him, drawing on his brand of revolutionary Marxism, to prescribe the course which he believes the world



should and ultimately will follow. Some of these characteristics will alter when China comes fully into contact with the world through all the channels that now exist, including primarily the large complex of international organizations which has come into being in our era [Lall 1968 p. 15].

Lall's opinion implies that greater interdependence in foreign affairs by China can be expected and tends to support the main hypothesis of this thesis.

#### C. NATIONAL INTEREST ANALYSIS OF SINO-SOVIET SECURITY RELATIONS

This section will use the paradigm originated by Thomas W. Robinson in his study A National Interest Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, March 1966, pp. 7-15; see Appendix B) and attempt to update it to 1975 based in part upon the Sino-Soviet polemics previously cited in Appendix A. Robinson divides Sino-Soviet national interests into five time frames, namely: "1949-1953: Soviet Dominance and Chinese Submission"; "1954-1959: Era of Good Feelings"; 1956: Destalinization, Revolt, and Chinese Mediation"; "1957-1959: Secret Agreements, Shifts in the Wind, and Intra-Bloc Competitions"; and "1960-1964 (November): Open Polemics and Beginnings of Direct Opposition." In general, his listing describes how Soviet and Chinese identical and complementary interests have dwindled while their conflicting interests have grown. For the sake of brevity, Robinson's second (1954-1955), third (1956), and fourth (1957-1959) periods were omitted in the appendix.





## 1. Updated Model

The following model represents the author's opinion only, based upon the selection of Sino-Soviet polemics contained in Appendix A, a review of other polemics ranging over the period of from 1965 until 1975, and Robinson's original model. It does not purport to represent an extension of Robinson's thinking but does represent the author's interpretation of the present national security interests of Russia and China.

### a. 1965-1975 (March): Increasingly Hostile Polemics and Occasional Armed Clashes

#### I. Identical Interests

1. Defense against attack from the United States.
2. Against neocolonialism and for conversion of newly independent countries to socialism.
3. For developing military, naval, and nuclear superiority over the West.
4. Against American military intervention in "wars of national liberation" in the Far East.

#### II. Complementary Interests

| <u>Soviet Union</u>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | <u>China</u>                                                                                                   |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. Protection from attack from the rear along the Sino-Soviet Border so as not to be engaged in a two-front war.                                                                                                                                                                   |                                                                                                                |
| 2. Against thermonuclear war between United States and Soviet Union.                                                                                                                                                                                                               | 2. Against thermonuclear war between United States and China.                                                  |
| 3. Increased trade with the West, especially the United States, to speed up heavy industrialization, update computer technology (see case study, Chapter III), improve aerospace research, and maintain a source for additional agricultural products and fertilizers when needed. |                                                                                                                |
| 4. Increased exchange of intercultural representatives and greater export of communist propaganda to the West, especially the United States.                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                |
| 5. Use of foreign aid and military assistance primarily when a high probability of economic return or military alliance is expected.                                                                                                                                               | 5. Use of foreign aid and military assistance to increase Peking's stature as the leader of the "third" world. |



### III. Conflicting Interests

#### Soviet Union

1. Against overseas American troops and bases.
2. Against thermonuclear war with the United States.
3. Against limited war with United States for fear of nuclear escalation.
4. Opposition to transfer of territory to China.
5. No support of violent "national liberation movements" if United States involved.
6. Differences on how to overcome United States strategic superiority.
7. Retard Chinese rate of production and industrialization.
8. Continued "independence" of Mongolia.
9. Against domination of North Korea by China.
10. Against domination of North Vietnam by China.
11. Reassert Soviet ideology as the true road to world communism.
12. Settle world crises with or without Chinese presence.
13. Unwillingness to use Soviet power in a confrontation
14. Emplanting regimes abroad whose domestic institutions, political philosophy and societal organizations are as similar as possible to the Soviet Union's own.
15. Support India as a block to China.

#### China

1. For some American presence overseas, especially as a buffer against Soviet forces in the Far East.
2. For thermonuclear war between Russia and the United States.
3. For limited war as long as China is not involved.
4. Recovery of at least some of Chinese territorial irredenta essential.
5. Support for violent "national liberation movements" even if United States is involved.
7. Advance rate of military, economic, and industrial development by all means possible.
8. Reincorporation of Mongolia as a Chinese province.
9. Against domination of North Korea by Russia.
10. Against domination of North Vietnam by Russia.
11. Replace Soviet "social imperialism" with the thought of Mao as the legitimate way to world communism.
12. Insistence that world crises cannot be solved without Chinese presence.
13. Use of Soviet power to assist in settling Taiwan issue required.
14. Emplanting regimes abroad whose domestic institutions, political philosophy and societal organizations are as similar as possible to China's own.
15. Discredit India as a worthy rival for "third" world leadership and weaken her structurally.



16. Continued interest in "welfare" of brother Central Asian nationalities across Chinese border.
17. For expansion of peaceful means of communist influence throughout the world, especially the "third" world.
18. Desire for a negotiated settlement of the Sino-Soviet territorial dispute with little or no loss of Soviet territory.
19. Support "open sea" and limited (12 nautical mile) territorial sea concept in international maritime law.
20. For a collective Asian security pact.
21. For reduction of NATO force levels.
22. For increased "blue water" presence of Soviet fleet throughout the world.
23. Continued emphasis on detente and ease of tension with the West.
24. Continued emphasis on SALT.
25. For a divided Germany.
26. War can be avoided by peaceful coexistence.

16. Protection of Chinese border nationalities from Soviet subversion.
17. For expansion by peaceful and violent means of communist influence throughout the world, especially the "third" world.
18. Settlement of the Sino-Soviet territorial dispute, probable only after Mao dies, with open recognition by Soviet Union that Chinese territory was taken by "unequal treaties."
19. Favors restricted passage of warships through straits and 200 nautical mile territorial seas.
20. Against a collective Asian security pact.
21. For increase in NATO force levels to draw Russian forces away from the Sino-Soviet border.
22. For keeping the Soviet fleet out of the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans.
23. Detente is a superficial gambit therefore vigilance and preparations for war must continue.
24. SALT is no more effective in preventing war than restrictions on naval tonnages were in 1921 and 1930.
25. For a united Germany.
26. War is inevitable so long as society is divided into classes.

## 2. Conclusion

The comparison presented above suggests that the Sino-Soviet conflict has continued to intensify during the last decade. Although occasional diplomatic balloons have been sent up by each side, neither China nor Russia has demonstrated any bonifide willingness to settle their differences to date.







It can be expected that the present diplomatic stalemate will continue at least until the death of Mao Tse-tung and probably until the early or mid-1980's.

#### D. SINO-SOVIET INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS AND SECURITY POLICY

The eighth of August is a revolutionary date noted and celebrated in Communist China for a reason which might surprise many Black Americans. On that day in 1963 Chairman Mao Tse-tung issued a major statement supporting American Negroes and their struggle against racial discrimination. The statement was made, according to Mao, at the repeated request of a Mr. Robert Williams, the former President of the Monroe, North Carolina, Chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Although this particular statement has not yet become one of the most widely known sayings of Chairman Mao, it is often bannered to black visitors in Peking and marks the beginning of an apparent attempt to win-over the loyalties of discouraged minorities worldwide to the view that the leadership in Peking is their friend and champion. On the other hand, the Soviet Union too professes to be the brother of all mankind but is having a difficult time selling the idea in view of world-wide publicity given to their persecution of Jewish people and the increasing number of more vocal dissidents.

The largest and most populous nations on earth, Russia and Red China respectively, both actively seek their announced communist goal of world domination. They differ, not in the



goal itself, but in who reaches it first.. The ideological honeymoon between Soviet Russia and the People's Republic of China, which commenced in 1949, lasted only until their traditional concepts of territorial rights and spheres of influence came into conflict. Both seek to attract uncommitted governments of Third World nations to their cause by traditional diplomatic relations while simultaneously using the most elaborate techniques of internal subversion yet developed by man to win political control over these same governments. One prevalent theme of overt communist doctrine is the so-called lack of racial prejudice. This section will examine that theme from the vantage points of a few of the growing number of communist dissidents and defectors as well as from the literature of Sino-Soviet specialists.

A. Doak Barnett has noted that:

In almost every nation in South and Southeast Asia there is sensitivity to race prejudice. In subtle ways feelings about race and racial discrimination have influenced the assessments which their leaders have made of the motives and aims of both Communist China and the United States. In recent years appeals for "Asian Solidarity" against the West and propaganda stressing racial discrimination in the United States have evoked a fairly wide and sympathetic response [Barnett 1960 p. 298].

An example of propaganda stressing racial discrimination in the United States is Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung's statement of 8 August 1963 which said in part:



...I call on the workers, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals, enlightened elements of the bourgeoisie and other enlightened persons of all colours in the world, whether white, black, yellow or brown, to unite to oppose the racial discrimination practised by U.S. imperialism and support the American Negroes in their struggle against racial discrimination. In the final analysis, national struggle is a matter of class struggle. Among the whites in the United States it is only the reactionary ruling circles who oppress the Negro people. They can in no way represent the workers, farmers, revolutionary intellectuals and other enlightened persons who comprise the overwhelming majority of the white people [from Jen-min Jih-pao 12 August 1963 as quoted in Chai, ed. 1972 pp. 113-114].

The Chinese also resorted to racist appeals to undermine the Russians. As the Sino-Soviet conflict intensified, Peking succeeded in forcing Russian delegates out of Afro-Asian gatherings on the grounds that (to cite Peking) "...the political center of the Soviet Union...has always been in Europe and therefore it has traditionally been acknowledged as a European country." [Lasky 1965 p. 55]

Also in 1963, an open letter from the Chinese charged that Moscow, while professing to champion an end to racial discrimination, was actually pursuing a policy of "preserving the hegemony of the so-called 'superior race' over oppressed nations." Later they accused the Russians of renewing fears about the "Yellow Peril" and of "inciting racial hatred among white people." (A charge that was valid as will be seen later.) The Russians countered with "Mao Tse-tung endeavors to stir up racial currents in the struggle of the world peoples against colonialism." They also claimed that the Chinese were using the filthiest and most dispicable tactics of "racist speculation and fabrication," etc. [Lasky 1965 pp. 55-56].





The contrast between the policies overtly supported on the floor of the United Nations by the entire Communist bloc vote and the policies actually carried out can be shown by the following example. Russia, Red China, and virtually all communist nations have consistently voted unanimously in the United Nations for trade sanctions against the apartheid government of South Africa. However, in 1963 Red China tripled its trade with South Africa. In August of 1964 Pravda concentrated on exposing this Chinese "hypocrisy" by printing that Peking had sent "great quantities of dynamite to South Africa to be used against Africans," but said nothing of increasing trade with South Africa by its own satellites of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and East Germany. On January 21, 1965, Kenya told its fellow African nations that "the principal result of the boycott has been to impose great economic hardships on Afro-Asian countries which put it in force, to the profit of other countries - especially in the Eastern and Western blocs and some in South America - which have replaced them and increased commerce with South Africa." The Kenya delegation went on to cite statistics showing that the communist countries - particularly Red China and East Germany - were increasing their trade with South Africa far faster than the West [Lasky 1965 pp. 56-57].

One of the chapters in Mr. Lasky's book is entitled "Apartheid U." which is the nickname given to Friendship University (later renamed Patrice Lumumba University) in



Moscow. The chapter discusses at length the disenchantment with Russia which develops among the majority of foreign students because of the racial discrimination they encounter in Moscow.

Emmanuel John Hevi's book, An African Student in China, (New York — Praeger, 1963), maintains that the Peking regime, while posing as the defender of the persecuted races against the whites, including the Russians, actually seeks to make the African accept once and for all the idea of superiority of Yellow over Black.

In late 1963, Red China's Premier, Chou En-lai took a fifty-day trek through darkest Africa that covered ten African countries. At the conclusion of his trip he noted that "revolutionary prospects are excellent throughout the African continent" [Lasky 1965 p. 173]. After this trip the Chinese decided that Africa was ripe for a full-scale anti-white campaign. Russia had already bungled their initial attempt to subvert the continent in Guinea and in the Congo. However, the Chinese, because of their skin color, stressed that only they could be the real champions of the downtrodden dark-skinned races. The Russians reacted by denouncing the Chinese as racists. Early in 1964 French President Charles de Gaulle recognized Peking. Six of fifteen former French colonies followed suit and suddenly, Paris became the headquarters for Red China's infiltration of Africa.

On May 26, 1964, a Red Chinese Cultural Attache by the name of Tung Chi-ping walked into the United States Embassy



in the tiny African Kingdom of Burundi and asked for political asylum. He was the second Chinese Communist official ever to seek sanctuary with Americans. He explained to the Americans that the Red Chinese Embassy was little concerned with diplomacy and that "actually, Communist China does not care about Burundi. "What Peking really cares about is the Congo." And he quoted a statement Mao Tse-tung had made earlier in Peking: "When we grab the Congo, we can proceed to grab the whole of Africa. Burundi is the stepping-stone for reaching the Congo" [Lasky 1965 p. 187].

In the final chapter of his book Lasky cites both Russian and Chinese polemics against each other and implies that the Sino-Soviet dispute has gone past the point of no return because of the deep national, racial, and economic rivalries involved. He also mentions that of the forty nations who have received Soviet aid, none has been won over to full-fledged Communism and although the post-Khrushchev leadership has accelerated an unannounced Soviet policy of reducing foreign aid commitments, they are finding it difficult because of Red Chinese pressure. Just as nations in the past found it easy to play the United States against Russia in foreign aid, they have now begun playing Russia against Red China.

In June of 1959, a twenty-seven-year-old Soviet diplomat at the Russian Embassy in Rangoon, Burma, by the name of Aleksandr Kaznacheev, quietly went to the American Embassy there, admitted his disillusionment with communism, and asked





for sanctuary. His book, Inside a Soviet Embassy (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1962) offers a rare look into the actual workings of Soviet political intelligence, subversion, and racism. While the gathering of information in the military, economic, and — above all — political field is a vital task for the Soviet diplomatic corps, it is only a subsidiary task of Soviet Intelligence. The primary objective of Soviet Intelligence in foreign policy is the direct subversion of existing political systems. Soviet diplomatic representatives are trained in the elite and exclusive International Relations Institute in Moscow for a period of six years. The student body, about 2,000 at any given time, is selected from exclusive groups. First, children of the social elite or "Soviet New Class" of ministers, generals, and high-ranking diplomats. Second, operationally experienced intelligence officers of the State Security Police. The third group is from among young communists who have excelled in Konsomal work. Students never apply for the Institute themselves but are recommended by Party District Committees and selected by an admission committee consisting of members of the Foreign Ministry, KGB, Party Central Committee, and the staff of the Institute itself. Additionally, there are about 200 foreign students from other communist countries at the Institute. In the early 1960's, the largest number came from Communist China, but North Korea, North Vietnam, Outer Mongolia, and seven European satellites of the Soviet



Union were also represented. Students specialize in a particular area of the world (e.g., the Eastern Division) during the six-year curriculum and must be completely fluent in at least two foreign languages by graduation because of the Soviet belief that "there can be no good cold-war fighter without a thorough knowledge of foreign languages." Only the top 30 per cent of the graduates actually go abroad while the remaining 70 per cent remain in the Soviet Union's "ice-box" of overseas specialists which can be sent into the diplomatic battle overseas on short notice.

Soviet Embassy personnel overseas function as a closed society and remain mostly within the confines of their embassy with the exception of their intelligence operatives who are free to live outside on the local economy.

Kaznacheev states that long before the open Sino-Soviet split the KGB in the mid-fifties spread fears of China throughout the Soviet population so that by 1956 the ordinary Soviet Citizen was more apprehensive about zheltaya opasnost (yellow peril) than about Western war preparations. This fear took three main forms. First, open conflict between China and the Soviet Union is inevitable because of China's alarming rate of economic and military growth supported by fanatical nationalistic drive. Second, the growing awareness that the Chinese Communist regime is even more totalitarian than the Soviet. The third fear is the aggressive spirit of the Chinese and their attitude toward a general war. For example,



in early 1957 some Chinese leaders publicly stated that in a worldwide nuclear holocaust "...if 300 million of us die, 300 million will live, and the whole world will be Chinese" [Kaznacheev 1962 p. 124].

Regarding the nature of the Sino-Soviet dispute Kaznacheev states:

Now, to any Russian, the idea that an ideology can cause a rift between two major Communist powers is an utter naivete, for nobody knows better than the Russians that the Communist ideology does not play an important role in the present Communist system, whatever the Soviet leaders have persuaded Westerners to believe. The Russians know well that it is not the construction of the prosperous and classless Communist society which is the final goal of the Soviet rulers, but the perpetuation forever of their political power and their dictatorship. Everything else, including Marx's controversial theories, Soviet internal and external policies, the very Soviet system, are all put into service toward this goal. The Communist ideology is not the beginning and the end of the Soviet society, is not its driving force, as many Westerners believe, but a mere weapon, one of many, with the help of which the Soviet government carries on the thought-control and the massive indoctrination inside the country, and camouflages its expansionist aims abroad [Kaznacheev 1962 p. 125].

Not all Westerners have been "persuaded" of the key role of ideology as the following statement by an eminent American political scientist shows:

The most important conflict within communism is, of course, between the Soviet Union and Red China. This is, first and foremost, a struggle over power between two major states, not just between Communist parties differing over interpretation of doctrine. The ideological barrage hurled by each side against the other is only camouflage, under whose cover the real power struggle between the two countries is fought relentlessly and with increasing hostility...

Another powerful force behind the Sino-Soviet conflict concerns nationalism, both territorial and







cultural. The Chinese-Russian border stretches for four thousand miles through Central and Eastern Asia. For three centuries, Russia helped herself to vast Chinese territories, probably more territory than any one nation has ever taken from another. Chinese maps now indicate the area of the country both before and after foreign imperialist territorial gains, and as it happens these maps show that Russia has been the chief imperialist power in China's history...

However, the force of nationalism in the Sino-Soviet conflict goes deeper than disputes over square miles and population densities. Marx or no Marx, over 700 million Chinese will not accept the idea that 225 million motely peoples of the Soviet Union are to be their overlords. From the traditional Chinese viewpoint, China's civilization is not only the oldest in the world but also the most accomplished. Politically, the Chinese are proud of the fact that for twenty-one centuries they have been able to unite a large part of the human race under one government. In this traditional Chinese view, the Russians are meddlesome troublemakers, imperialist intruders, and — by the standards of Chinese culture — a horde of crude barbarians...

But despite the conflict between Red China and the Soviet Union the free nations must always keep in mind that basically these two leading Communist states do not disagree over whether to bury the non-Communist nations, but how to bury them — and over who will be in charge after the funeral. The Sino-Soviet conflict will not, by itself, solve the world-wide problem of Communist expansion [Ebenstein 1965 pp. 319-322].

Kaznacheev holds that whereas internal police control, repressions, purges, ideological brainwashing, and indoctrination were successful weapons in the past to ensure regime stability, today the Soviets rely more and more on the "external factor" (e.g., mounting international tensions, the cold war, atomic hysteria, and the "yellow peril").

He also notes that the Soviet Union is composed of several completely different nations and races and that the Great Russian nation only represents about 50 per cent of the total Soviet population. The U.S.S.R. is so vast



that not even half of its land area has been explored. Therefore, the Soviet goal is expansion of political control only, not territorial colonization, which is unnecessary and almost impossible.

On the other-hand, China recently reported a population of almost 800 million (as compared to 210 million in the United States and 250 million in the Soviet Union) [Monterey Peninsula Herald 22 August 1974 p. 3]. Almost entirely of one national origin, China's nationalism has been sharpened by more than a century of foreign domination and humiliation. Because of this, Communist China can be expected to pursue not only political expansion, as the Soviet Rulers do, but also territorial.

A final observation by Kaznacheev is believed to be worth quoting at length:

With this expansion — territorially limited to solve China's main problem, and politically unlimited to establish Chinese world supremacy — they hope to retain forever their dictatorship in China. Extreme nationalism is the main feature of Chinese Communism and the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, Chinese style, is merely a clever device used for keeping control internally and covering Chinese nationalistic expansion externally.

Thus, the growing dependence of both the Soviet and the Chinese Communist regimes upon the external factor and, as a result, their growing aggressiveness are the keys to understanding of all Communist policies. No doubt, there is clear realization on both sides that their far-reaching interests, ambitions, and goals are irreconcilable. First, there is not enough space in the present world for two empires, and one can be established only over the corpse of the other. Second, the very existence of an independent major power would destroy the stability of any empire, especially one which is based on political control;



therefore the struggle to death between them is inevitable.

It is this dependence of both Communist brothers upon the external factor and their final realization that an open conflict between them is inevitable that constitutes the real reason of the Soviet-Chinese breach, in whatever form it may appear to the world at any given moment.

Although their present rivalry is already conducted on a pretty wide front and covers such important global issues as supremacy in the Communist bloc, control over the entire world Communist movement, penetration into the Asian, African, Latin American continents, and division of strategic regions into spheres of influence, it is very improbable that they will actually break their alliance before they finish with their common and still more dangerous enemy — the Free World. Only if the West is weakened still further, or one of the "brothers" decides that the other side represents now the main threat, will they bring the breach into the open. Until then, China and the Soviet Union will keep up the appearance of unity, while subtly preparing the ground for the future struggle [Kaznacheev 1962 p. 3].

In view of the fact that the open breach between Soviet Russia and Communist China is now known world-wide and that the logic of this ex-Soviet intelligence officer could well be valid, a clear and present warning is evident that the United States should move to strengthen and not weaken Western defenses.







### III. THE GROWTH OF CHINESE POWER AND THE SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL CONFLICT

The communist regime has been in power in the People's Republic of China for over a quarter of a century. During this period tremendous changes have taken place within China as the communist leadership seeks to rapidly transform an agrarian society into a modern and industrialized nation. Perhaps of more long-range significance to policy-makers in other nations is the rate-of-change of Chinese power rather than any singular milestone such as the development of nuclear weapons. This chapter will be a comparative survey of the growth rate of various forms of Chinese power vis-a-vis other nations with particular emphasis on China's self-declared main adversary, the Soviet Union.

In his book Future Shock (New York: Bantam Books, 1970) Alvin Toffler decries the unnecessary strain placed upon the populaces of highly-industrialized nations by a failure to orient technological advancement to carefully develop long-range national goals:

...Yet systems of goal formation based on elitist premises are simply no longer 'efficient.' In the struggle to capture control of the forces of change, they are increasingly counter-productive. For under super-industrialism, democracy becomes not a political luxury, but a primal necessity [Toffler 1970 pp. 475 passim].

If Toffler's theme applies to communist power elites in general and to Chinese Communist power elites in particular,



it then begs the questions -- to what extent can communist regimes continue their present rate of growth and technological change without introducing more liberal and democratic reforms both within their societies and in their relations with other nation states; also, can the present rate of development be sustained in China without a collapse of the societal infrastructure brought on as a consequence of a Chinese "future shock" perhaps even more severe than that which might be experienced by the present superindustrialized nations? The ultimate answers to such questions are speculative at best but some insight into them can be gained by the comparative study of the growth of national power in China which follows. The following sections will identify, compare, and analyze key factors in this growth; namely, factors of Chinese and Soviet political leadership, culture and geo-politics, economics, science and technology, and strategy.

#### A. LEADERSHIP FACTORS

The Chinese Communist Party is the largest communist party in the world with a membership of 28 million, as reported by the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973. In comparison, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had a membership of 14,330,525 as of 1 January 1973 as reported by the Secretariat, or only about one-half the Chinese membership [Staar, ed. 1974 pp. 69 and 418]. This massive Chinese party is ruled by an elite group known as the Central



Committee. Within the Central Committee is the Political Bureau (Politburo) of the Central Committee; and within the Politburo, is the Standing Committee of the Politburo. The incumbents within the Party structure serve in the key executive positions of the Party itself, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and the governmental bureaucracy.

Thomas J. Weiss has noted that the ruling elite of the Communist Party in China has remained remarkably stable for the past forty years as contrasted with the Soviet Union in which Stalin's purges of the 1930's eliminated most of the "Old Bolsheviks" of the October Revolution of 1917. The purges have resulted in second generation leaders such as Brezhnev and Kosygin rising to power. Weiss states that one of the most striking manifestations of the unique continuity of Communist Chinese leadership is that since 1935 the average age of the top-level elite has tended to rise almost as rapidly as time has passed. The average age of the party Politburo in January, 1934, was approximately thirty-five. In 1969, thirty-five years later, the average of the ten active members of the Politburo of the Eighth Central Committee was about sixty-eight [Weiss in Yuan-li Wu, ed. 1973 pp. 241-243].

The age factor alone makes a relatively rapid turnover of the ruling elites a certainty, probably within the next decade. Possible outcomes of succession among China's rulers will be addressed in the next chapter. It is





sufficient to note here that the massive changes which have taken place in Chinese society during the past quarter of a century were managed by a ruling gerontocracy which is about to pass from the scene.

## B. GEO-POLITICAL AND CULTURAL FACTORS

### 1. Population

The official 1974 estimate of the population of mainland China published by the Communist Chinese government is "almost 800 million" [The World Almanac 1975 p. 520]. Various western estimates range from 680 million [Chiao-min Hsieh 1973 p. 61] to 900 million [The Military Balance 1974-1975 1974 p. 49]. Projections for the year 1990 range between 1,301,260,000 and 1,333,128,000 people [People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment 1972 pp. 328-329]. Until only a few years ago the birth rate in China was estimated to be one of the highest in the world (35 per 1000). As the death rate at this time had fallen to about 12 per 1000, the annual population increase was at least 13 million. In other words, the population of China increases more in a matter of four years than the entire population of France [Nagel's Encyclopedia Guide China 1973 p. 54]. In 1949, Mao Tse-tung made this optimistic statement concerning China's population in response to a statement by Dean Acheson that overpopulation was one of the causes of revolution in China:



It is a very good thing that China has a big population. Even if China's population multiplies many times, she is fully capable of finding a solution; the solution is production...

Of all things in the world, people are the most precious. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, as long as there are people, every kind of miracle can be performed. We are refuters of Acheson's counter-revolutionary theory. We believe that revolution can change everything, and that before long there will arise a new China with a big population and a great wealth of products, where life will be abundant and culture will flourish. All pessimistic views are utterly groundless [Mao Tse-tung volume IV 1969 pp. 453-454].

Today, over twenty-five years after the above statement, Mao's forecast of a "big population" has proved valid but the "great wealth of products" part has yet to be realized. Moreover, the withdrawal of Soviet technological advisors coupled with the famine of 1959-1962 apparently caused the Peking regime to institute several methods of birth control.

Rafael Salas, executive director of the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, has stated that China has the largest and most extensive family-planning program anywhere in the world today and that it is being conducted by the Chinese alone with no outside assistance from the United Nations Fund ["Red China Pushing Vast Population Control Program" San Jose Mercury News 16 December 1973 p. 22]. A Stanford chemistry professor by the name of Carl Djerassi lauds Chinese expertise in birth control and believes that their techniques could be used in other developing nations to keep the global birthrate problem within



limits. He cites an ingenious oral contraceptive in the form of water-soluble paper squares each about one-third the size of a postage stamp which serves as a "paper pill" and which is the most common form of birth control in China. Other techniques used are late marriages, the virtual absence of pre-marital intercourse, and abortions after the second child ["Chinese Expertise in Birth Control Boon for the World" San Jose Mercury News 7 April 1974 p. 16].

According to Nagel's Encyclopedia Guide China the Chinese population is extremely young with two out of every five Chinese under the age of eighteen. In a huge and developing nation such as China this alone could tend to cause the standard of living to lag population growth in the future thus compounding problems of population control, governmental authority, and regime stability. If this proves to be the case, Acheson's observation may again prove valid, notwithstanding Mao's critique.

Population density variance in Communist China is pronounced with less than five percent of the population living in the western half of China where the terrain is either high mountains or arid basins. In the eastern half of China the population density exceeds 520 persons per square mile in areas of high agricultural production. Areas of lower population in eastern China are usually indicative of nonagricultural land [Rand McNally Illustrated Atlas of China 1972 p. 36]. Seventy-five percent of China's population





are Han Chinese with ethnic minorities amounting to less than forty million or five percent of the total. Still these minority groups, who retain non-Chinese customs, religions, and languages, occupy almost two-thirds of the surface area of China mostly in the western mountains, deserts, and steppes [Nagel's Encyclopedia Guide China 1973 p. 57]. In addition to the mainland, over eighteen million "overseas Chinese" now reside in almost every country of the world. A ninety-six percent majority of these live in Asia [Yean-li Wu 1973 p. 415].

The Soviet government population estimate for 1974 was 250,900,000 [The World Almanac & Book of Facts 1975 p. 574]. As in China, more than forty percent of the total is under the age of eighteen. The 1973 birthrate was about 21 per 1000 and the death rate less than 8. In absolute terms, these data represent an annual increase of 3.5 million people [Nagel's Encyclopedia Guide U.S.S.R. 1973 pp. 36-41]. About eighty percent of the population consists of Great Russians, the remainder consists of many ethnic minorities, of which the most numerous are the Tatars, Ukrainians, Chuvash, Bashkiss, and Mordvinians [Encyclopedia Americana volume 24 1973 p. 43]. There is evidence of Chinese influence, growing dissent, and unrest among these minorities [for example, see "The Ukraine - Russia's Thorn in the Side" Christian Science Monitor 27 June 1974 p. 2]. According to the Monitor the Soviet birthrate is declining as a result of



a climbing divorce rate (30 percent in 1972), increased abortions (the most common form of birth control in the Soviet Union), and a desire by the populace for a rising standard of living. The Monitor notes that by the end of the 1970's the working proportion of the Soviet population will have fallen to 54 percent of the total and that by 1990, the burden of financing pensions and maintaining a high national income will fall upon an even smaller proportion. By the end of the century computers predict that the Soviet population will grow to between 320 and 340 million while the Chinese population is expected to be well over one billion ["Kremlin Keeps Quiet on Declining Soviet Birthrate" Christian Science Monitor 13 May 1974 p. 5C].

In search of new sources of minerals and oil, the Soviet Union is committed to a cohesive 15-year plan beginning in 1976 to relocate a large portion of the 34-million-strong Young Communist organization (Komsomol) to Siberia. The goals include a million new Siberian settlers in the next five years but at the present, scientists in Moscow admit that more people are leaving Siberia than going there ["Go East, Young Man, Soviet Leaders Urge" Christian Science Monitor 17 June 1974 p. 3C; see also, "Wanted: Residents for Siberia" Christian Science Monitor 28 June 1974 p. 5C]. In addition to prospecting, an important part of the program is to complete the 2,000 mile Baikal-Amur rail line which will run approximately 300 miles north of the existing



Trans-Siberian railroad thus providing a higher degree of security to Russian military logistics in the event of war with China.

## 2. Territory

With an area of about 3.7 million square miles, China ranks third in size in the world following Russia (8.65 million square miles) and Canada (3.85 million square miles). China shares approximately 13,210 miles of land borders with twelve neighbors and has a coastline of approximately 3,500 miles [Area Handbook for the People's Republic of China 1972 p. vii]. Thomas Robinson maintains that Soviet military planners must contend with a 9,700 mile common border with China. His reasoning is as follows:

The Sino-Soviet border comprises three sectors: the Inner Asian sector (2,000 miles), the Mongolian sector (2,700 miles), and the Far Eastern sector (2,000 miles). The Sino-Mongolian boundary is included as part of the Sino-Soviet boundary not only because of the limited sovereignty of the Mongolian People's Republic but also because Soviet and Chinese military forces are ranged against each other across that border and because the Soviet Union is, for all intents and purposes, in charge of the defense of Mongolia [Thomas Robinson "Soviet Policy in East Asia" Problems in Communism November-December 1973 p. 40].

In addition to the Sino-Soviet territorial conflict, both Nationalist and Communist China have territorial differences with several countries such as Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines over the ownership of several island groups located near China such as the Paracel Islands, Spratley Islands, Pratas Islands, Senkaku Islands, Taiping Island,







and Chungsha Island. On 19 January 1974 these differences resulted in a naval battle between South Vietnam and Communist China and the occupation of the Paracels by China. Various U.S. newspapers attributed the occupation to China's desire for oil exploration and development which is probably accurate but other strategic uses of these islands might include naval bases, radar air defense, and naval intelligence observation posts. For a concise review of the battle and the history of territorial claims to these islands see the 4-10 March 1974 issue of Keesing's Contemporary Archives, pages 26388-26389. Also, for a detailed analysis of the international law aspects of the Sino-Japanese dispute see "The Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Tiao-Yu-Tai (Senkaku) Islands and the Law of Territorial Acquisition" in the Virginia Journal of International Law, winter 1974, pages 221-266.

### 3. Agriculture and Climate

Agriculture represents the most important part of the Chinese economy, engaging up to 85 percent of the labor force, providing a substantial part of foreign exchange earnings, and contributing approximately one-third to the gross national product. China is the world's foremost producer of rice, sweet potatoes, sorghum, soybeans, millet, barley, peanuts, and tea. Her main industrial crops are cotton, other fibers, and various oilseeds [Commander's Digest 29 November 1973 p. 15]. Fisheries, forestry, and grazing are less important. State farms represent 10



percent and communes 90 percent of agricultural activity. Agence France-Presse reported that there are more than 50,000 people's communes in China in which three quarters of the Chinese or more than 600 million people live. This gives an average of about 12,000 per commune with some communes having over 50,000. Only 10 percent or 300 million acres of China is arable land, the rest being mountains or desert. This means the average commune consists of 5,200 acres. The communes are designed for military as well as agricultural work in that they are honeycombed with deep shelters in which foodstuffs are stored in case of enemy attack. The goal is that they be capable of living isolated for months on end ["Chinese Communes May Have Over 30,000 Residents" Monterey Peninsula Herald 1 November 1974 p. 22].

An interesting agricultural development in Siberia is that Soviet scientists have reported that they have produced frost-resistant wild Arctic grasses in dry Siberian lake bottoms and are feeding cattle with it. They believe it to be a significant step in providing food for the new Soviet settlers who intend to develop the rich resources in Siberia ["Cattle Grass in Arctic Soviets Claim" Christian Science Monitor 23 August 1974 p. 1].

#### 4. Terrain and Transportation

China's landforms are also quite varied ranging from the 8,880-meter peak of Mt. Chomolungma (Everest) to the Turfan Depression, which is 154 meters below sea level.




virtually all types of geological landforms are found between these extremes. The three most basic characteristics of China's topography are: (1) decrease in land elevation from west to east, (2) most mountain ranges run from west to east, and (3) widely varied landforms (see Map 5). Map 5 also depicts some of the most common invasion routes traditionally used by invading armies. China's landmass can be divided into five general patterns: (1) plains, 11 percent, (2) basins, 16 percent, (3) plateaus, 34 percent, (4) hills, 9 percent, and (5) mountains, 30 percent [Chiao-min Hsieh 1973 pp. 13-21].

Lack of adequate internal communications and transportation has been a problem throughout Chinese history. The communist government is aware of the problem as evinced by the fact that the development of modern transportation networks has been a major part of each successive five-year plan. The primary means of transportation in China in terms of volume carried, passengers moved, and distance traveled is railroads with water and road transport as secondary means. Only in Tibet does a highway replace the railroad as the chief means of transportation. Recently the Chinese have built a new "Konka" bridge across the River Bramaputra capable of carrying two-way heavy vehicular traffic, only eight miles from the Indian border of the Northeast Frontier Agency territory of Assam. The bridge overcomes the biggest invasion obstacle the PLA faced in its 1962 invasion of India.





## CHINA'S TERRAIN FEATURES



[Source: Chiao-min Hsieh 1973 p. 14]

Map 5



The PLA is believed to have over 300,000 troops in Tibet and the bridge makes it possible to move large numbers of these troops from the interior of Tibet to the Indian frontier in a matter of hours ["Chinese Upgrade Their Military Power, Mobility in Tibet" The Sunday Peninsula Herald 17 February 1974 p. 11A]. The Peking Review claims that China opened nine new trunk highways in 1974 in addition to the construction of over 10,000 kilometers (6,214 miles) of motor roads in mountain areas. The Communist Chinese magazine also claims that the total length of asphalt-surface roads at the end of 1974 was more than ten times that of 1965 and that roads constructed in Yunnan Province in 1974 alone exceeded the total mileage laid from 1949 to 1973 ["Motor Roads Built in 1974" Peking Review 21 February 1975 pp. 22-23]. Regarding purely military logistics, the Chinese are known to have constructed all-weather roads in areas of strategic importance such as along the coastline of the Taiwan Strait and near the borders of North Vietnam, Laos, and Burma. Since 1969 Peking has completed several new roads in northeastern and northwestern China in order to provide better military access to the Sino-Soviet border [People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment 1972 p. 173]. Airroutes are too expensive for routine transport and are reserved for urgent transportation requirements between distant points.



## 5. Natural Resources

According to the French writer, Jan Deleyne, China is poorly endowed with natural resources in comparison with the United States or the Soviet Union. Still, known Chinese reserves of the main raw materials are sufficient with the exceptions of nickel, platinum, copper, and chrome and an ambitious prospecting program is underway to discover new sources of these key minerals. Deleyne also notes that raw materials and semi-finished products constitute the main items of import. China's growing armament industries require these materials, especially platinum, industrial diamonds, ruthenium, irridium, chrome, copper, nickel, and iron and steel [Deleyne 1973 pp. 18 and 150].

Total oil output for China in 1973 was reported by Chou En-lai to have been 50 million tons which represented a big increase over estimates from previous years. The Christian Science Monitor believes China's sudden oil riches are mainly from increased production at the main oil facility at Taching, plus the field at Shengli in Shantung Province and a new field at Takang which was announced in early 1974 ["Oil - China Has Plenty, Sells Little" Christian Science Monitor 12 July 1974 p. 4]. David K. E. Bruce, U.S. Ambassador to China has stated that China will soon become an important oil exporter, and could soon make \$100 billion per year from oil supplies on its continental shelf and in the Yellow Sea ["New Oil Finds Bubbling in Many Parts of World" Christian Science Monitor 16 October 1974 p. 8]. A more optimistic





estimate made in the December 1974 issue of the Hong Kong magazine Current Scene is that China should have easily earned \$350 million U.S. dollars in 1974 from exporting petroleum to Japan, Hong Kong, Thailand, and the Philippines.

Despite the huge growth of China's oil industry, coal still provides 80 percent of China's energy. Along with the United States and Russia, China is among the three richest countries in the world in terms of coal with reserves estimated at 9,000 trillion tons. Coal production jumped from 240 million tons in 1966 to 300 million in 1970. During the past several years China has implemented plans to scatter her industrial centers widely over China instead of only in the north and east for strategic reasons. In conjunction with this plan she has commenced producing modern industrial facilities in every province ["China Speeds Plans for Wide Expansion of Coal-producing Operations" Christian Science Monitor 23 April 1974 p. 5D].

The Financial Times Service in Hong Kong notes that in the late 1950's Chinese economists predicted that she would surpass Britain in steel production and, although it has taken longer than they expected, they are believed to have now accomplished that milestone. Although no steel statistics have been released by China since 1972, they had turned out 23 million metric tons that year, an increase of 2 million tons over the previous year. In comparison, British steel production for 1973 was 26.6 metric tons. The



best estimates of current Chinese steel production is in excess of 26 million tons. Plans for further increases in steel production are evidenced by the recent purchase of a one-million-ton cold-rolling steel mill from Germany and the fact that negotiations have been underway with a Japanese firm for steel plants three or four times as large as that ["China on Verge of Matching British Steel Production" Christian Science Monitor 15 May 1974 p. 5B].

The Financial Times Service also reports that sophisticated equipment purchases from foreign suppliers along with increasing skill by Chinese engineers have also resulted in an electric power generating capacity in 1973 30 percent above the total in 1972 with a total capacity of twice that of 1965. This figure would be in excess of 100 billion kilowatt hours. Thermal power plants have been purchased from Hitachi of Japan, John Brown Engineering in Britain, and various West German firms. The Chinese claim to have built their own 125,000 kilowatt steam turbine plant in 1969 and a 300,000 kilowatt hydroturbine plant which was installed on the upper reaches of the Yellow River. Smaller hydroelectric plants numbering 50,000 with a combined generating capacity of eight times the 1965 figure have been installed in rural areas all over China according to Communist Chinese sources. The power thus generated is expected to spur economic growth by furnishing energy for milling machinery and irrigation pumps ["Chinese Step Up Electric Generating



Capacity" Christian Science Monitor 29 May 1974 p. 3A].

Figure 1 represents China's growth rate in the development of these resources.

### C. ECONOMIC FACTORS

The data presented in this section are based in part upon an unclassified Central Intelligence Agency source which was originally prepared for former President Nixon's visit to China and later published by Rand McNally. They are designed to give a reliable indication of relative rankings and possible future trends but it should be noted that "the incompatability of reporting systems preclude exact representations without extensive footnoting" [Rand McNally Illustrated Atlas of China 1972 pp. 72 passim].

#### 1. Gross National Product

As depicted in Figure 2 the Chinese gross national product is continuing to rise but the rate of increase of the gross national product per capita (at \$140.00 in 1970) has not kept pace probably due to the population increases cited earlier. Also, in comparison with the United States, Russia, Japan, and India, the Chinese figure compares favorably only with the latter (at \$80.00) and both China and India trail the superindustrialized states by a significant margin. It seems intuitively obvious from the above data that Peking's national interest would best be served by policies designed to decrease the threat of war and to increase international trade in order to further





# CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION


| Period and year                | GNP<br>(billions of<br>dollars) | Population,<br>mid-year<br>(millions) | GNP per<br>capita<br>(dollars) | Industrial<br>production<br>(1957 = 100) | Agricultural<br>production<br>(1957 = 100) | Steel output<br>(millions of<br>metric tons) | Grain output<br>(millions of<br>metric tons) | Volume<br>(billions of<br>dollars) | Percentage<br>with<br>Communist<br>countries |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|
| Rehabilitation                 |                                 |                                       |                                |                                          |                                            |                                              |                                              |                                    |                                              |
| 1949                           | 36                              | 538                                   | 67                             | 25                                       | 54                                         | 0.16                                         | 108                                          | 0.83                               |                                              |
| 1950                           | 43                              | 547                                   | 79                             | 31                                       | 64                                         | 0.61                                         | 125                                          | 1.21                               | 29                                           |
| 1951                           | 50                              | 558                                   | 90                             | 42                                       | 71                                         | 0.90                                         | 135                                          | 1.90                               | 51                                           |
| 1952                           | 59                              | 570                                   | 104                            | 51                                       | 83                                         | 1.35                                         | 154                                          | 1.89                               | 70                                           |
| First Five-Year Plan           |                                 |                                       |                                |                                          |                                            |                                              |                                              |                                    |                                              |
| 1953                           | 63                              | 583                                   | 108                            | 64                                       | 83                                         | 1.77                                         | 157                                          | 2.30                               | 68                                           |
| 1954                           | 66                              | 596                                   | 110                            | 73                                       | 84                                         | 2.22                                         | 160                                          | 2.35                               | 74                                           |
| 1955                           | 72                              | 611                                   | 117                            | 74                                       | 94                                         | 2.85                                         | 175                                          | 3.04                               | 74                                           |
| 1956                           | 78                              | 626                                   | 124                            | 91                                       | 97                                         | 4.46                                         | 182                                          | 3.12                               | 66                                           |
| 1957                           | 82                              | 642                                   | 128                            | 100                                      | 100                                        | 5.35                                         | 185                                          | 3.06                               | 64                                           |
| Great Leap Forward             |                                 |                                       |                                |                                          |                                            |                                              |                                              |                                    |                                              |
| 1958                           | 95                              | 658                                   | 144                            | 131                                      | 108                                        | 8.0                                          | 200                                          | 3.76                               | 63                                           |
| 1959                           | 92                              | 674                                   | 137                            | 166                                      | 86                                         | 10.0                                         | 165                                          | 4.29                               | 69                                           |
| 1960                           | 89                              | 689                                   | 130                            | 161-163                                  | 83                                         | 13.0                                         | 160                                          | 3.99                               | 66                                           |
| Readjustment and recovery      |                                 |                                       |                                |                                          |                                            |                                              |                                              |                                    |                                              |
| 1961                           | 72                              | 701                                   | 103                            | 107-110                                  | 78                                         | 8.0                                          | 160                                          | 3.02                               | 56                                           |
| 1962                           | 79                              | 710                                   | 112                            | 108-113                                  | 90                                         | 8.0                                          | 175-180                                      | 2.68                               | 53                                           |
| 1963                           | 82                              | 721                                   | 114                            | 119-125                                  | 90                                         | 9.0                                          | 175-180                                      | 2.77                               | 45                                           |
| 1964                           | 90                              | 735                                   | 122                            | 133-142                                  | 96                                         | 10.0                                         | 180-185                                      | 3.22                               | 34                                           |
| 1965                           | 97                              | 751                                   | 129                            | 148-161                                  | 101                                        | 11.0                                         | 190-195                                      | 3.88                               | 30                                           |
| Cultural Revolution            |                                 |                                       |                                |                                          |                                            |                                              |                                              |                                    |                                              |
| 1966                           | 105                             | 766                                   | 137                            | 165-181                                  | 106                                        | 13.0                                         | 195-200                                      | 4.24                               | 26                                           |
| 1967                           | 101                             | 783                                   | 129                            | 134-149                                  | 115                                        | 10.0                                         | 210-215                                      | 3.90                               | 21                                           |
| 1968                           | 100                             | 800                                   | 125                            | 144-163                                  | 106                                        | 12.0                                         | 195-200                                      | 3.76                               | 22                                           |
| 1969                           | 109                             | 818                                   | 134                            | 170-194                                  | 109                                        | 15.0                                         | 200-205                                      | 3.86                               | 20                                           |
| Resumption of regular planning |                                 |                                       |                                |                                          |                                            |                                              |                                              |                                    |                                              |
| 1970                           | 122                             | 836                                   | 146                            | 199-230                                  | 116                                        | 18.0                                         | 215-220                                      | 4.22                               | 20                                           |
| 1971                           | 128                             | 855                                   | 150                            | 223-258                                  | 115                                        | 21.0                                         | 215-220                                      | 4.50                               | 21                                           |

[Source: People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment 1972 p. 5]

Figure 1



## Production



[Source: Rand McNally Illustrated Atlas of China  
1972 p. 72]

Figure 2



increase the rate of industrialization and production, an observation which again reinforces the main hypothesis of this thesis. For a more complete picture of China's economic performance from 1952 through 1973 see Figure 3.

## 2. Merchant Marine

There is a distinct lack of data on the Chinese merchant marine and shipbuilding industries. In 1970 the Chinese merchant fleet was composed of 248 ships with a total tonnage of 867,994 deadweight tons. Compared with a registered tonnage of 402,000 in 1960, this shows a growth rate of over 100 percent in one decade. Additionally, there was an unspecified number of foreign ships under charter. The Chinese government has reported that its shipyards are producing 10,000-15,000 displacement ton vessels and advanced diesel engines of 8,800 horsepower to propel them. Japanese sources estimate that nine such vessels had been launched during the late 1960s and early 1970s [Area Handbook for the People's Republic of China 1972 pp. 447 and 532]. The Far Eastern Economic Review's Asia 1973 Yearbook notes on page 110 that the Chinese shipbuilding industry was slated for rapid expansion in the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1971-1975) and that purchase orders were placed in Rijeka, Yugoslavia, for four 15,000 ton diesel freighters and ten 12,000 horsepower engines to be installed in ships built in Chinese yards. John R. Dewenter states that China's own shipbuilding industry progressed from the construction of 10,000-ton ships in 1969,





# CHINA: ECONOMIC INDICATORS

[Source: Asia 1975 Yearbook Far Eastern Economic Review  
1975 p. 165]

| Key indicators                             | 1952  | 1957  | 1958  | 1959  | 1960  | 1961  | 1962  | 1963  | 1964  | 1965  | 1966  | 1967  | 1968  | 1969  | 1970  | 1971  | 1972  | 1973    |
|--------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|---------|
| GNP (billion in constant 1972 \$)          | 64    | 88    | 102   | 98    | 94    | 79    | 88    | 93    | 103   | 114   | 122   | 119   | 118   | 130   | 147   | 159   | 161   | 172     |
| Population, mid-year (millions)            | 570   | 641   | 657   | 672   | 685   | 695   | 704   | 716   | 731   | 747   | 763   | 780   | 798   | 817   | 837   | 857   | 878   | 899     |
| Per capita GNP (1972 \$)                   | 112   | 156   | 156   | 146   | 137   | 113   | 125   | 131   | 141   | 152   | 160   | 152   | 147   | 159   | 176   | 185   | 184   | 191     |
| Industrial production index (1957=100)     | 51    | 100   | 131   | 166   | 163   | 109   | 111   | 123   | 140   | 159   | 181   | 149   | 164   | 202   | 240   | 271   | 294   | 319     |
| Agricultural                               |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |         |
| Grain (million metric tons)                | 154   | 185   | 200   | 165   | 160   | 160   | 180   | 185   | 195   | 210   | 215   | 230   | 215   | 220   | 240   | 246   | 236   | 250     |
| Cotton (million metric tons)               | 1.3   | 1.6   | 1.7   | 1.2   | 0.9   | 1.0   | 1.2   | 1.3   | 1.6   | 1.9   | 1.8   | 2.2   | 2.0   | 1.9   | 2.0   | 2.2   | 1.9   | 2.3     |
| Chemical fertilizers (million metric tons) | 0.4   | 1.9   | 3.0   | 3.1   | 3.5   | 2.5   | 3.1   | 5.1   | 5.4   | 8.0   | 9.9   | 10.2  | 12.2  | 15.4  | 18.3  | 21.2  | 24.1  | 28.9    |
| Supply                                     | 0.2   | 0.8   | 1.4   | 1.9   | 2.5   | 1.5   | 2.1   | 3.1   | 4.2   | 5.7   | 7.4   | 5.9   | 8.2   | 11.3  | 14.0  | 16.9  | 19.9  | 24.8    |
| Production                                 | 0.2   | 1.1   | 1.6   | 1.2   | 1.0   | 1.0   | 1.0   | 2.0   | 1.2   | 2.3   | 2.5   | 4.3   | 4.0   | 4.1   | 4.3   | 4.3   | 4.2   | 4.1     |
| Imports                                    |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |         |
| Industrial Production                      |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |         |
| Crude steel (million metric tons)          | 1.35  | 5.35  | 8.0   | 10    | 13    | 8     | 8     | 9     | 10    | 11    | 13    | 10    | 12    | 15    | 18    | 21    | 23    | 26      |
| Coal (million metric tons)                 | 66.5  | 130.7 | 230   | 300   | 280   | 170   | 180   | 190   | 200   | 220   | 240   | 190   | 205   | 258   | 310   | 335   | 357   | 378     |
| Electric power (billion kilowatt hours)    | 7.3   | 19.3  | 28    | 42    | 47    | 31    | 30    | 33    | 36    | 42    | 50    | 45    | 50    | 60    | 72    | 85    | 93    | 101     |
| Crude oil (million metric tons)            | 0.44  | 1.46  | 2.3   | 3.7   | 5.3   | 5.2   | 5.8   | 6.4   | 8     | 10.8  | 14    | 14    | 15    | 20.3  | 28.5  | 36.7  | 43    | 53      |
| Cement (million metric tons)               | 2.86  | 6.86  | 9.3   | 10.6  | 9.0   | 6.0   | 5.6   | 6.9   | 9.0   | 11.2  | 12.9  | 11.0  | 11.3  | 13.0  | 13.3  | 13.8  | 14.8  | 15.4    |
| Machine tools (thousand units)             | 13.7  | 28.3  | 30    | 33    | 38    | 30    | 25    | 35    | 38    | 44    | 48    | 40    | 40    | 45    | 50    | 55    | 60    | 65      |
| Trucks (thousand units)                    | 0     | 7.5   | 16.0  | 19.4  | 15    | 1     | 14    | 16    | 26    | 34    | 47    | 34    | 31    | 60    | 70    | 86    | 100   | 110     |
| Locomotives (units)                        | 20    | 167   | 350   | 500   | 600   | 100   | 25    | 25    | 25    | 50    | 140   | 200   | 240   | 260   | 280   | 200   | 220   | 240     |
| Freight cars (thousand units)              | 5.8   | 7.3   | 11    | 17    | 23    | 3     | 4.0   | 5.9   | 5.7   | 6.6   | 7.3   | 6.9   | 8.7   | 11    | 12    | 14    | 15    | 16      |
| Cotton cloth (billion linear meters)       | 3.83  | 5.05  | 5.7   | 7.5   | 5.8   | 4.0   | 4.2   | 4.5   | 4.9   | 5.4   | 6.0   | 4.8   | 4.8   | 6.5   | 7.5   | 7.5   | 7.5   | 7.5     |
| Foreign trade (million current US\$)       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |         |
| Total                                      | 1,890 | 3,060 | 3,760 | 4,290 | 3,990 | 3,020 | 2,680 | 2,770 | 3,220 | 3,880 | 4,240 | 3,900 | 3,760 | 3,860 | 4,290 | 4,720 | 5,830 | 9,352.4 |
| Exports (FOB)                              | 800   | 1,620 | 1,940 | 2,230 | 1,960 | 1,530 | 1,530 | 1,570 | 1,750 | 2,040 | 2,210 | 1,950 | 1,940 | 2,030 | 2,050 | 2,410 | 3,060 | 4,392.9 |
| Imports (CIF)                              | 1,010 | 1,440 | 1,820 | 2,060 | 2,030 | 1,490 | 1,150 | 1,200 | 1,470 | 1,840 | 2,030 | 1,950 | 1,820 | 1,830 | 2,240 | 2,310 | 2,770 | 4,959.5 |



to 15,000 tons in 1970, to 20,000 and 25,000 tons in 1971  
[Dewenter "China Afloat" Foreign Affairs July 1972 p. 749].


Ninety-five percent of China's international trade is handled by the ports of Da lian, Qin haung dao, Xin gang, Lian yun gang, Shang hai, Huang pu, and Zhan jiang [Nagel's Encyclopedia-Guide China 1973 p. 287].

### 3. International Trade

The most noticeable trend in China's international trade is the growing amount of trade with non-communist countries as compared with decreasing trade with communist countries. As Figure 4 depicts, the reverse occurred at about the same time as the Sino-Soviet dispute. While China exports over time have shown a gradual increase, especially with the free world, Figure 5 shows her imports have remained relatively stable compared to the industrialized nations. The short-term outlook for China's international trade can be extrapolated with reasonable accuracy from the data above. Imports will be limited chiefly to items required for further industrialization with little demand for consumer items, other than possibly food, in order to avoid foreign indebtedness. In the long-term, she could greatly expand international trade and her financial reserves by aggressively developing export markets for industrial raw materials in demand in developed countries, especially oil, certain metals, and coking coal. A decision to pursue such a course will most likely be presaged and signaled by a massive program to build up China's fledgling merchant marine.



## CHINA: TRADE AND ECONOMIC TRENDS




[Source: People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment 1972 p. 340]

Figure 4





# CHINA'S IMPORTS OF ALL PRODUCTS, WITH COMPARISONS



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

NEG. ERS 8712-72(4) ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE

[Source: Agricultural Trade of the People's Republic of China, 1955-69 1972 p. 11]

Figure 5



Russia has already begun a rapid expansion of her merchant marine which is presently ranked as fifth in the world in terms of gross tonnage with a total of 17 million tons. Timofei Guzhenko, Soviet Minister for the Merchant Marine, announced Soviet plans for revolutionary expansion in an interview in the weekly Nedelya which was picked up by the London Observer Service ["Russ to Expand Merchant Marine" San Jose Mercury 12 January 1974 p. 22]. Also, the Soviet Union's second atomic icebreaker was launched in 1973 and is expected to complete outfitting at a Leningrad shipyard in 1975 ["Russ Launch Atomic Icebreaker" San Jose Mercury 4 November 1973 p. 41].

Numerous economists in the United States have gone on record in support of increased trading between the United States and the People's Republic of China as well as projects such as a joint investment program between the two nations. An example is Dr. Harned Pettus Hoose who served as a non-governmental advisor to former President Nixon during his 1971 visit to China. Dr. Harned sees such joint ventures as a move toward solving the world's economic problems ["U.S.-China Trade, Investment Seen As Economic Solution" Monterey Peninsula Herald 3 October 1974 p. 13]. In a talk before invited students and staff at the Naval Postgraduate School Professor Harry Schaeffer of the University of Kansas Department of Economics observed that the centralized economic planning germane to communist governments has produced remarkable results in Russia when it was in an underdeveloped



stage and that this economic system works well in producing homogeneous products such as electric power or intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, the system has proven ineffective in the production of consumer products such as automobiles and television sets because of improper incentives. The Soviet regime has recognized this and has begun using the profit motive more at a time when the United States (under former President Nixon) was utilizing more governmental control of the economy than at any time in its history. He noted that it took Soviet Russia until 1928 to equal the production level of 1917. His conclusion was that increased international trade and negotiation with both Russia and China is a preferable common ground on which to interact than that of the battlefield [Schaeffer "Are the U.S. and Soviet Economies Converging?" Talk given at the Naval Postgraduate School 26 April 1974].

#### 4. Narcotics

A Nationalist Chinese writer, Ch'en Shen-wen, has published numerous recent pamphlets for the World Anti-Communist League (for example, see "Communist China and Drug Traffic" Taiwan: World Anti-Communist League, China Chapter, volume XX, number 176, 1974) and English-language Taiwan periodicals concerning Communist China and drug traffic. His main theme is that while Peking pretends to oppose the use of hard drugs, it is secretly using them as both an economic weapon and as a tool to gain control over the will of free men and states. Ch'en builds his case against Peking's





exportation of hard drugs with select quotations from both communist and non-communist sources including defectors, Pravda, TASS, Japan Times, The Stars and Stripes, various U.S. Congressmen, U.S. Congressional reports, United Nations reports, and so on. He quotes Chou En-lai as having told Nassir:

...U.S. servicemen are experimenting with opium eating and we are helping them in this respect. We have grown the best quality opium especially for them. Do you remember those days when the Westerners forced sales of opium on us? Today we will pay them in their own coin... [Ch'en Shen-wen Free China Review February 1974 p. 21].

He also quotes a former engineer in China, Tsou Kuang-han, as testifying before a U.S. Senate seminar on 16 November 1972 that:

...On the mainland I remember Mao saying: 'The American imperialists used bacteriological warfare in the Korean War and are now using chemical warfare in Vietnam. We are going to use indigenous chemical warfare to paralyze the American forces on the Vietnam battlefields.' [Ch'en Shen-wen Free China Review February 1974 pp. 27-28].

Ch'en also produces a map which purports to show opium growing areas, collection points, and exit routes in Mainland China (see Figure 6).

An opposing position is expressed by Alfred W. McCoy in The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1972) in which he maintains that China's narcotics supply dried up in 1949 and that she is no longer a factor in the international narcotics traffic. He holds that the source of Asian heroin is refineries in Hong Kong and the "Golden Triangle" of northeastern Burma,



## NARCOTICS COLLECTION POINTS AND EXIT ROUTES



Map shows the opium growing area on the Chinese mainland. Communists are using drugs as a weapon

[Sources: Ch'en Shen-wen "Narcotics Offensive" Free China Review February 1974 p. 26; see also Deacon 1974 p. 280]

Figure 6



northern Thailand, and northern Laos where approximately one thousand tons of raw opium (70 percent of the world's illicit supply) is harvested. McCoy's book is well documented with over ninety pages of footnotes.

As to which position is correct, in view of the conflicting evidence, the writer concludes that neither has been proved. However, it seems most unlikely that the People's Republic of China would forgo the opportunity to make high profits from the current demand for illicit drugs. Moreover, it is within the realm of possibility that drug sales assisted Peking in neutralizing her foreign debts.

#### 5. Foreign Aid

In 1970 the People's Republic of China overtook the Soviet Union as the main communist donor of economic aid to developing countries (see Figure 7; in 1970 the Chinese amount was \$709 million as compared with a Soviet figure of \$204 million). According to the Foreign Policy Association China's main political objectives in her increasing program of foreign aid are to undermine Soviet influence among both non-communist governments as well as world revolutionary movements and to establish itself as the leading spokesman for the world's underprivileged, nonwhite majority [Great Decisions 1973 pp. 8-9]. Sino-Soviet polemics concerning foreign aid are listed in Appendix A. It suffices to note here that a trend has begun toward reduced foreign aid on the part of the Soviet Union while Communist China has





CHINA: EXTENSIONS OF ECONOMIC AID TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, BY COUNTRY 1956-71

(In millions of U.S. dollars)

|                          | Total | 1956-60 | 1961-64 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 |
|--------------------------|-------|---------|---------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| <b>Total</b>             | 2,196 | 180     | 543     | 73   | 118  | 52   | 54   | (1)  | 709  | 467  |
| <b>Africa</b>            | 1,112 | 26      | 247     | 27   | 41   | 22   | 0    | 0    | 454  | 295  |
| Algeria                  | 92    |         | 52      |      |      |      |      |      |      | 40   |
| Central African Republic | 4     |         | 4       |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Congo                    | 25    |         | 25      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Ethiopia                 | 84    |         |         |      |      |      |      |      |      | 84   |
| Ghana                    | 40    |         | 40      |      |      |      |      |      | 10   |      |
| Guinea                   | 66    | 26      |         |      | 30   |      |      |      |      |      |
| Kenya                    | 18    |         | 18      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Mali                     | 55    |         | 42      | 10   | 3    |      |      |      |      |      |
| Mauritania               | 25    |         |         |      |      | 5    |      |      |      | 20   |
| Morocco                  | 137   |         | 20      | 2    | (1)  |      |      |      | 42   | 110  |
| Somalia                  | 82    |         |         |      |      |      |      |      | 201  | 40   |
| Sudan                    | 206   |         | 46      |      | 8    |      |      |      |      | 1    |
| Tanzania                 | 15    |         | 15      |      |      |      |      |      | 201  |      |
| Uganda                   | 218   |         |         |      |      | 17   |      |      |      |      |
| Zambia                   |       |         |         |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| <b>East Asia</b>         | 281   | 76      | 87      | 18   | 43   | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 57   |
| Burma                    | 84    |         | 27      |      |      |      |      |      |      | 57   |
| Cameroon                 | 92    | 49      |         |      | 43   |      |      |      |      |      |
| Indonesia                | 105   | 27      | 60      | 18   |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| <b>Latin America</b>     | 44    | 0       | 0       | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 44   |
| Chile                    | 2     |         |         |      |      |      |      |      |      | 2    |
| Peru                     | 42    |         |         |      |      |      |      |      |      | 42   |
| <b>Middle East</b>       | 275   | 20      | 125     | 0    | 15   | 21   | 12   | (1)  | 43   | 39   |
| Egypt                    | 106   | 5       | 86      |      |      | 21   |      |      |      | 39   |
| Iraq                     | 39    |         |         |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Syria                    | 16    |         | 16      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Yemen (Aden)             | 55    |         |         |      |      |      | 12   |      | 43   |      |
| Yemen (San'a)            | 59    | 15      | 29      |      | 15   |      | (1)  |      |      |      |
| <b>South Asia</b>        | 484   | 58      | 81      | 28   | 19   | 9    | 42   | 0    | 212  | 32   |
| Afghanistan              | 28    |         |         |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Ceylon                   | 85    | 26      | 15      | 28   |      |      |      |      | 12   | 32   |
| Nepal                    | 62    | 32      |         |      | 19   |      | 2    |      |      |      |
| Pakistan                 | 309   |         | 60      |      |      | 9    | 40   |      | 200  |      |

<sup>1</sup> Less than \$500,000.

[Source: People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment 1972 p. 381]  
Figure 7



increased its support of less developed countries. The unanswerable question is not if, but when she will reduce this aid.

#### D. FOREIGN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FACTORS

This section will probe the role played by foreign science and technology in increasing the rate of economic development in communist countries. Included as a case study is a state-of-the-art survey of Sino-Soviet computer technology. While military applications of this technology are sometimes obvious or can be extrapolated from the factual data contained in this section, there is a distinct lack of locally available source data on the specific military applications of Communist computer technology. However, Russian and Chinese computers, computer characteristics, and related technology will be covered in sufficient detail that the reader can easily draw his own conclusions regarding the military implications.

##### 1. Background

According to Kurt Stehling the growth of military and space technology since 1945 has been responsible for starting the computer age. The mechanical calculators used in World Wars I and II and the electronic computers developed since then are a culmination of the historical process of unceasing warfare, mechanization, and reliance upon machines and mathematical aids. For example, the most widely used and familiar calculator, the slide rule, was originally conceived in the middle of the nineteenth century by a French artillery



officer, Amedee Mannheim, in order to improve artillery accuracy by more rapid and precise ballistic calculations. Mechanical calculators were added during World War I to further improve artillery and naval gunfire accuracy. These were improved and refined through World War II not only for the original purposes, but also for the development of new weapons systems such as the atom bomb, bombsights, radar, jet engines, and German V-2 rockets which carried their own mechanical computers for long-range trajectory computations [Stehling 1972 pp. 128-129].

The Korean war and the "Cold War" caused a major boost in U.S. military preparedness expenditures which resulted in the development of new rocket engines, missile guidance, and missile control systems. All of these depended upon an increasingly sophisticated family of first generation electronic computers to handle increasing amounts of data. The United States Air Force's Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) early-warning radar air defense system of the 1950's and 1960's was the first large-scale development and application of first generation vacuum-tube computers in the United States. The first large-scale business application of computers was the American Airlines "SABRE" reservations system designed to help solve the critical "no-show" problem of large airlines.

On 4 October 1957 the Russian Sputnik I was launched which resulted in the great U.S.-U.S.S.R. space race, not to mention a significant shift in emphasis toward the study of





hard science in American schools and universities. In 1960, President Kennedy announced the program to send a man to the moon as a national goal. One spin-off of this highly successful program has been the rapid development of transisterized second and integrated-circuit third generation computers in the United States. This case study will examine the state-of-the-art of communist computer technology today.

## 2. Soviet Computer Development and Foreign Technology

A review of computer literature, including Russian translations and the analysis of American experts who have visited Russia, seems to indicate that the Russians lag the United States by several years but have the raw technical potential to achieve near parity in the early 1980's. Lack of centralized planning (normally omnipresent in communist nations) in Moscow has resulted in a failure to establish systematic programming and support services for business and commercial applications of computers. For such fields as missile warfare and space exploration, however, the Russians seem far less behind the United States than formerly [Stehling 1972 p. 236].

Another source of the Soviet lag is the lack of time-sharing systems in the Soviet Union according to N. Moiseyev, deputy director of the Computing Center of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow. Writing in Pravda, he has urged that his center be used as an experimental base for the time-sharing technique. The Center is located in southwest Moscow and is one of the few places in the Soviet Union known to have



Besm-6 machines, the largest Soviet computers. Time-sharing systems, long used in the United States, are designed to make maximum use of precious computer time of the powerful central processor by linking it with hundreds or even thousands of users over high-speed communication lines. Moiseyev decried what he described as the present tendency of each major industrial plant, research institute, design bureau, or university to have its own computing center. The practice results in inefficient use of computing capacity and the dissemination of many small machines among users tends to discourage the use of powerful computers needed for some problems. He also urged the introduction of American-styled software or program developing organizations that would sell their services to the user and thereby simultaneously enable the use of machines for many different problems. American experts have found the time-sharing programs proposed for the Siberian Department of the Academy of Science in Novosibirsk to be outdated by American standards and dependent upon the introduction of the new third-generation Ryad computers [Shabad "Soviet Lag Cited in Computer Use" New York Times 6 January 1974 p. 16].

Perry warns that an a priori assumption that the Soviet military research and development process is inefficient may be invalid and that in several respects U.S. practices may be inferior in the long run. One distinction he makes is that the Soviet military research and development



(R&D) system is markedly more efficient than its civil-sector equivalent, which may be the reverse of the present situation in the United States. Another is that the Soviet Union generally favors a pattern of continuing design and development, with evolutionary models succeeding one another at regular intervals, and with a pronounced dependence on prototyping as an aid to production decisions. The U.S. emphasis is on production rather than research and development, and more benefits accrue to producers than to developers. Customers for military research and development in the Soviet Union have an evident aversion to high-risk technology whereas U.S. military customers have been willing to accept risk for large advances in technology and are willing to pay the high costs involved. The dependence of the U.S. R&D process on continued production programs is in marked contrast to a Soviet reliance on central, stable funding that allows the persistence of a relatively steady-state R&D process. If American R&D budgets continue to be subject to attrition, as seems likely, the United States may be obliged to accept major changes in its acquisition policies and practices; otherwise, the Soviets may be able to overcome whatever technological advantage the United States has acquired by reason of its relatively higher investment in military R&D during the 1950's and 1960's [Perry 1973 pp. v-vii].

According to the Area Handbook for the Soviet Union, the fields of automation and computerization are the clearest examples of Russian technological lag behind five to ten







years behind the U.S. Soviet computers are slower, have less memory capacity, and are less varied and adaptable to different tasks than U.S. computers. First generation Soviet computers, the M-20 and Ural 1, were not produced until 1959. Second generation machines in the Ural series appeared after 1961 but are known to be infamously inefficient, particularly the Ural 4. Large computers in the Minsk and Besm series have been subsequently developed. The Besm-6 is the most advanced model now in general use, handling a million operations a second. Seventy percent of the medium and small computers have been developed at the Kiev Cybernetics Research Institute, a center for research into mass production of computers. These include the Mir series for scientific computations and the Dnepr series for control of production processes. The new Ryad series to be produced at the Minsk plant is to be the heart of a nationwide computer network linking 800 regional data-processing centers. Despite the traditional Soviet emphasis on the practical application of science, the fact is that more resources are devoted to research than to development. Research scientists enjoy greater prestige and financial rewards than their counterparts in industry. The technological lag in the computer and other Soviet industries does not appear to be caused by lack of funding, trained personnel, or any inherent weakness in research and development sectors. Rather, the lag seems to result from a failure to translate the innovative findings



of basic research into the development of new computers, products, and manufacturing processes [Keefe 1971 pp. 369-370].

A flood of articles in recent issues of the Current Digest of the Soviet Press clearly demonstrates that the Soviet government, scientists, academicians, and journalists are well aware of the weaknesses noted above and are taking action to correct them. The following series of brief quotes excised from lengthy articles demonstrate this:

In our country, the production of electronic machines and their external devices and elements is dispersed among various ministries and departments. In none of them are computers the main type of output. Hence, the lack of coordination between computer developers and industry, the irrational utilization of cadres of mathematicians specializing in this field and designers, and the difficulties with plans for material supply and the development and production of these machines.

The fact that the computer producers have no single boss to carry out a uniform technical policy fully accounts for even such phenomena as the production of different types of electronic computers that have incompatible programs and operate with different machine languages. Incompatibility and 'polyglotism' are very appreciable phenomena from an economic standpoint [Mkrtchyan Current Digest of the Soviet Press 2 October 1974 pp. 8-9].

The second and no less important question is that of the difficulties connected with computer software. Under the existing state of affairs, thousands of organizations that have acquired a computer are left 'alone with it' and are compelled to work out the software for their jobs virtually from scratch. Moreover, information exchanges have not been organized. Consequently, work is inevitably duplicated. Additional difficulties in this respect are caused by the fact that the computers we turn out are not provided with a set of program compilers [Semenikhin Current Digest of the Soviet Press 16 October 1974 p. 7].





To accelerate the commissioning of automated management systems, a shift to the designing of computer centers and automated management systems and the writing of standardized programs for them is under way.

...The U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers has adopted the proposal of the State Committee for Science and Technology and the Ministry of Instrument Making, Means of Automation and Control Systems on organizing a special association to write programs for Ryad-type computers on a centralized basis and according to customers' orders, and to provide the personnel of automated management systems with the necessary assistance in putting these programs into effect.

...The creation of a uniform system of interacting computer centers in the country, equipped with up-to-date computers, will make it possible to compile optimized national-economic plans for any required number of indices.

This state network will be based on territorial and group time-sharing computer centers [Zhimerin Current Digest of the Soviet Press 6 November 1974 pp. 14-15].

...the same is true of systems of time-sharing computer centers, the form of computer use that best meets the needs of the socialist system of a planned economy. There are two approaches to the utilization of computer technology and the development of automated management systems -- the decentralized and the centralized. At present, the decentralized or departmental approach is dominant -- it reflects the desire of enterprises, organizations, ministries and departments to possess and service their own computers and to set up small computer centers, as well as their negative attitude toward specialization and its obvious advantages. The proponents of this approach oppose the concentration of computer technology and information, upholding narrow departmental interests, they see the merits of decentralization but not its shortcomings.

...It is necessary to solve a number of other organizational problems too, including...the broader and more efficient utilization of foreign experience and imported technology. The problems of improving repair work, the training of cadres and the recruitment of highly qualified specialists, including





foreigners, for work on the creation and introduction of automated management systems must also be solved [Samborsky Current Digest of the Soviet Press 6 November 1974 pp. 15-16].

In an unclassified report on advanced weapons forecasting published by the Defense Intelligence Agency Woodhouse draws the following conclusions regarding the future of Soviet technology forecasting:

a. Since Premier Kosygin's official endorsement of economic, scientific, and technological forecasting in 1965, forecasting has gained acceptance at the highest levels of the Soviet government. Because of its lack of acceptance and use in decision-making in the U.S., this will almost certainly lead to major advances in technology forecasting in the Soviet Union.

b. The prestige of forecasting and forecasters has grown as technological forecasting became a major factor in the preparation of the state economic Gosplan.

c. Although many Soviet forecasting techniques have been borrowed from the West, V. M. Gluhkov, the "father" of the Soviet computer industry, has recently introduced new forecasting techniques which have gained immense influence in both the scientific and political spheres.

d. Unless forecasting gains important and influential adherents in U.S. government and industry, leadership in technology forecasting will pass from the U.S. to the Soviet Union during this decade [Woodhouse 1972 pp. 1-22].



A two-way spin-off of the joint U.S. - U.S.S.R. Apollo - Soyuz Test Project is increased knowledge of the other's command and control systems by both sides. Already the lack of advanced technology is evident throughout the Soviet space program. Aviation Week and Space Technology notes that the Soviet control center at Kakhin uses substantially less computer support in handling spacecraft data than its American counterpart. Much Soviet data handling is done by hand, with considerable personnel needed for such activities. Also, telemetry from the Soyuz is substantially less than is common from U.S. spacecraft, because the Soviets do not monitor their simpler systems to such a high degree ["Soviet Control System Limited" Aviation Week and Space Technology 7 October 1974 pp. 12-13]. The implied result is that the U.S. may be giving more information than it is gaining from this mutual scientific venture of friendship.

Late in October of 1973 Control Data and the Soviet Union signed a ten-year agreement to cooperate in the design and development of advanced computer technology. It was the first long-term agreement in the computer field between a U.S. firm and the Soviets and might eventually lead to joint manufacturing operations [Britannica Book of the Year 1974 p. 203]. On the same day that the U.S.S.R. signed an agreement with the American Coca-Cola Company (26 June 1974), another agreement was signed with Burroughs Corporation for scientific and technical cooperation in the area of computer



technology, including training and the development, programming, production, and application of computers ["Agreements with U.S. Firms" The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 24 July 1974 p. 28]. These examples represent a practical application of the recommendations made by Samborsky above. Other examples are:

a. Soviet officials have conducted negotiations with IBM to install a computerized central control system as well as satellite operations in each of six sub-divisions of the world's largest truck factory under construction at Naverzhynye Chelny, U.S.S.R. The Soviets are also negotiating with Honeywell to install a multimillion-dollar automated control system within the plant ["U.S. Computer Expected for Soviet Factory" Monterey Peninsula Herald 3 December 1973 p. 10].

b. A ten-year agreement with the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain on the development of economic, scientific, technical, and industrial cooperation was signed on 6 May 1974. British expertise in computer technology was one feature of this agreement ["Agreement Signed" (from Izvestia, 8 May 1974) The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 5 June 1974 pp. 18-19].

c. In 1972 Russia joined the Netherlands in a joint business venture to adapt Dutch computer peripherals - disks, visual display units, etc. - to the Russian Minsk-32 "Elorg" computer. The Elorg computer is the equivalent of the IBM





7000-series, circa 1962 ["Soviet Union: Western Help for Russian Computers" Business Week 24 June 1972 p. 43].

d. Time notes that the Soviets had bought about 100 Western computers by July of 1973, 21 of them from Britain's International Computers Limited. Also, Control Data has delivered the largest Western machine in the Soviet Union, a Model 6200 now at the Dubna Research Institute, and is negotiating to set up a time-sharing network in Russia. Honeywell Bull, a French based subsidiary, has installed an automated record-keeping system at the Gosbank in Leningrad ["Great Bleep Forward" Time 16 July 1973 pp. 52-53].

e. In December of 1973 Westinghouse Electric received approval to construct a \$10-million facility near Warsaw for the production of semiconductor rectifiers and, more recently, Teledyne Microelectronics received an export license to build a hybrid microcircuit assembly facility for Cajavec, a Yugoslav electronics company ["Teledyne Expands Micro-circuit Market" Aviation Week and Space Technology 22 April 1974 p. 44].

f. It was reported on 22 January 1974 that three loans totaling nearly \$40 million were signed in London to finance a joint venture steel mill in Yugoslavia with U.S. technical assistance. Three U.S. companies will supply machinery, licenses, and consultation and will have a \$2.2 million equity in the plant [Facts on File 26 January 1974 p. 56].

g. In late 1973 the Soviet Union signed a contract with the C. E. Lummus Company and Monsanto Chemical Company for



the purchase of a complete \$100 million petrochemical plant to be built at Severodonetsk, 475 miles south of Moscow. The plant will use one of the most recent processes developed by Monsanto which is in use at only one of its plants in the United States ["Russ Buy Complete U.S. Plant" San Jose Mercury 24 November 1973 p. 21].

h. Dzhermen M. Gvishiani, son-in-law of Premier Alexei N. Kosygin and head of the Council of Ministers State Committee on Science and Technology, stated in early 1974 that "Even without most-favored-nation treatment or credits (which the U.S. Congress has since quashed -- the author), much will still be happening. Men and credits are not an absolute." He also disclosed that at that time the Soviets already had 19 agreements with American firms and that the Russian policy was to remain "quiet" and wait for those "who make decisions" in the United States to realize that the Soviet Union was not benefiting in some unknown way ["Soviet Renew Bid for U.S. Know-how" Christian Science Monitor 27 March 1974 p. 1].

Most of the above examples could only have been approved within the American grand strategy framework of detente under the Nixon Administration but not all of "those who make decisions" are convinced of the Soviet Union's benign intentions. Senator Henry M. Jackson (Dem. -- Wash.), Chairman of the Senate Government Operations Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, has repeatedly expressed alarm



over this strategy. Recently, when the Defense Department strongly opposed a contract signed over a year ago, under which Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corporation would build a complete microcircuit facility in Poland, Senator Jackson sponsored an amendment to the Fiscal 1975 Defense Department authorization bill to give the Secretary of Defense increased authority to block the export of advanced technology. Without mentioning Fairchild by name, he charged that "if this production line is built, we will have transferred a large part of our national integrated-circuit technology...we will have removed the largest single problem the Soviet Bloc has in the production of modern computers and enormously upgraded the military potential of our adversaries" ["Avionics Export Efforts Draw Scrutiny" Aviation Week and Space Technology 1 July 1974 pp. 16-17]. More recently, a spokesman for Senator Jackson's committee said the panel expects to examine the sensitive questions involved in the transfer of advanced U.S. technology to the Soviet Union which can result from proposed deals involving the Soviet Aeroflot airline and the U.S. companies of Lockheed, Boeing, and McDonnell Douglas ["Lockheed-Soviet Cooperation Studied" Monterey Peninsula Herald 2 December 1974 p. 21]. Earlier the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George Brown, had warned that the United States might be going too far in the export of critical technology to the Soviet Union. Cited specifically was Soviet liaison with McDonnell-Douglas and





Lockheed ["Exports of Technology to U.S.S.R. Questioned" Christian Science Monitor 11 October 1974 p. 6]. Senator Jackson has been joined by Representative Charles A. Vanik (Dem. - Ohio) in pressing for tighter controls on the export of American technology to the Soviet Union. Both congressmen question the wisdom of selling sophisticated police and criminology equipment to Russia. In Senator Jackson's words: "Are we getting detente when we are going to sell... to the Russians police equipment that will help the KGB to hold the dissidents under even tighter control?" Representative Vanik's position was: "A crime control device can easily be converted into a weapon of oppression. It would be tragic if oppression in the Soviet Union would result from devices and equipment stamped: 'Made in America.'" These comments were prompted by the participation of U.S. companies in Moscow's "Krimtehnika 74" exhibition of 14-28 August 1974. An example was the firm of Voice Identification Incorporated of Somerville, New Jersey, which manufactures an advanced electronic voiceprint device widely used by law enforcement agencies in the United States. This is the same equipment that was used to verify ex-Soviet premier Nikita S. Khrushchev on tapes that were later published as Khrushchev Remembers ["Senator Says Soviets May Buy U.S. Police Devices" Monterey Peninsula Herald 15 July 1974 p. 2].

Soviet Army and Navy leaders have not neglected the military role of computers and "ASC" (Automated Systems of



Control in Soviet parlance) as reflected by translations of Soviet military writers in the winter 1975 Strategic Review. Soviet Rear Admiral V. Babiyy quotes both Marshall Grechko ("The question of the mastery of troop management on the basis of new technical means, with scientific methods, takes on a unique actuality") and Fleet Admiral Gorshkov ("However technically perfect the fleet may be...the basis of naval forces is always man -- the master of all means of warfare") in support of his arguments for increased use of ASC to enhance the quality of combat decision-making with quantitative analysis [Babiyy "Specifics of Making Decisions with the Use of ASC" Naval Collections journal January 1974 as translated in Strategic Review winter 1975 pp. 116-121]. General-Lieutenant Engineer V. Filippov and General-Major Engineer S. Belotserkovskiy describe the Soviet Air Force Engineering Academy's use of a "Mir" computer center in a manner that could apply to the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School's IBM 360 located in the W. R. Church Computer Center were it not for the usual references in Soviet official writing to statements made by high party officials, in this case Brezhnev's admonishments for scientific-technical progress as the pivot of Soviet economic policy [Filippov and Belotserkovskiy "Computers and Training" Red Star 18 June 1974 as translated in Strategic Review winter 1975 pp. 124-127].

Appendix C is a listing of all known Soviet Unified Systems (ES) Computers and their specifications.



### 3. Chinese Computer Development and Foreign Technology

"Self-reliance" was one of the most overworked terms in the lexicon of the Peking Review and other English-language publications of Communist China during 1974. With all due respect to the very significant accomplishments of the Peking regime, its actions speak louder than its words. In early 1974 the Communist Chinese Party's theoretical journal, Red Flag, sharply attacked the notion that the key to the country's rapid industrialization is the importation of foreign technology. The article caustically denigrated the "handful of comrades" who "blindly worship foreign technology and equipment" and show lack of confidence in Chinese working masses ["China's Cultural Switch" Christian Science Monitor 17 February 1974 p. 8]. Agence France-Presse service reported that a August 1974 issue of the Shanghai monthly Hsuehsi Yu Pipan ("Studies and Criticisms") attacked Chinese who think "The Moon is rounder abroad" and that "The Chinese are a nation of incompetents." It noted that the withdrawal of Soviet nuclear specialists did not stop the Chinese development of nuclear weapons and that the construction of 10,000 ton ocean-going freighters by 100 percent Chinese in Shanghai shipyards was a feat certain "authorities" believed to be impossible ["Shanghai Monthly Rips 'Round Moon' Chinese" Monterey Peninsula Herald 29 August 1974 p. 21]. Regardless of this proud verbiage, China has continued to seek the purchase of foreign technology and the exchange of scientific experts as evidenced by the following:







a. The Baker Oil Tools Corporation of Los Angeles has sold several million dollars worth of pilot offshore drilling equipment to the Chinese and is negotiating additional major sales of equipment ["China Decides to Accelerate Its Production of Oil" Sunday Peninsula Herald 10 November 1974 p. 11B].

b. In March of 1974 the West German consortium of Schloemann Siemag-AG and Demag-AG, Duisburg, won a \$200 million Chinese contract to commence construction of a \$3.75 billion steel complex in Wuhan. This complex is expected to add 25 percent to the Chinese rolled cold-strip steel capacity when it is completed in 1977. Also, Nippon Steel has signed a major \$15 billion hot-steel rolling mill contract with China ["Marathon Negotiations Net Chinese Contract for German Steel Group" Christian Science Monitor 18 April 1974 p. 5D].

c. The Christian Science Monitor has also reported that China has embarked on a major buying spree of foreign technology commencing in 1972 which has included a French petro-chemical complex costing about \$264 million, American Boeings, and British Trident jet airliners for a total of \$420 million, and oil-drilling equipment including rigs and support vessels ["Peking Reemphasizes Industrial Self-reliance" Christian Science Monitor 25 January 1974 p. 6].

d. The United Aircraft Corporation was given permission by the federal government early in 1974 to discuss the possible sale of American helicopters to China. The



Washington Star-News quoted an unidentified U.S. official as saying that helicopter sales to China are "bound to increase suspicions in Moscow that the U.S. is taking sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute." ["China Copter Sales Eyed" San Jose Mercury 16 January 1974 p. 9].

e. The United States and the People's Republic of China commenced exchanging scientific experts in September of 1974 as a result of an agreement between Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and Premier Chou En-lai reached in Peking in November of 1973. China's groups of experts have included agronomists, seismologists, and laser specialists ["U.S. and China Exchanging Experts" Monterey Peninsula Herald 5 September 1974 p. 22].

The Chinese, just as the Russians, are extremely tight on releasing information concerning military computer technology. However, in July of 1972 a distinguished group of American computer scientists were invited to visit the People's Republic of China for three weeks and to tour computer facilities and to discuss computer technology with Chinese experts in Shanghai and Peking. These are some of their observations:

a. They believed they saw a representative picture of the most advanced non-military computer technology in China.

b. Chinese computer scientists are very well read and eager to learn the very latest research results, for



example, they would repeatedly state "Don't tell us what you have already published, tell us only what has not been published."

c. China's universities seem to play a secondary role in computer development. For example, Tsinghua in Peking, China's most important technically oriented institution of higher learning was virtually closed during the Cultural Revolution (1966 to 1969) and enrollment in 1972 was only one-third of the level in 1966 of 12,000 students.

d. The Telecommunications Factory in Peking produces one to two integrated circuit digital computers a week and the Shanghai Radio Factory Number 13 produces about ten computers per year.

e. The Chinese have been manufacturing integrated circuits, at least in limited quantities, since 1968 -- reportedly the same year in which production of integrated circuits began in the Soviet Union.

f. Computer circuits of the transistor-transistor logic (TTL) family with rise times of 20 to 30 nanoseconds are in use. Emitter-coupled logic (ECL) circuits, in ceramic packages, with rise times of 3 to 4 nanoseconds are in pilot production at the Shanghai Metallurgical Research Institute.

g. Connector technology is weak in laminated printed circuit boards and possible bottlenecks could happen in computer production capability because of it.





h. China emphasizes central processor development over input-output technology because of heavy emphasis on computations in industry. Punched paper tape is used vice punched cards. Output is on CRT's in smaller machines and impact or electrostatic line printers with speeds of 10 lines per second on larger machines. All printing is Arabic numbers and Roman letters.

i. It would be a mistake to conclude that China is "n" years behind the U.S. in computer technology. The Chinese have demonstrated the ability to reach very high levels of technology in a very short time and with little or no help from outside China. Their state of technological knowledge is expanding rapidly. "Much will depend on present and future national priorities in China and on broadening the base of interaction with the Western world." Apparently the interaction cited above is well underway. On 5 October 1973, a group of 14 computer experts from Mainland China commenced a six-week tour of American computer facilities under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences, the Social Research Council, and the American Academy of Learned Societies. A few of the places visited included: Ames Research Center, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Fairchild, and Stanford Reserach Institute ["China's Computer Experts See Ames" San Jose Mercury 7 November 1973 p. 73].



j. Computers seemed to be used exclusively for scientific and engineering calculations. Examples specifically mentioned by the Chinese included lens design, weather prediction, mechanical structure analysis (as in bridge or dam building), and artificial insimulation studies.

k. International Algol (Algorithmically oriented language) is the main computer language used by the Chinese.

l. The Chinese show little interest in mini-computers which have become so prevalent in the United States. They are strongly oriented to produce what they call "super computer" - very big and fast machines such as the Control Data Corporation Star computer and the Burroughs B6700 [Cheatham "Computers in China: A Travel Report" Science 12 October 1973 pp. 134-140]. The October 1974 issue of China Reconstructs, page 23, does, however, picture a desk-sized computer called the "Great Wall 203" which is claimed to be 2.5 times as fast as foreign calculators of the same size, have twice the storage capacity, and an expanded computer language.

The Communist Chinese emphasis on research and development and scientific modernization is underlined by the spectacular growth in the total number of research institutions since 1949 - from 100 to between 1,500 and 2,000 [Encyclopedia Americana volume 6 1973 p. 562]. For a listing and the principal characteristics of some Chinese computers see part 2 of Appendix C.



## E. STRATEGIC FACTORS

Appendix D represents a side by side comparison of Communist Chinese and Russian orders of battle taken from the Military Balance 1974-1975 published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Figure 8 shows the chronological build-up of military forces in the Sino-Soviet border areas from 1967 until 1973 and was taken from the Strategic Survey 1973, again published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.


### 1. Logistics

From the sheer size of the Soviet military build-up along the Sino-Soviet border and in their Far Eastern fleet it is evident that the Kremlin learned its lesson during World War II and has no intention of repeating Stalin's error of failing to mobilize in 1941 against Germany. However, the failure of logistical support to both the Far Eastern military and naval commands has been a historic weakness of Russia and proved decisive in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. Here again Russia seems to have learned and has developed a high degree of flexibility in logistical support for her Far Eastern forces. Noteworthy are the opening of the Arctic Sea supply and transit route, the work in progress to complete the new Baikal-Amur railway, the fact that the opening of the Suez canal will shorten the sea supply line to the Indian Ocean from 11,000 miles (from Vladivostok) to only 2,000 miles (from Black Sea ports), the stockpiling of military supplies in Siberia, negotiations for additional "coaling





### Build-up of Forces in the Sino-Soviet Border Area\*



**Notes:** \* Soviet Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern Military Districts and Outer Mongolia; Chinese Sinkiang, Shenyang and Peking Military Regions (also Inner Mongolia – formerly a separate Military Region, now part of the Peking Military Region) are included in the totals.

From 1963 to 1966 the Soviet Union strength in the Far East was 17 divisions. There was no data for China.

Soviet mechanized divisions have about 11,000 men, armoured divisions about 9,000. Chinese infantry divisions have between 12,000 and 14,000 men, armoured about 10,000. Soviet armoured strength is 3-10 divisions; China may have as many as three armoured divisions in the area.

[Source: Strategic Survey 1973 1974 p. 67]

Figure 8



stations" in India, Africa, Spain, and Portugal, and the development of large, high-payload aircraft such as the Antonov An-12 "Cub" which can operate on skis and Antonov An-22 "Cock" which has a specially designed landing gear for off-runway operation (the 1967-68 issue of Jane's All the World's Aircraft notes that the main tire mounts retract into fuselage fairings and that tire pressure can be adjusted both in flight and on the ground to suit the airfield surface; see page 375).

Notwithstanding these factors, the long trans-Siberian railroad would probably be depended upon to move the bulk of men and material to the Far East in the event of war and it is vulnerable to attack by Chinese aircraft, airborne forces, missiles, and/or commando-type raids. Thomas Robinson holds that if the railway is severed in a military conflict then Siberia would be effectively isolated and placed at the mercy of an invader because it is not self-sufficient [Robinson "Soviet Policy in East Asia" Problems in Communism November-December 1973 p. 38].

## 2. Possible Battle Scenarios

China is relatively secure from attack from the south; there has never been a major successful invasion through the mountainous terrain of East or Central Asia from the south nor has there been any large-scale amphibious invasion along the Chinese coast. China is vulnerable, however, to naval amphibious attack and invasion along her long eastern seaboard



where most of her people and industry are located. Granted that an invader would face formidable military obstacles such as mountains, wide rivers, and a huge and defiant population, nevertheless he might conclude that this is the optimum area to attempt a rapid and decisive military victory. As China's access to the open sea is impeded in the south by the ring of South and Southeast Asian states and in the east by the island chain which extends from the southern tip of the Kamchatka Peninsula to the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula, any seapower capable of maintaining control of the sea and air in the area is in a position to invade China. John R. Dewenter believes that from the outset the Chinese Communists have considered coastal defense their first priority, originally due to the presence of hostile Nationalist and American naval vessels but more recently as a result of "Soviet revisionism's naval ring of encirclement against China." [Dewenter "China Afloat" Foreign Affairs July 1972 pp. 746-747]. The Russian navy has a history of successful use of gunboat diplomacy and seapower against China during the past century. The Liaotung Peninsula was leased from China partly as a result of a Russian cruiser's presence in a Chinese port and gunboats were employed by the Russians against the Chinese Nationalists on the Sungari in 1929 [Holloway "The Red Navy's Role in the Sino-Soviet Split" Naval Institute Proceedings September 1973 p. 23].





### 3. The Manchurian Model

Russia has had extensive military experience in Manchuria in the last century with results ranging from defeat in the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War, through the 1938-1939 frontier clashes, to victory in the 1945 Manchurian Campaign. It should be noted that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria commenced on 9 August 1945 three days after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. Under the command of Marshal Vasilevskiy, the Soviet attack was comprised of a three prong advance against a demoralized, poorly armed, "shell" of a Kwantung Army which had been depleted of its strength by manpower demands elsewhere (see John Toland, The Rising Sun New York: Bantam Books, 1970, pp. 833 passim). In a rare statement a Soviet source admitted that the Japanese Manchurian garrison had been reduced in the latter half of 1943 and in 1944 [Gallagher 1963 p. 34]. Another important point to keep in mind regarding the Soviet victory is that the battle lasted only ten days before an unconditional surrender was made by the Kwantung Army. A more lengthy campaign would have sorely taxed Russia's ability to supply her army which was known to be having logistical problems. Major Michael E. Ekman, U.S. Army, has written a brilliant analysis of the Soviet Manchurian Campaign and has noted that the present order of battle in Manchuria between Russia and China is almost exactly the same today in regard to force dispositions as



it was in 1945 between Russia and China. He relates the Soviet High Command's strategic plan then to call for three simultaneous converging offensives aimed at Central Manchuria:

...The Transbaikal Front was to strike east from the Tamtsak salient on the Mongolian People's Republic frontier in the west; the Second Far Eastern Front was to attack along a broad front from the north, cross the Amur River, and strike south from the area southwest of Khabarovsk; and the First Far Eastern Front was to attack westward from the Primorye" [Ekman "The 1945 Soviet Manchurian Campaign: A Model for Sino-Soviet War" Naval War College Review July-August 1974 p. 83].

Ekman concludes that the Soviet High Command could use a similar strategy based on a 7-10-day campaign designed to neutralize the People's Liberation Army, destroy China's nuclear capability, and topple Mao's regime, but would do so only if they felt assured they could conclude the war rapidly on their terms. Failure would mean protracted guerrilla war and possibly the beginning of World War III.

#### 4. Strategic Balance Trends

A significant shift took place in the world military balance of power between the United States, Russia, and China during the first half of this decade. By almost any yardstick a preponderance of military power has shifted from the West to the Soviet and Chinese blocs. American news coverage for several years was saturated by frontpage stories of the events of "Watergate" which led to the resignation of former President Nixon. Perhaps of more long-range significance to the fate of the American republic are stories



which were often pushed to the back pages. A few representative titles serve to illustrate the point: "U.S. Sea Supremacy Lost, Zumwalt Says," Monterey Peninsula Herald, 30 June 1974, page 5A; "Nuclear Superiority Lost, Admiral Says" (in this case, Vice Admiral Joseph P. Moorer, Commander of the Eastern Sea Frontier), Monterey Peninsula Herald, 16 May 1974, page 10; "Soviets Reach Parity with U.S. Nuclear Subs," Christian Science Monitor, 13 March 1974, page 3D; "Soviet Defense Boss Seeks Bigger Arsenal," San Jose Mercury, 15 January 1974, page 15; "Russ Arms Buildup Will Go On," San Jose Mercury, 24 February 1974, page 31; "Soviet Arms Gains Surprise Washington: Four New ICBMs Tested - Three of Them MIRV's," Christian Science Monitor, 15 March 1974, page 5F; "Russians Test Monster Missile," San Jose Mercury, 1 September 1974, page 22; "Soviet Arms Parade Displays Airborne Minitank with Parachute," San Jose Mercury, 8 November 1973, page 22; "Russia Reported Leading, China Building Nuclear Capability," Monterey Peninsula Herald, 20 September 1974, page 32; "Soviets Surpass U.S. in Surface-air Weaponry: Lessons from Mideast War," Christian Science Monitor, 7 December 1973, page 1; "Big Build-up Seen in Chinese A-power," Christian Science Monitor, 20 September 1974, page 8; "China Accuses Soviets of A-Arms Expansion," Monterey Peninsula Herald, 8 April 1974, page 8; and "New China N-Test Activity Reported," Monterey Peninsula Herald, 24 October 1974, page 11. It should be noted that only one of the above stories was deemed newsworthy enough by the editor to make front page news.







The editor of Jane's Fighting Ships has reported that the Soviet Union has more nuclear submarines than all the NATO fleets combined and has a considerable lead in anti-ship armament. He also cites China's rapid progress in building destroyers and missile frigates which theoretically give the Chinese their first fleet offensive capability ["Jane's Sees Red Fleet Growing as West Lags" Monterey Peninsula Herald 29 August 1974, p. 10]. Admiral John McCain, Jr., (USN -- retired) notes that the Chinese navy has the world's third largest fleet of 40 attack submarines and a growing missile patrol boat force. He also warns that as we reduce our forces in the western Pacific as a result of the Nixon Doctrine we must place increasing reliance on air and naval power with the army as a strategic reserve to maintain a credible presence in Asia [McCain "The Communist Military Threat" Asian Outlook April 1974 p. 19]. Dewenter notes that the Red Chinese navy is, or soon will be, the third largest in terms of personnel and small high-speed patrol craft [Dewenter "China Afloat" Foreign Affairs July 1972 p. 749]. The Communist Chinese Air Force was noted as the world's third largest as early as 1972 ["Communist China's Air Force" NATO's Fifteen Nations August-September 1972 p. 72]. China's capacity for nuclear attack has progressed to where she has about 50 MRBM's, between 20-30 IRBM's, and a delivery force of about 100 Tu-16 medium bombers and up to 400 Chinese-built F9 Fighter-bombers. U.S. Department of



Defense officials noted in February of 1974 that Chinese development of a 6,000 mile, three megaton ICBM has progressed steadily but slower than estimated. The most recent estimates indicate that the Chinese ICBM will be combat ready in 1976 or 1977 and that an additional two or three years of testing and launch base construction will be required before China could deploy between 10 and 25 operationally-ready ICBM's ["Chinese Development of ICBM Against U.S. Going Slowly" Monterey Peninsula Herald 6 February 1974 p. 26]. NATO analysts have noted that China has between 1,000 and 1,500 technicians on Zanzibar installing an extensive network of missile telemetering equipment and that the 12,000-ton Chinese space and missile tracking ship "Hsian Yang Hung" was already cruising the Indian Ocean in early 1974 ["Communist China's Capacity for Nuclear Attack," NATO's Fifteen Nations, April-May 1974 p. 82]. China conducted an additional atmospheric nuclear explosion in the intermediate range (200 kilotons to 1 megaton) on 17 June 1974 at the Lop Nor test site in Sinkiang Province and was reported to be making preparations for a seventeenth blast in October of 1974 ["New China N-Test Activity Reported," Monterey Peninsula Herald 24 October 1974 p. 11].

The armed forces of both China and Russia are known to be well-trained in nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare defense. Additionally, China has spent an enormous amount of time and energy in building air-conditioned,



well-stocked, underground (25-40 feet deep) bomb shelters throughout China since the border clashes of 1969 in anticipation of a nuclear attack.

This section has highlighted significant strengths and weaknesses in both Chinese and Russian power. One key factor missing because of lack of data is the exact location of military and naval units but, of course, this can change rapidly and unexpectedly just as it did in the case of Chinese troop movements prior to their entry into the Korean War [see Whiting 1960 pp. 116ff. and Marshall 1953 pp. 1-17]. However, the game "The East is Red: the Sino-Soviet War" (New York: Simulations Publications Incorporated, 1974) offers the players four scenarios varying in states of combat readiness from "current" to "full" and in degree of mobilization from one to thirty days. In an unusual "book review" of this game, Michael Markowitz states that the forces deployed on the game board represent current Western intelligence estimates of the available Soviet and Chinese forces [Markowitz Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars April-August 1974 p. 76]. The game designer, James F. Dunnigan, notes in the rules that the biggest unknown in his research for the game is the expected combat performance of both armies neither of which has been in combat for over twenty years. He also reinforces the points made earlier in this section that while the Soviet Union has the nuclear capability to obliterate the entire industrial structure of China, the success of a





Russian invasion of Manchuria would be predicated upon a fast and decisive victory because they have accumulated not more than four weeks of supplies.

#### F. FACTORIAL ANALYSIS OF SINO-SOVIET POWER

This final section of Chapter III represents the author's interpretation of the above data. The conclusions expressed are subject to change as more information on Sino-Soviet relations is made available (for example, refer to the recent activities of Soviet agent Victor Louis in Chapter V).

##### 1. Analysis

Although the Chinese Communist Party is the largest and its top leadership the more stable during the past forty years, changes in its ruling elite are bound to take place during the next decade. The prospects for a violent or smooth transition of Communist Party leadership will be addressed in the next chapter. The fact that Russia has a higher percentage of competent and experienced managers, scientists, and technicians is not expected to change significantly during the next decade in view of the disruptive effects of the Cultural Revolution on China's educational system and the fact that 85 percent of the labor force is still required in agriculture to feed China. While Mao holds that people are the most important things in the world, the immense and growing population of China could prove a strategic and political liability in the event of agricultural



disaster or if cognitive dissonance in the population results from unmet rising expectations among the Chinese people. In comparison to China and most, if not all other countries of the world, Russia has more territory than she requires. China can be expected to continue to covet the Russian territory which she believes to be rightfully hers. She will periodically probe weak areas in Russian border integrity in these areas but will not commit major military forces there. Although Russia has never given up territory it has acquired, it could make limited territorial concessions to placate the second generation Chinese leaders who follow Mao with no serious strategic loss. Russia will probably attempt to do this during the next decade in order to restore viable linkages of influence and limited control in China. The varied terrain of China poses a formidable obstacle to any invader and the logistical difficulties it would cause could prove insurmountable in any sustained campaign. Both Russia and China enjoy the advantages of vast natural resources. If explorations now in progress succeed in discovering new sources of raw material reserves, which seems probable, both could possibly become self-sufficient in the long term with ominous implications for the rest of the world. China now seems embarked upon a program of rapid merchant marine and naval expansion similar to that of the Russians in the early sixties. Its effect cannot avoid increasing the national power and prestige of the People's Republic. Russia, however,



can be expected to retain her substantial lead in this area for the foreseeable future. China's increasing program of foreign aid to less-developed countries requires additional investigation. Unless it contains unknown and revolutionary new techniques, it promises to be no more successful than American and Russian aid programs. All evidence related to the import of technology points to a clear-cut need by Communist China and Russia for Western scientific and managerial products and skills. While Russia is far ahead in the technological race, China's rate of development is increasing. The evidence presented suggests that Western scientific and technical exchanges and cooperation with Russia and China are being conducted with minimal control, coordination, and supervision by the United States government. This could prove to be one of the weakest aspects and most-dangerous spin-offs of detente, detrimental to the national security of the United States in the long run unless it is stopped or an effective supervisory agency is established. Such an agency should be comprised of knowledgeable and technically competent representatives from the Department of State, Department of Defense, and the American scientific community. The weakest link in Soviet military power vis a vis China is the trans-Siberian railroad. Its "life-expectancy" in a Sino-Soviet war is deemed to be very short. Though Russia could overwhelm Chinese naval and border forces in sudden and coordinated attacks, the resilient power of the People's Liberation Army, backed by millions of Chinese





survivors, would be intensified by hate and nationalistic pride and could prove to be fatal to Soviet Russia in any sustained war, especially if other hostile neighbors opened a second or third front. To win a "military victory" against China, Russia would be required to use force in the form of not only conventional, but also nuclear, biological (especially biological), and chemical warfare.

## 2. Future Outlook

Granting that a military victory is possible, for Russia to manage and bring under control the millions of hostile surviving Chinese is highly dubious and would make her susceptible to one of her historic phobias -- a two-front war with Europe and/or the United States in the form of World War III. China can be expected to continue to raise her rate of economic advance and her development of nuclear and conventional weapons in order to influence less developed nations and increase her own feeling of security from the deterrent power of her weapons. She will press her irredentist claims for lost territory whenever she is in a military position of superiority, especially among the islands ringing the mainland. China is more vulnerable to a conventional attack by Russian seapower than by the Red Army along her land borders and cannot overcome this vulnerability in the foreseeable future.

Russia will maintain her forces in Siberia and continue to build-up her Far Eastern fleet. She will attempt to regain influence and control in China after Mao dies. Political succession is the subject of the next chapter.



#### IV. POLITICAL SUCCESSION AND THE SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL CONFLICT

Political succession has been defined as the transfer of sovereign power from a ruler or government to a successor [Rush 1965 p. 1]. It has been described in the past as the Achilles heel of totalitarian regimes but, as Adam B. Ulam notes, comparatively smooth transitions were made after Khrushchev in 1964 and Lin Piao in 1971 without any apparent effect on Russian Communist Chinese foreign policy [Ulam 1974 p. 760]. J. K. Holloway, Jr., observes that the deaths of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai in anything close to quick succession could unbalance any Far Eastern power equation but cautions that State interests often survive leaders' deaths. He cites as examples Russia after Stalin and France after DeGaulle and observes that armies stay in place, and ideologies and national interests tend to change slowly [Holloway "The Red Navy's Role in the Sino-Soviet Split" Naval Institute Proceedings September 1973 p. 22]. There is a common saying among sports fans (and naval strategists) that "you can't tell the players without a program." This section will attempt to identify the key players in any succession crisis in Peking or the Kremlin with special attention to how the outcome might affect Sino-Soviet relations.



## A. CHINESE ELITE POWER STRUCTURE MODELS

A glance at the list of references shows that several China scholars have addressed themselves to the study of elites in Communist China but a closer examination of the biographical data shows that no single approach, or operational code has been accepted to elucidate expected future behavior of these elites. Some of the most popular models or approaches to the study of Chinese elites are concisely summarized by Yung Wei as follows:

1. The "red vs. expert" mode which pictures the differences between the Maoists and the anti-Maoists in the Cultural Revolution as a conflict between those who stress revolutionary experience and those who favor pragmatic technical knowledge as a basis for solving specific problems of state.

2. The "palace coup" model which focuses upon the political intrigues of top ruling cliques and how their actions permeate down through the bureaucratic structures to the entire populace.

3. The "regional vs. central government" model which contrasts the power base of the political elites in Peking with that of the provincial and regional leaders.

4. The "military-party-bureaucratic struggle" model which rests on the group-conflict theory and explains the cultural revolution in terms of a struggle for domination among various professional groups.





5. The "political personality" model which attempts to explain Communist Chinese politics in terms of the personalities of selected leaders. This model is divided into several subgroups. The first uses the techniques of the investigative reporter or intelligence analyst to analyze Chinese political leaders by examining Communist newspapers, broadcasts, photographs, and reading between the lines to ascertain future trends. The second subgroup uses biographical data to determine "who did what to whom and where" but both these approaches fail to answer the question "why?". The third subgroup applies a psychocultural and psychoanalytical approach to political personalities using the tools of cultural anthropology and psychoanalysis. A caveat to this approach is the failure of similar techniques to ascertain accurate personality profiles of potential skyjackers. In an attempt to provide new operational techniques, Yung introduces two heuristic models designed to identify important variables and their interrelationships. The first "elite recruitment and political development" model specifies seven sets of variables upon which data can be gathered and linkages can be developed. These are the social, economic, and political environment, personal background, political ideology, path of recruitment, types of elites, types of elite conflicts, and outcomes of elite conflicts. His second model is entitled "elite dominance and political development" and concentrates upon comparing the two elite groups in Nationalist and Communist China by linking three sets of



variables: time periods, types of political elites, and types of chronological crises faced by each [Yung Wei "Elite Conflicts in Chinese Politics: A Comparative Note" Studies in Comparative Communism Spring/Summer 1974 pp. 64-73].

The Asia 1975 Yearbook, published by the Far Eastern Economic Review, states that the simplistic theory that Chinese domestic politics are determined by the interactions of two groups, the Maoists and the anti-Maoists, was proved false by the events of 1974. It noted that the "three pillars" of the political system (Party, Army, and Administration) have been differentiated into no less than six discernable factions as the result of internal conflict and controversy. The Review identifies these factions as:

1. Those leaders of the State administrative and diplomatic machine who were not purged during the Cultural Revolution, such as Chou En-lai, Li Hsien-nien, Tung Pi-wu, Nieh Hung-chen, Chi Peng-fei and Chia Kuan-hua.
2. Party and administrative cadres who were purged during the Cultural Revolution but later reinstated, probably led by Teng Hsiao-ping.
3. The cultural revolutionary Left led by Chiang Ching, Yao Wen-yuan, and possibly Chang Ghun-chiao.
4. An emerging Secret Police left-wing, whose members have gained great influence since the Tenth Party Congress.
5. The regional military leaders who remain strong notwithstanding their setback in late 1973.



6. A new and highly professional central military elite represented in the Politbureau by Yek Chien-ying and Su Chen-hua and which gained strength with the rehabilitation of Yang Cheng-wu

The Review concludes that compromises between these factions are possible as Mao seems to be retreating into the role of promoting the legality of the political system and that alliances may have already formed to deal with long-range development policies and generational, rather than personal, succession [Asia 1975 Yearbook Far Eastern Economic Review 1974 pp. 148-150].

The Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University lists five additional succession models, some of which are similar, but not identical, to those already covered. They are:

1. The "palace politics" model which holds that Chinese politics and succession revolve around the ambitions of individual aspirants. Andrew Nathan is cited as a proponent of this model. He describes Chinese politics as a pyramid, the entire structure of which will crumble if the man at the apex is removed. The Center cautions that this approach can only result in abstract generalities concerning predictions of future events in China because facts about personal interrelationships among China's ruling elite are virtually non-existent to outside researchers.

2. The "bureaucratic politics" model which perceives international politics as the interrelation of contending





bureaucracies rather than individual states. Dr. William Whitson, a critic of this approach, holds that Chinese political factions coalesce around particular policy prescriptions rather than bureaucratic lines in emergency situations.

3. The "geographic approach" model which notes that individual Chinese remain loyal to the leaders in the 29 provinces or military regions, rather than to the Peking regime. A variant of this concept of China as a confederation is the split between the North and South regions in China. In addition to differences in diet and dialect, Southern China is most concerned with amphibious invasion by sea and air, especially by the U.S. or Japan, while Northern China concentrates on the Soviet threat of an invasion by land. Whitson believes that the current older leaders from the southern Yangtze Valley will be replaced during the next five years by recruits taken from Northern China during World War II who have moved to positions just below the High Command levels. The Center notes that China is composed of five key regions with 80 percent of its military and economic power concentrated in the North-east (Manchuria and Peking). Other regions are Wu Han, the Szechuan region along the western part of the Yangtze River, the Central-east area of Nanking and Shanghai, and Canton. Four of the regions are commanded by the Second and Third Field Army groups which are northerners.



4. The "historical" model in which the five field armies organized during the revolution, represents the configuration of power today.

5. The "ideology" model which breaks Chinese politics into the orthodox or conservative faction versus the Maoists or radicals. Whitson cautions that while this model is the most popular, it is an oversimplification because of the constant shifting of Chinese political actors [Cline and Rader, ed. "The Struggle for Power in Peking and Its Impact on the Outside World" Center for Strategic and International Studies Report 25 June 1974, pp. 1-6].

#### B. SINO-SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE ELITES

Figures 9 and 10 are taken from an excellent article published in the Spring/Summer 1973 edition of Studies in Comparative Communism entitled "A Comparison of the Current Chinese and Soviet Central Committees" by Derek J. Waller and Robert H. Donaldson. This section will cite some of their findings to depict changes and trends in the political elites of the two rival powers. Waller and Donaldson define the Soviet and Chinese political elite as the Central Committees of their communist parties and utilize biographical and career data on the full members of the 1969 Chinese Central Committee and the 1971 Soviet Central Committee. In Table 1 of Figure 9, entitled "Distribution of Soviet and Chinese Central Committees by Rank," they note that while Soviet incumbents remained relatively stable at 64%, new



members of the Chinese Central Committee represented 81% indicating a high turnover rate due in part to the impact of the Cultural Revolution. Table 2 of Figure 9 examines a comparison of the ages of the Russian and Chinese Central Committee members and shows that while 42 percent of the Soviet elite was born later than 1914 only 7 percent of the Chinese elite fall into this category demonstrating that the average age of the Chinese elite is older than that of the Russians. Waller and Donaldson observe however, that while the mean age of the Russian elite is increasing (from 51 in 1956 to 58 in 1971) the Chinese elite's mean age held steady at 63 between 1965 and 1969 and probably dropped over the Cultural Revolution period. Table 3 of Figure 9 depicts a breakdown of the career patterns of the two elites. The most striking contrast between them is the fact that the Soviet elite is dominated by party careerists (45%) and the Chinese elite is dominated by military careerists (44%). Another significant difference is the larger contingent of workers and peasants in the Chinese elite (21% as compared with 5% for the Soviet elite). This large percentage is noteworthy as the workers and peasants were included in the Chinese elite for the first time in 1969, possibly at the demand of Mao. Table 4 of Figure 10 depicts the variable "current occupation" which is defined as the sector where elite members were employed at the time of their most recent election as compared to a previous election. This shows a trend toward diversification and specialization in the Soviet





elite by slightly less representation of the party and more by administrators and managers (the "other" category). In contrast, the Chinese elite shows a sharp decline in party representation plus the "other" category of managerial specialists while the military and labor sectors show impressive gains. Table 5 of Figure 10 is a comparison of the two elites based upon whether central committee incumbents work principally in Moscow or Peking, in regions, or abroad. The figure demonstrates that the two elites are similar in their geographical distribution but that the Soviets have a larger percentage of their Central Committee stationed abroad. What is not shown is the fact that in 1965, 81 percent of the Chinese elite was located in Peking. The later percentage of 43 percent represents a move to increase regional elite representation to prevent moves toward regional autonomy. Waller and Donaldson conclude that the current Soviet elite composition tends to prove the hypothesis that an increasingly industrialized and complex society demands replacement of "revolutionary veterans" by "managerial modernizers" or the triumph of the "experts" over the "reds" cited earlier. In contrast, the composition of the Chinese elite seems to reject this model in favor of filling vacancies with revolutionary generation colleagues rather than younger managers (with the exception of Wang Hung-wen who might be considered a token gesture toward youthful representation). Also, the dramatic increase in



TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET AND CHINESE CENTRAL COMMITTEES BY RANK

| Rank         | Soviet |     | Chinese |     |
|--------------|--------|-----|---------|-----|
|              | No.    | %   | No.     | %   |
| Full members | 241    | 100 | 170     | 100 |
| Incumbents   | 153    | 64  | 32      | 19  |
| New members  | 88     | 36  | 138     | 81  |
| Politburo    | 21     | 9   | 25      | 14  |

TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF THE SOVIET AND CHINESE CENTRAL COMMITTEES BY BIRTHDATE

| Birthdate   | Soviet<br>(N = 232) |        | Chinese<br>(N = 85) |        |
|-------------|---------------------|--------|---------------------|--------|
|             | %                   | Cum. % | %                   | Cum. % |
| Before 1900 | 3                   | 3      | 21                  | 21     |
| 1900-1904   | 7                   | 10     | 12                  | 33     |
| 1905-1909   | 21                  | 31     | 28                  | 61     |
| 1910-1914   | 28                  | 59     | 32                  | 93     |
| 1915-1919   | 22                  | 81     | 6                   | 99     |
| 1920-       | 20                  | 101 *  | 1                   | 100    |

\* Total exceeds 100% because of rounding of individual entries.

TABLE 3. CAREER PATTERNS OF THE SOVIET AND CHINESE CENTRAL COMMITTEES (Percentage)

| Career               | Soviet (N = 235) | Chinese (N = 163) |
|----------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| State                | 26               | 18                |
| Party                | 45               | 10                |
| Military             | 10               | 44                |
| Workers and peasants | 5                | 21                |
| Other                | 14               | 7                 |
| Total                | 100              | 100               |

[Source: Waller, D. J. and R. H. Donaldson "A Comparison of the Current Chinese and Soviet Central Committees" *Studies in Comparative Communism* Spring/Summer 1973 pp. 56-58] Figure 9



TABLE 4. CURRENT OCCUPATIONS OF THE SOVIET AND CHINESE CENTRAL COMMITTEES  
WITH COMPARISONS OF THE 1956 ELITES  
(Percentage)

| Current Occupation   | Soviet            |                   | Chinese          |                   |
|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|
|                      | 1956<br>(N = 133) | 1971<br>(N = 241) | 1956<br>(N = 96) | 1969<br>(N = 166) |
| State                | 38                | 40                | 33               | 32                |
| Party                | 55                | 41                | 27               | 8                 |
| Military             | 5                 | 8                 | 24               | 34                |
| Workers and peasants | 0                 | 5                 | 0                | 21                |
| Other                | 2                 | 7                 | 16               | 5                 |
| Total                | 100               | 101 *             | 100              | 100               |

\* Total exceeds 100% because of rounding of individual entries.

In both the Soviet and Chinese cases, persons coded in the workers-and-peasants category normally are "leading" or "shock" workers. Far from being typical manual laborers, they are usually persons who are being singled out for special virtues or accomplishments in the field of production.

TABLE 5. LEVEL OF CURRENT OCCUPATION OF THE SOVIET AND CHINESE CENTRAL COMMITTEES  
(Percentage)

| Level    | Soviet (N = 240) | Chinese (N = 168) |
|----------|------------------|-------------------|
| Center   | 46               | 43                |
| Regional | 48               | 57                |
| Abroad   | 6                | 1                 |
| Total    | 100              | 101 *             |

\* Total exceeds 100% because of rounding of individual entries.

[Source: Waller, D. J. and R. H. Donaldson "A Comparison of the Current Chinese and Soviet Central Committees" Studies in Comparative Communism Spring/Summer 1973 pp. 60-62]

Figure 10





the numbers of career military men seems to reflect the need to consolidate and strengthen the regime in the aftermath of the cultural revolution [Waller and Donaldson "A Comparison of the Current Chinese and Soviet Central Committees" Studies in Comparative Communism Spring/Summer 1973 pp. 51-65].

Thus far this chapter has described and briefly explained various techniques used by political analysts to study Sino-Soviet elites. For a more detailed description the reader is invited to consult the list of references, especially Robert A. Scalapino's work, Elites in the People's Republic of China. No attempt will be made here to develop or expand these models as this is beyond the scope of this thesis. Moreover, any of them would be a fitting subject for additional research. The next section is designed to provide the reader with a limited biographical profile of specific personalities among the ruling elite of the People's Republic of China.

#### C. COMMUNIST CHINESE POLITICAL SUCCESSION CANDIDATES

No one outside China, nor perhaps inside China, knows who will inherit the leadership of the regime when Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai pass from the scene. Still the transition to the post-Mao/Chou era is anticipated with great interest by national policy-makers around the world because of the possible effects it will have upon international politics in general and super-power political relations in particular. Among the important questions to be answered by this transition of power is whether it can be done smoothly so that



China can maintain a moderate foreign policy or whether it will lead to a violent struggle for power, social anarchy, and possible economic collapse which would invite direct intervention by the Soviet Union under the guise of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Twice before in the cases of Liu Shao-chi and Lin Piao the policy of publicly designating an heir to Mao has failed and it is unlikely that this mistake will be made again. The present situation seems to center around Chou En-lai, only four years Mao's junior, managing a future succession crisis by building some type of collective leadership which can survive the death of Mao. As the events of the cultural revolution and the alleged plot of Lin Piao show, a historical model of intrigue, violence, and suspicion has evolved among the top leadership which suggests that the transition to a post-Maoist era might take place in an environment of dangerous national instability. If this proves to be the case, the Soviet troops can be expected to move into China to "restore order" to a "brotherly" socialist state.

Mao has become somewhat of a "living Buddha" or god to the mainland Chinese who are a society that venerates age and experience. However, as Harry Harding, Jr. observes, Mao's death will reduce the influence of his ideology in at least two important ways. First, Chinese leaders will soon discover the ambiguity of Mao's writings which can interpreted in innumerable ways. Without Mao to resolve disagreements over interpretation, his ideology can be expected to decay into a set of ritualized cliches to reinforce decisions



already reached on pragmatic grounds. Secondly, it is unlikely that any group of leaders will emerge that can combine Mao's commitment to revolutionary values with his ability to mobilize enough political support to see them implemented. Harding concludes that Maoism will probably become a perpetual counterculture in post Maoist China, able to criticize trends toward increasing bureaucracy and specialization in policy-making, but unable to halt them [Harding 1974 pp. 46-47]. The remaining part of this section will identify key members of the Chinese Communist Party from among whom some form of collective leadership is likely to emerge when Mao and Chou leave the political stage.

1. Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party

- a. Mao Tse-Tung, Chairman, Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, 81-years old. As biographical information on Mao is interspersed throughout the thesis it will not be repeated here other than to say he reportedly made his last public appearance in August 1973 and has not been seen by foreign visitors to China since 16 January 1975 when he met with Franz Josef Strauss, Chairman of West Germany's Christian Social Union ["Mao Has Seen No Foreigners Since Jan. 16" Monterey Peninsula Herald 6 March 1975 p. 13].

- b. Chou En-lai, Vice Chairman, Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and Premier, State Council, 76-years old. Chou has served as a chief negotiator, administrator and conciliator of the Chinese Communist movement for a half a century. He is architect of China's moderate policy of







detente at home and abroad. The Fourth National People's Congress, China's top legislative body reappointed Chou as Premier on 17 January 1975 and this is generally recognized as a victory of Chou's moderate policies over the opposition of the radical hardline wing of the party led by Mao's wife, Chiang Ching. Robert E. Elegant believes that Chou has effectively destroyed the power base of Mao by masterminding a bloodless coup which saw two of his close friends appointed to key military positions: Teng Hsia-ping to Chief-of-Staff of the People's Liberation Army and Yeh Chien-ying to Minister of Defense [Elegant "Teng May Inherit China's Leadership" Sunday Peninsula Herald 2 February 1975 p. 5B]. As previously noted, Mao's last public appearance was made on 16 January 1975, the day before the above appointments were announced. He was not present at the congress or the plenary session of the Central Committee and no explanation for his absence has been given. It is possible that he was displeased with the results of the Congress although he did succeed in having the position of president (formerly occupied by the purged traitor Lui Shao-chi and aspired to by Lin Piao) abolished from the constitution. It is possible that his absence was "arranged" by reason of his ill-health, age, infirmity, or opposition to the course of events but it is equally possible that he retired to meditate and produce a new series of writings.

c. Teng Hsiao-ping, First Vice Premier of the State Council, Vice Chairman of the Communist Party Standing



Committee of the Politburo, and Chief-of-staff of the People's Liberation Army, 75-years old. As a result of the Fourth National People's Congress, Teng has emerged in the unique position of being the only man in the Chinese hierarchy to simultaneously hold office in the three most powerful organizations in China: the Communist Party, the People's Liberation Army and the government. In the writer's opinion, Teng is the one individual who might succeed Mao and/or Chou if he has the ambition and can maintain a coalition of support among contending political factions which seems unlikely.

d. Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and Minister of National Defense, 75-years old. An old drinking companion of Chou who is known to have nursed him through a critical illness in the 1920's. Ching Ping and Dennis Bloodworth describe him as an impressive strategist with a flair for guerilla warfare. He was a senior instructor at the Whampoa Military Academy under Chiang Kai-shek in 1924. He spent two years studying tactics and warfare in Russia and Germany in the late 1920's. He is known to be an expert in subversion, infiltration, propaganda, and the fostering of underground activities among Overseas Chinese. He was largely credited with the kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek in 1936 which resulted in a pragmatic alliance between the Kuomintang and Communists against the Japanese. He used his liaison position between the two uneasy partners to effect the defection of sixteen Kuomintang regiments to Mao. He is known to be bitterly opposed to



Chiang Ch'ing and her rebel movement because Red Guards smashed the fingers of his son-in-law, a once gifted pianist. He is a tall, robust, and serene man, quiet in manner, fastidious in appearance, and known for his sometimes unbridled behavior and love of comfort. In 1957 he once described Soviet military achievements as the "priceless assets of all countries in the Socialist camp" but has more recently espoused the Maoist position that it is better for the People's Liberation Army to be "red" than "expert." [Ching Ping and Bloodworth 1973 pp. 162-165].

e. Li Hsien-nien, Vice Premier, State Council, 69-years old. Li succeeded Teng as Minister of Finance, a field he has specialized in for twenty years. Although criticized during the Cultural Revolution, he survived Red Guard attacks due to the protection of Chou En-Lai. Ping and Bloodworth devote more than a chapter of their book, Heirs Apparent, to Li whom they nickname "the Money God." Li commanded a guerilla force of 60,000 men against the Japanese in 1941 and continued to lead troops against the Kuomintang after the defeat of Japan. He is one of few genuine proletarians in the Chinese elite having begun life as a carpenter's apprentice and never having studied other than a course he took in the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University at Yen-an. Still he is among the most traveled of Chinese leaders and impresses foreign visitors as an honest and thoughtful negotiator. Li and his colleagues





in the Finance and Trade Office contrived to pay off all of China's foreign debts and earned for China an international reputation for being a trustworthy partner in banking or trading transactions. He is a protege of Chou En-lai and regarded as the financial key to China's drive for greatness among nations in terms of her expanding trade and nuclear programs [Ching Ping and Bloodworth 1973 pp. 39-47].

f. Chang Chun-chiao, First Secretary of the Shanghai Chinese Communist Party, Chairman of the Shanghai Provincial Revolutionary Committee and full member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, 55-years old. Chang is a highly gifted and relatively young Shanghainese who is in charge of Party administration. Ping and Bloodworth identify him as "the Brain" and as one of the key "extremists" of the Cultural Revolution along with Yao-Wen-yuan and Chiang ch-ing. By 1972, Shanghai was a conspicuous exception to the rule that the military ruled the new party committees in China's 29 provincial divisions [Ching Ping and Bloodworth 1973 pp. 17-26]. Leo Goodstadt cautions that even though the outside world regards him as an advocate of the Party's extreme left wing, a careful study of his speeches reveals a pragmatic mind free of sterile cliches and that Chang has little sympathy for any form of extremism. Also, he is known for his dedication to both Mao and Chou [Goodstadt "The People's Short-list for Power" Far Eastern Economic Review 20 December 1974 pp. 28-29].



g. Li Teh-sheng, Vice Chairman Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and Commander of the Shen-yang Military Region, 61-years old. Li, as the country's senior serving soldier, was out of sight for several weeks in early 1974 and was the target of an extensive wall-poster campaign. He reappeared on the political scene in May of 1974. Transferred from the Peking Military Region in late 1974, his present post commands the Manchurian provinces which is the most strategic region of the nation threatened by Soviet frontier garrisons, for example, China's largest steel plant at Anshan and its major oilfield at Taching ["Chinese Puzzle: Purge that Wasn't?" Christian Science Monitor 7 May 1974 p. 4].

h. Chen Hsi-lieu, Commander of the Peking Military Region and full member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, 61-years old. Chen's military background is significant as he commanded the troops which faced the Soviet border assaults in 1969. He is an artillery specialist, an expert on missile warfare, and believed to have had some Soviet military training. He is the chief military advisor physically located in Peking [Goodstadt "The People's Shortlist for Power" Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 December 1974, p. 30].

i. Chi Teng-Kuei, First Political Commissar of the Peking Military Region and full member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, 60-years old. While formally serving as Chen's political commissar, Chi has in practice shed his army uniform and is one of the two figures in the



top party elite who represent the interests of the provinces in Peking. He has been described as close to Mao and is presumed to have intimate knowledge of the problems of local administrations in implementing central directives [Goodstadt "The People's Short-list for Power" Far Eastern Economic Review 20 December 1974 p. 30].

j. Hua Kuo-feng, First Secretary of the Hunan Chinese Communist Party, Acting Chairman of the Hunan Provincial Revolutionary Committee, and full member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, 60-years old. Another provincial expert, Hua is from Mao's home province and was entrusted with the special responsibility for the investigation of Lin Piao's plot against Mao. He has a successful administrative record and has an excellent background in economic affairs [Goodstadt "The People's Short-list for Power" Far Eastern Economic Review 20 December 1974 p. 30].

k. Wu Teh, Mayor of Peking, First Secretary of the Peking Chinese Communist Party, and full member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, 60-years old. Wu is a third expert in local administration and has been closely connected with ideological affairs [Goodstadt "The People's Short-list for Power" Far Eastern Economic Review 20 December 1974 p. 30].

l. Wei Kuo-ching, First Secretary of the Kwangsi Chinese Communist Party, Chairman of the Kwangsi Provincial Revolutionary Committee, and full member of the Politburo





of the Chinese Communist Party (age unknown). Wei is the leader of China's 50 million non-Han minority people. Because of this and the fact that Kwangsi is in the strategic position just north of the Gulf of Tonkin, Wei survived even though he has been accused of killing thousands of pro-Mao Red Guards and of using arms destined for North Vietnam to do so [Ching Ping and Bloodworth 1973 p. 119].

m. Yao Wen-yuan, Second Secretary of the Shanghai Chinese Communist Party and full member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, 44-years old. One of the two younger generation full members of the Politburo, Yao has been specially praised by Mao for his political orthodoxy and courage. He is an intellectual who has ideological control over the nation's main publications [Goodstadt "The People's Short-list for Power" Far Eastern Economic Review 20 December 1974 p. 30].

n. Wang Hung-wen, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, 38 years old. Wang is the youngest member of the Politburo who seems to serve as a motivational symbol to other young Chinese to show that it is possible to rise overnight from the ranks of peasants and workers to the top elite structure in the nation [Goodstadt "The Peoples Short-list for Power" Far Eastern Economic Review 20 December 1974 p. 30].

o. Chen Yung-Kuei, Secretary of the Shansi Chinese Communist Party, full member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, and designated Model Peasant, 60-years old.



Chen is from the Tachai brigade which has been designated by Mao as the model farming unit for China. Illiterate until middle age, he now tours the country giving extremely effective and down-to-earth speeches on the lessons of the Tachi [Goodstadt "The People's Short-list for Power" Far Eastern Economic Review 20 December 1974 p. 30].

p. Chiang Ching, Mao's wife, full member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, 59-years old. Madam Chiang is a highly controversial figure who regularly dresses in unorthodox Western type suits instead of the standard baggy tunic-and-trousers female uniform. She is viewed by most China-watchers as a leader of the "radical" wing of the party. She was demoted from the Standing Committee of the Politburo in 1973 and has thus lost some of the influence she wielded during the height of the Cultural Revolution. Her tenure seems tied to the longevity of her husband.

Other members of the Politburo of less obvious significance are Chu Te, Chairman of the National People's Congress, Kang Sheng, Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; Tung Pi-wu, Acting Chairman of the People's Republic of China; Hsu Shih-yu, Commander of the Canton Military Region; Liu Po-ch'eng, Vice Chairman of the National People's Congress, and Wang Tung-hsing, Director of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Alternate members of the Politburo are



Ni Chik-fu, Chairman of the Peking Trade Union Council, Lai Fu-tung, First Secretary of the Sinkiang Chinese Communist Party; Su Chen-hua, Deputy Commander of the People's Liberation Army's Navy; and Wu Kuei-hsien, a woman Model Worker and Secretary of the Shensi Chinese Communist Party.

## 2. China's Regional Military Commanders

Figure 11 shows a breakdown of the reshuffle of nine senior military commanders that was announced in Peking on 1 January 1974. It is significant to note that the change represented an increase in political status for Pi Tung-chum, Ting Sheng, Yang Tek-chih, Yang Yung, and Wang Pi-cheng. The shift of military leaders has been widely interpreted as a move by Mao and Chou to prevent local military commanders from building a permanent power base from which they could challenge the central party leadership in Peking. Goodstadt sees the Soviet border threat as the reason that the military commanders accepted the transfers and believes that if the military later concludes that a deliberate attempt has been made to destroy their personal political standing, the reshuffle could backfire against Chou and Mao [Goodstadt "Chou and Mao; Fingers on the Trigger" Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 January 1975 pp. 10-12].

John Roderick sees the elite struggle in Peking as revolving around the question of whether to increase the power of the Communist Party in Peking or to give more leeway to the provinces where military commanders exercise significant





# CHINA'S NEW MILITARY COMMANDERS

| Name  | Original Field Army | Party Central Committee ranking | Posted to Military command Region | Military Regions traditional Field Army | Industrial capacity of Military Region as % national output | Previous Military Region commanded | Change in political status (+,0,-) |
|-------|---------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
|       | Li Teh-sheng        | II                              | Vice Chairman                     | Shenyang                                | 12%                                                         | --                                 | 0                                  |
|       | Chen Hsi-lien       | II                              | Politburo                         | Peking                                  | 14%                                                         | Shenyang                           | -                                  |
|       | Hsu Shih-yu         | III                             | Politburo                         | Canton                                  | 7%                                                          | Nanking                            | -                                  |
| (i)   | Chin Chi-wei        | II                              | Member                            | Chengtu                                 | 6%                                                          | Kunming                            | 0                                  |
| (ii)  | Han Hsien-chu       | III                             | Member                            | Lanchow                                 | 3%                                                          | Foochow                            | -                                  |
|       | Pi Tung-chun        | III                             | Member                            | Foochow                                 | 4%                                                          | Lanchow                            | +                                  |
|       | Ting Sheng          | IV                              | Member                            | Nanking                                 | 38%                                                         | Canton                             | -                                  |
|       | Tseng Ssu-yu        | V                               | Member                            | Tsinan                                  | 3%                                                          | Wuhan                              | 0                                  |
| (iii) | Yang Teh-Chih       | II                              | Member                            | Wuhan                                   | 7%                                                          | Tsinan                             | +                                  |
|       | Yang Yung           | II                              | Member                            | Singkiang                               | 1%                                                          | Peking(1967)                       | +                                  |
| (iv)  | Wang Pi-cheng       | III                             | Member                            | Kunming                                 | 1%                                                          | Nanking(1967)                      | +                                  |

Outranked politically by:

- (i) Liu Hsing-yuan IV Member Political Commissar
- (ii) Hsien Heng-han I Member Political Commissar
- (iii) Saifudin I Politburo Political Commissar (Alternate)
- (iv) Chou Hsing II Member Political Commissar

[Source: "Mao: Fingers on the Trigger" Far Eastern Economic Review 7 January 1974 p. 10]

Figure 11



control. As evidence he cites the campaign against Confucius and Lin Piao as an effort to rally greater national loyalty to the top party leadership [Roderick "Centralism-Regionalism Debate Continues in China" The Joplin Globe 2 January 1975, p. 8B].

#### D. SOVIET POLITICAL SUCCESSION

As is the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union is a closed society with little information available to the West concerning the dynamics of its internal politics. It is known that Soviet political leadership is selected by a process known as co-option. By apparent design, the individuals in power have gained significant positions of leadership in the Politburo, Secretariat, and Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as well as in the government at the levels of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers. The result is an interlocking network between the political power structure and the government. It is surmised that cliques representing specific interests interact by the process of democratic centralism to select those individuals with the greatest amount of persuasive power and political support from below. Recent reports of Brezhnev's failing health have stirred speculation as to who will replace him. For the author to join this speculation is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, Appendix E will provide the reader with a list of possible succession candidates.



## E. POSSIBLE OUTCOMES OF POLITICAL SUCCESSION

No one knows with certainty what the outcomes of political succession in Peking and Moscow will be but the writer will venture his opinion based upon his research and the data cited above. Mao appears to have retired from active political control in China with the reins transferred to Chou. Chou can be expected to continue his policy of detente with the United States and to seek increased trade with the West, especially the importation of advanced technology and food when required. The question of Taiwan can be expected to remain on the back-burner of China's priorities as long as detente with the United States is evident and moves toward diplomatic exchange with Taiwan are possible. Talks regarding the Sino-Soviet territorial dispute will continue and a settlement could happen at any time. However, such a settlement is not expected prior to the demise of Mao and probably not before about 1980. The results of the Tenth Party Congress and Fourth People's Congress show that Chou and his "moderate" policies have overcome much of the opposition of the radical and revolutionary left. Also, there is a slightly less military power in evidence in the central hierarchy although the potential for a rise in popularity of the military's preference for an "expert" over "red" People's Liberation Army is still in evidence and can be expected to flourish in direct proportion to any decrease in Sino-Soviet hostility. The inevitable rise of more second generation, post-revolutionary leaders





in the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party during the next decade will make a settlement of the Sino-Soviet territorial dispute more likely with a consequent limited rapprochement with the Soviet Union distinctly possible before 1985.



## V. UNITED STATES STRATEGY CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL CONFLICT

The preceding chapters have dealt substantially with a historiographic development of the Sino-Soviet conflict emphasizing significant events which have occurred since the People's Republic of China became a sovereign state on 1 October 1949, Chinese national security interests, the rate of growth of strategic power in the People's Republic and political succession among communist political elites in China and Russia. While drawing inferences from the factual data already presented, this final chapter will make a partial transition to the realm of speculation in an attempt to identify salient factors which could lead to either a Sino-Soviet rapprochement or conventional and/or nuclear war.

### A. SINO-SOVIET DETENTE/RAPPROCHEMENT FACTORS

The historical seeds of conflict between Russia and China have been outlined in some detail as have the more recent sources of friction between these powerful communist giants. Perhaps of equal significance to the American policy-maker are the factors which might lead to better Sino-Soviet relations in the future. Some of these factors are listed below.

#### 1. Bilateral Meetings and Talks

The mere fact that both China and Russia have chosen to maintain diplomatic relations lends credence to their hope for better future relations. On 11 September 1969, Kosygin



and Chou En-lai met at the Peking airport and were reported to have agreed that negotiations should be held on disputed territories during which the armed forces of each country would be withdrawn from the disputed borders. The negotiations began on 20 October 1969 and continued until July of 1973, when the leader of the Soviet delegation, Leonid Ilyichev, returned to Moscow to resume his duties as a Deputy Foreign Minister, which were not connected with Sino-Soviet relations. He returned to Peking in June of 1974 apparently to resume the border negotiations and to secure the release of the three Russian border guards held by the Chinese since the guards' helicopter landed in China in March of 1974 (see chapter one). The talks were reported to have been suspended in July and Ilyichev again returned to Moscow ["China, Soviet Union Again Suspend Talks" Christian Science Monitor 26 July 1974 p. 8]. The Soviet Union, however, confirmed in August that the negotiations were pressing ahead despite earlier speculation of a suspension ["Moscow-Peking Talks Push On" Christian Science Monitor 19 August 1974 p. 8]. The first indication of a possible thaw in the Sino-Soviet conflict was the Chinese proposal of 7 November 1974 cited in chapter one which suggested the signing of a non-aggression pact without persisting in the previous demands of a withdrawal of forces nor an admission by the Soviets that the border treaties were unequal ["Putting a Feeler Across the Border" Far Eastern Economic Review 22 November 1974 p. 14]. Soviet





officials complained that Chinese leaders did not even reply to their earlier offer of a non-aggression treaty made in November of 1974 ["Soviets Again Ask China to Sign a Nonwar Pact" Christian Science Monitor 26 November 1973 p. 12]. Brezhnev rejected the most recent Chinese proposal in late November 1974 calling it "absolutely unacceptable" and stating that the Soviet Union does not "make claims to any foreign lands, so there are no 'disputed areas' to us in this sense." ["China, Russia Border Talks to be Resumed" Monterey Peninsula Herald 12 February 1975 p. 7]. Ilyichev was reported to have returned to Peking on 12 February 1975 to resume talks on Sino-Soviet border dispute according to TASS ["China, Russia Border Talks to be Resumed" Monterey Peninsula Herald 12 February 1975]. It seems apparent that Moscow sees no advantage to concluding a border agreement with China until a new power group emerges in Peking. This would allow the Soviets to use a border settlement as a tool in forging closer Sino-Soviet relations in a post-Mao era. Polemics notwithstanding, the climate for negotiations seems better than at any time since the 1969 clashes as evidenced by China's willingness to sign a non-aggression pact without a withdrawal of forces or a Soviet admission that the original treaties were unfair. Erik Pierre states that the Soviets also have made a major concession: they have agreed that international law is applicable in defining frontier lines in shared rivers. Previously, the Russians had insisted that a protocol attached to the 1860 Treaty of Peking defined frontier



lines [Pierre "Putting a Feeler Across the Border" Far Eastern Economic Review 22 November 1974 p. 14]. Neville Maxwell of Oxford University agrees and concisely outlines the salient elements of international law pertaining to the dispute in his brief article for the first issue of Modern China [Maxwell "A Note on the Amur/Ussuri Sector of the Sino-Soviet Boundaries" Modern China January 1975 pp. 116-126]. Maxwell notes that China reads the Treaty of Peking as conforming to the thalweg (the central line of the main channel) principle of international law to define the boundaries. This principle gives the riparian states equal navigation rights on the river and it is followed by the Soviet Union in its relations with all neighbors with which it shares river boundaries except China. According to Maxwell, the Soviets claim the boundary line is along the Chinese bank of the rivers and that they rest this claim on maps exchanged by Russian and Chinese boundary commissioners in June of 1861 which they claim became a supplement to the treaty. Maxwell observes that this is why the Soviet government refers always to "the treaty documents" and never to "the treaty" in upholding its claims. He notes that the Soviet government has been willing to accept the thalweg principle since formal exchanges over boundary questions began in Peking in 1964, but only as a concession, requiring Chinese reciprocation in the form of agreeing that "the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri rivers" mentioned in the Treaty of Peking is defined by the Kozakevicheva Channel (Fuyuan Stream) which connects the



rivers some forty kilometers upstream from their main confluence at Khabarovsk (see Figure 12). This the Chinese government has adamantly refused to concede. In the writer's opinion, the strategic value of the disputed Hei Xiazi (see Figure 12 ) is minimal compared to the advantages of a settlement of the Sino-Soviet territorial conflict. Also, a Soviet concession on this point will signal the beginning of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement which is a distinct possibility during the next decade.

## 2. Formal Agreements


Arthur Huck observes that China has never been the center of a military alliance-system and that her one major military alliance, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance of February 1950, has been of questionable value to both sides [Huck 1970 pp. 68-69]. The Soviets maintain that the Treaty protected China from attack by the United States during the Korean War and the off-shore islands crisis of 1959 but as Whiting noted in China Crosses the Yalu, Khrushchev's statement of support for China came only after the crisis had reached its peak. Moreover, Soviet offers of military support to her allies always seem to appear only after the high point of crisis and uncertainty has passed. The Treaty will be valid until 1980 with the option for renewal at five-year intervals thereafter. Huck notes that Chen Yi declared the Treaty worthless in 1963 and that its anniversary has not been observed in China since 1966. The temperature of Sino-Soviet relations can be gauged







DISPUTED HEI XIAZI AREA



[Source: Maxwell "A Note on the Amur/Ussuri Sector of the Sino-Soviet Boundaries" Modern China January 1975 p. 121]

Figure 12



in 1980 by whether the Treaty is renewed or not. In the writer's opinion, the Soviet Union will make a maximum effort to renew the Treaty and resolve the territorial dispute by 1980.

Despite the polemics and deterioration in relations between Russia and China since 1969, several significant agreements have been made including trade and payment agreements signed on 5 August 1971 and 13 June 1972. Under these agreements trade between them was planned to increase from \$167,000,000 in 1971 to \$288,000,000 in 1972 [Keesing's Contemporary Archives 4-10 March 1974 p. 26390]. On 17 July 1973 TASS reported a protocol to the 1954 Sino-Soviet Civil Aviation Agreement to permit Chinese civil flights to Moscow. Previously, Chinese flights were limited to Irkutsk [Current Scene August 1973 p. 27]. Future Sino-Soviet agreements should be watched as an indicator of growing trans-national interdependence and integration.

### 3. Third-Party Threats

As Robert North observes, the post World War II balance of power in Asia has been upset by the continuance of the Sino-Soviet controversy, the spectacular growth of Japanese economic and industrial strength, advances in Chinese nuclear capabilities, and United States activities in Vietnam. The outcome has resulted in major realignments among the People's Republic, Russia, the United States, Japan, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, India, Pakistan, and other countries. North expects the tendency toward shifting power relations to



increasingly erode and override ideological attraction and bonds in the future and that new cleavages and alliance patterns may well emerge in the Pacific area as well as other parts of the world [North 1974 p. 163]. It is possible that such new alliance patterns might combine groups of countries which would be perceived as a joint threat to Russia and China, thus forcing rapprochement in the form of a new and stronger Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. An indicator of such a threat is the fact that Japan has announced a military Five Year Plan which will cost about 16.6 billion dollars and mean that Japan has the seventh largest defense budget after the United States, Russia, China, West Germany, France, and Britain [Muraoka "Japanese Security and the United States" Adelphi Papers Number Ninety-five 1973 p. 4].

#### 4. Communist Ideology

While communist ideology is viewed as either a weapon or as international camouflage for internal power struggles and expansion by both a former Soviet intelligence officer and an eminent American political theorist (see chapter 2), it still serves as a vital linkage for mutual cooperation between communist nation-states in their announced goals of world conquest and the elimination of non-communist nations. As Ebenstein noted, Russia and China do not disagree over whether to bury the free peoples of the West, but only on how to bury them — and over who will be in charge after the funeral. Though "monolithic communism" seems relegated to





history as "polycentric communism" and "third-world" nationalism continue to grow, the concept continues to serve as a framework of cooperation between Russia and China as long as viable alternative systems exist. A major strike against either Russia or China by any third force might conceivably revive and strengthen their former alliance.

#### 5. Economic and Industrial Development

If China's present rate of economic development and industrial expansion (addressed in chapter three) is sustained or increased it is probable that additional bilateral trade agreements, such as those cited above, will be made in the future. Any significant increase in trade will most likely be predicated upon China's shift from an agrarian to a largely industrial-based economy. China's decision to greatly expand her navy and merchant marine is evidence that she intends to make this shift, probably during the next decade. Increased Sino-Soviet economic trade and cooperation in the future would be indicative of lessening conflict and growing detente.

#### 6. Cultural Exchanges

While cultural exchanges have dwindled between Moscow and Peking, they have increased with non-communist nations under the aegis of detente. As an indication of mellowing Sino-Soviet relations, any increase in cultural and scientific exchanges should be watched closely.



## 7. Military Aid

Soviet military aid to China ended in the 1960's and it is unlikely that it will be resumed in the foreseeable future. Still limited Soviet military assistance might be proposed as a gambit to improve Sino-Soviet relations, especially after the death of Mao tse-tung. Such an offer would probably be greeted with open-arms by the "expert" element within the Chinese military high command. Any future transfer of Soviet military hardware or assistance may be viewed as a clear signal of increasing Soviet influence in Peking.

## 8. Relations with the United States

Peking has repeatedly emphasized Russia as its main threat in the world today while Soviet actions are devoted to overcoming the military superiority of the United States. Charles Osgood argues that "as long as people in nations perceive international relations in human terms — as witness the language they use to talk about them — principles of interpersonal relations should be applicable." He foresees these principles as causing both Russia and China to develop negative reactions toward efforts by the United States to improve relations with both and states that it would be in the best interests of the United States to decrease the level of mutual threat perception between Russia and China [Hall "Prediction: 'Nixon and the U.S. are Going to Become Gradually Negative for Both Russia and China, and Simultaneously'" Psychology Today November 1973 p. 56]. Perhaps the most



important fact for American policy-makers to keep in mind during the aura of detente is that no communist leader, whether Russian or Chinese, is interested in the long-term survival of the United States. In the writer's opinion, Russian and Chinese interest in detente with the West will vaporize instantly when, and if, either can develop a clear military and economic superiority to the United States.

#### 9. Post-Mao Leadership

In the writer's opinion, the Sino-Soviet territorial dispute can be resolved rapidly by the Soviet Union if it so chooses. Some of the restraints to such a resolution are Russia's historical quest for warm-water ports (Vladivostok is ice-free eight months out of the year), Russia's desire for buffer states between her and any potential enemy, and her traditional fear of a sustained two-front war. Although Russia has a history of territorial expansion, over half of her land area has not even been explored. On the other hand, China's expanding population will demand additional arable land at some point in the near future. The most advantageous solution to such a dilemma seems to be for Russia to offer limited territorial concessions to the Chinese ruling elite after the death of Mao Tse-Tung. Such concessions could serve to change Sino-Soviet hostility to increasing alliance virtually overnight. The alternative is the possibility for war which will be examined in the next section.





## B. WAR FACTORS

### 1. Territorial Dispute

The proximate cause of any future Sino-Soviet war will probably be their dispute over territory. From a rational cost-benefit standpoint, it seems unlikely that either Moscow or Peking would commit its forces to such an action if any reasonable alternative were available. However, various Russian, Chinese, and Western writers are on record as stating that war between Russia and China is inevitable. Among these are the Russian writer Andrei Amalrik who believes that once China has stockpiles of nuclear weapons it will increase its border skirmishes with the USSR and finally escalate them to war, probably between 1975 and 1980. He further states that the USSR is unlikely to try to invade China because of China's numerical superiority and is equally likely to reject a preventive nuclear attack as too dangerous. Thus he believes Russia will respond to the Chinese initiative of guerrilla war along the border with guerrilla warfare in a long and exhausting war. He notes that a Soviet military expert who had worked in China for several years, V. M. Primakov, believes:

The Chinese soldier is superior to ours — hardy, not inclined to grumble and brave. He has immense mobility in the field. For a Chinese soldier to march seventy kilometers in a day is simply a trifle ...Our infantrymen, who were quite amazed by the Chinese infantry, came to the conclusion that it is the best infantry in the world.



and concludes that Russia is in the last decades of its existence because the U.S. will not come to its aid in a Sino-Soviet war, Germany will be reunited and support China, and Russian nationalism will decline while non-Russian nationalism will flourish during the war [Amalrik 1970 pp. 54 passim]. Chou En-lai also sees war as inevitable but believes it will be between Russia and the United States rather than China ["Peking Prediction" Christian Science Monitor 21 January 1975 p. 6]. Harrison E. Salisbury contends that war between Russia and China is inevitable unless the death of Mao allows reconciliation or the United States makes every possible effort to help avoid it [Salisbury 1969 pp. 193-211]. Sir Robert Scott echoes this view by stating "sooner or later, fighting between the two (that is, Russia and China) is inevitable...In this volatile and explosive situation, with the certainty of Sino-Soviet tension and the possibility of open rupture, entailing consequences that cannot be foreseen, the aim of the West and especially of the United States should be to seek to defuse the risks in so far as that is possible" [Scott "China, Russia and the United States A British View" Foreign Affairs January 1970 pp. 340-341]. Richard Lowenthal takes the more balanced view that "given a measure of rationality of the leaderships on both sides, the fact of a serious conflict of power interests makes nuclear war between them no more inevitable than between either of them and the United States. The continuation of



limited and controlled conflict between Russia and China thus remains a far more plausible prospect than its end by either reunion or catastrophe [Lowenthal "Russia and China: Controlled Conflict" Foreign Affairs April 1971 pp. 517-518]. It is the writer's view that nothing in international politics is inevitable until it has happened. As Huck observes, despite many brave words, China's policy since Korea has been to pursue a low-risk strategy whenever the danger of intervention by a more powerful opponent has been high [Huck 1970 p. 46]. A recent quantitative study by Andres Onate shows that, contrary to popular opinion, quantitative data on foreign and domestic conflict behavior of the People's Republic of China for the period between 1950 and 1970 indicates strong evidence that the key factor toward understanding the relationship between foreign and domestic conflict in China is not domestic conflict alone, but also foreign conflict initiated by or directed toward China [Onate "The Conflict Interactions of the People's Republic of China, 1950-1970" The Journal of Conflict Resolution December 1974 pp. 578-594]. In an earlier study North has observed that most of the 23 crises between 1949 and 1965 in which the Chinese Communists were directly involved were defensive and concerned with border defense from Peking's viewpoint [North 1974 pp. 78-82]. Whiting made a similar observation in 1972:





The nine instances wherein the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has crossed customary borders in hostile array during the past twenty-two years provide prima facie evidence for the conventional image of a potentially expansionist regime contained by American commitments and force. However, closer examination of the use of military force by the People's Republic reveals an entirely different situation whereby the government in Peking, in most cases, deployed the PLA in defensive reaction against a perceived threat [Whiting "The Use of Force in Foreign Policy by the People's Republic of China" The Annals July 1972 p. 55].

In balance, the chances for a full-scale Sino-Soviet war seem remote during the next decade. Still the casus belli for many, if not most, of the wars of history has been territorial disputes. Never before in history has so much military power been concentrated face-to-face across a common border without resulting in war. War between Russia and China would quickly escalate to the unrestrained use of atomic, biological, and chemical warfare. Russian and particularly Chinese nuclear weapons are known to be "dirty" and prevailing westerly winds would quickly spread poisonous fallout to Korea, Japan, other Asian countries, and eventually the United States. Such a war was the theme of Suite's novel, On the Beach. Accordingly, it would be in the national interest of the United States to maintain the best possible intelligence on developments in the Sino-Soviet dispute and to be prepared to take rapid diplomatic and/or military action to defuse a full-scale war between Russia and China, if possible.



## 2. Chinese Coastal Waters

An interview with Mr. James Johnson of the National Marine and Fishery Service indicates no recent history of Sino-Soviet conflict at sea in Chinese coastal waters although there is considerable friction between Russian and Japanese and Korean fishermen in the same waters [James Johnson (an interview) 21 August 1974]. As the Chinese naval, merchant, and fishing fleets expand, the potential for conflict at sea will grow. However, China's navy cannot provide a significant challenge to Russia's Far Eastern Fleet in the foreseeable future.

## 3. Political Control

As Ebenstein has observed, the underlying cause of the Sino-Soviet conflict is a struggle for power, political control, and international leadership of the communist movement among the ruling elites of both Russia and China. Mao believes himself to be the senior communist leader since the death of Stalin but has been unable to sell this concept to the leadership in the Kremlin. The conflict has proven irreconcilable to date with little prospect for resolution until a new group of political elites come into power both in Peking and Moscow.

## 4. Taiwan Issue

The Soviet Union is on record as having virtually endorsed the idea of two Chinas in an article in the Novosti press information bulletin Number 44 of October 1973. The



article was written by "G. Galina" which causes some observers to believe it was written by Brezhnev's daughter whose first name is Galina and who works at Novosti. The article states "the de facto existence of two Chinas has long been and remains a reality" and that "The effects of the stepped-up activity of Peking on the international plain...have been largely upset by Taiwan's economic offensive. Within a short time the Taiwan regime was able to restore or maintain cooperation of commercial links with some hundred countries" ["Moscow Jabs at Peking with Taipei Praise" Christian Science Monitor 10 December 1973 p. 1]. There has been speculation that a 1969 visit to Taiwan by Soviet journalist Victor Louis was an attempt to sway Taiwan into joining the Soviet-sponsored Asian security pact and to improve relations between Russia and Nationalist China at the expense of Peking. Louis, whose real name is Vitali Yevgenneovich Lui, is a celebrated KGB agent of disinformation. Barron states that it was he who wrote the dispatch for the London Evening News (he is the only Soviet journalist allowed to act as a Moscow correspondent of a Western newspaper) that indicated the Soviet Union was considering a preemptive nuclear strike against China. This resulted in the KGB goal of pressuring China to resume border negotiations but had the untoward effect of causing the alarmed Chinese to enter into secret talks with the U.S. resulting in the visit of former President Nixon [Barron 1974 pp. 196-179]. More recently, Louis turned over





a thick manuscript on the Sino-Soviet border dispute to the office of the leading British publisher in London. The book, when published, may offer new insights into Moscow's intentions in the Far East according to Paul Wohl, the Monitor's Soviet analyst ["Action Called Possible on Sino-Soviet Issue" Christian Science Monitor 26 February 1975 p. 4]. Senator Jackson told newsmen at Peking airport that the United States "must move toward early recognition of the People's Republic" and that "there can be solutions" permitting the establishment of diplomatic relations with Peking which would not be incompatible with past U.S. pledges to Taiwan ["Jackson, Officials Confer in Peking" Christian Science Monitor 3 July 1974 p. 2].

#### 5. Indian Issue

Russia's policy regarding India seems twofold: first to cultivate a friendly relationship built on Soviet military and economic aid to ensure India will side with Moscow in the Sino-Soviet conflict and, secondly, to establish Soviet naval bases on the Indian coast as well as military and political influence throughout the country. For a detailed analysis of the Sino-Indian border war see Neville Maxwell's India's China War [Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1972).

#### 6. Japanese Issue

Ralph Cough holds that Japan is in a favorable position to reap many benefits from the Sino-Soviet confrontation



as long as it remains something less than a large-scale military conflict. He notes that neither Russia or China presses Japan to end its security treaty with the U.S. because each prefers that Japan remain linked to the U.S. rather than with its adversary in the dispute. He observes that while China supports Japan's claim to the northern islands held by the Soviet Union, Soviet support for the Japanese claim to the Senkaku Islands over that of China could complicate Japan's foreign policy objectives and make the delicate balance of Japanese diplomacy difficult to maintain. Japan seeks good relations with both Peking and Moscow to develop new markets and sources of supply while meeting the desire of Chinese and Soviets for access to Japanese goods and technology. Clough concludes that Japan's conflicts of interest are likely to become more severe, especially with China as Japan undertakes to expand politically and economically with the developing nations of East Asia and that Japan's attitude toward massive rearmament will depend on how much confidence they have in the willingness of the U.S. to continue its defense commitment [Clough 1975 pp. 70-90].

Dean W. Given holds that Russia will not return to Japan the island of Sakhalin or the chain of the Kuril Islands granted to Russia in the Yalta agreement because of the strategic value of the Kurils and the economic value of Sakhalin. He notes that Admiral Gorshkov has claimed that: "legal arguments confirm the correctness of fixing the status of the Sea of Okhotsh as both a closed and internal sea



coming under the international law concept of historical waters." He also observes that the Sea of Okhotsh is almost two-thirds the size of the Mediterranean Sea and that it provides more than one-tenth of the Soviet Union's annual fishing catch. Up until 1970, the Soviets had seized more than 1,200 Japanese fishing boats and jailed over 10,000 Japanese fishermen on charges of violating territorial waters. Given predicts that the Soviet Union might one day declare the Sea of Okhotsh closed to all foreign vessels, except Japan with which it would negotiate a fishing treaty [Given "The Sea of Okhotsh USSR's Great Lake?" Naval Institute Proceedings September 1970 pp. 47-51].

#### 7. Mongolian Issue

Alan Sanders notes that the Mongolian People's Republic, once part of the Chinese empire, is now Moscow's staunchest ally against Peking partly because of the great amounts of Soviet aid which has been forthcoming during the past 10 years of exacerbated Sino-Soviet relations. He also observes that the amount of Russian aid per capita of the Mongolian population far exceeds that given to any other developing country in the world and offers two possible reasons for this. First, Mongolia votes for Soviet policies in the UN and at Asian and African assemblies from which Moscow is excluded. Secondly, the Soviet Union can maintain a large physical presence on Mongolian soil closer to Peking than anywhere on its own territory. He also notes that the Mongols





have a historically ingrained dislike and distrust of the Chinese and their policies towards Mongolia [Sanders "Mongolia: A Bypass to Communism" Far Eastern Economic Review 13 December 1974 pp. 33-36]. A related article states that there are reports of frequent incursions into Mongolia by Chinese troops in violation of the 1962 Sino-Mongolian Treaty and that the number of Soviet troops in Mongolia was boosted from two divisions to five divisions in 1974. It also mentioned an unconfirmed report of a major Sino-Soviet clash on the Sino-Mongolian border in the spring of 1974 ["Renewing a Powerful Link with Moscow" Far Eastern Economic Review 13 December 1974 p. 35]. A more recent report by the London Daily Telegraph states that a series of five clashes took place along the Mongolian-Chinese frontier at a point 2,000 miles west of the Ussuri River in November of 1974 in which thirty men were killed or wounded. The same article reported "More than half the 60 Russian divisions now deployed on the Chinese frontier are in Mongolia ["Some troops only 400 miles from Peking" London Daily Telegraph 17 December 1974 p. 1L as quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: Western Europe 17 December 1974 p. W1]. Pravda promptly accused the Daily Telegraph of propagating false anti-Soviet material by stating "The London newspaper Daily Telegraph has printed a report to the effect that 'in November Russian and Chinese troops clashed along the Mongolian-Chinese border.' In an attempt to give an appearance of veracity to its



falsification, the newspaper even quoted a number of 'victims' and — as it has done more than once in the past — cited 'communist sources' that supposedly reported this information to the newspaper's correspondent..." ["'Daily Telegraph' Lies Again" Pravda 20 December 1974 p. 5 as translated in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press 15 January 1975 p. 23].

#### C. UNITED STATES GRAND STRATEGY AND THE SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL CONFLICT

In his excellent book devoted to the subject of grand strategy, John M. Collins defines the term as "the art and science of employing national power under all circumstances to exert desired degrees and types of control over the opposition through threats, force, indirect pressures, diplomacy, subterfuge, and other imaginative means, thereby satisfying national security interests and objectives" [Collins 1973 p. 14]. Collins holds that grand strategy is the purview of statesmen and that it controls military strategy, which is only one of its elements. He believes that grand strategy obviates the Clausewitz dictum that strategy simply is "the use of engagements to attain the object of war" [von Clausewitz 1950 p. 117] and that it cleaves closely to Liddell Hart's conclusion that "the true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this" [Hart 1967 p. 351]. Collins acknowledges that Sun Tzu first conceived this idea.



The Strategic Review quotes Sun Tzu (430-320 B.C.) as stating:  
"In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good...Hence, to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting"  
[Strategic Review Spring 1974 ibc].

1. Detente and the Sino-Soviet Territorial Conflict

If the passage cited earlier about the activities of Soviet agent Victor Louis is valid, then warmer relations between the United States and China resulted from and were made possible by the sub-rosa threat of Soviet Union to impose a settlement of the Sino-Soviet conflict by the means of nuclear blackmail. The threat then failed because it caused a fearful China to enter secret consultations with Henry Kissinger which resulted in the former President's visit to China and a thaw in Sino-American relations. Whether detente with either the Soviet Union or China can be sustained and grow or whether it will wither and fail is unknown. What is known is that the U.S. is in the advantageous position of being able to influence policy in both Peking and Moscow so long as it does not attempt the dangerous game of playing one Communist power against the other. Implicit in an American policy of detente with both Russia and China are both great opportunities to improve international cooperation, stability, and integration and great dangers of being susceptible to a





sudden attack, uncontrolled war, and possible military defeat if our diplomats "goof" or if our military readiness is perceived by an adversary as comparatively weak or unresponsive. In the different context of containment in 1947, George F. Kennan reached a similar conclusion in his famous "X" article which has relevance today:

To avoid destruction the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation.

Surely, there was never a fairer test of national quality than this. In the light of these circumstances, the thoughtful observer of Russian-American relations will find no cause for complaint in the Kremlin's challenge to American society. He will rather experience a certain gratitude to a Providence which, by providing the American people with this implacable challenge, has made their entire security as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear. [X (George F. Kennan) "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" Foreign Affairs July 1947 p. 582].

Detente with both Russia and China is the current policy of the United States. It will remain so unless the American body politic decides that its risks outweigh its advantages. A selection of arguments for and against detente follow. In response to a question by Bill Moyer, Secretary of State Kissinger recently defined detente as follows:

The problem of detente is often put as if the United States were making concessions to the Soviet Union in order to achieve peace. Basically, the problem of detente — the necessity of detente is produced by the fact that nuclear war in this period is going to involve a catastrophe for all of humanity. When the decision of peace and war involves the survival of tens of millions of



people, you're no longer playing power politics in the traditional sense. And for this reason, every American President in the postwar period, no matter how different their background, no matter what their party, has sooner or later been driven to making the problem of peace the central preoccupation of his foreign policy. This is the case also, obviously, in this Administration. We would like to leave a legacy of having made the world safer than when we found it, as must every Administration. To conduct confrontation politics when the stakes are going to be determined by nuclear weapons is the height of irresponsibility. This is what we mean by detente. We have sought systematically to improve political relations, to increase trade relations in order to produce a maximum number of links between us and the Soviet Union and to create a cooperative environment to reduce the dangers of war ["A Conversation with Henry Kissinger" Bill Moyer's Journal on the Public Broadcasting System 16 January 1975 8 P.M.].

Speaking on 14 November 1973 in Peking at a banquet given in his honor, Dr. Kissinger said: "When President Nixon came here less than two years ago on the journey that resulted in the Shanghai communique he was the pioneer. But the journey that was started by President Nixon has since become a necessity for all Americans. And no matter what happens in the United States in the future, friendship with the People's Republic of China is one of the constant factors of American foreign policy" [Kessing's Contemporary Archives 21-27 January 1974 p. 26316]. The statement seems to bear out a prophecy made by Chou En-lai in an interview by Edgar Snow in 1960: "There is no conflict of basic interests between the peoples of China and the United States, and friendship will eventually prevail" [Asia 1973 Handbook Far Eastern Economic Review p. 123].



Secretary of Defense Schlesinger has warned that the notion that detente permits the United States to disarm is a widespread illusion and that detente will disappear if the equilibrium of force is upset. He also states that United States military force levels are based upon the external capabilities which we hope to balance and not upon the diplomatic atmosphere ["Can Russia be Trusted" U.S. News and World Report 13 May 1974 p. 38].

Admiral Noel Gayler, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command has observed:

...We do have a detente with both Russia and China, and I welcome it and hope it endures, but the world changes and we have to deal with uncertainty.

You also have to notice the extraordinary and continuing Russian build-up, the way in which force and the threat of force has been used in recent years, and our vulnerability both to attack on us and on other countries who depend on us. The consequences, if an aggressive power were seen to be dominant militarily in the Pacific would be very unfortunate (underlined by author). ["U.S. Strategy for Staying No. 1 Power in Asia" U.S. News and World Report 25 March 1974 pp. 42-43].

Senator Jackson is well known for his reservations regarding detente with the Soviet Union as well as his pledge to seek early establishment of diplomatic relations with Peking ["Jackson, Officials Confer in Peking" Christian Science Monitor 3 July 1974 p. 2].

A more severe critic of detente is George Meany, President of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee quoted Theodore Draper as







saying "It is time to stop using cold war as a scare term and detente as a sedative term; in their relation to nuclear war, they are not that different." Meany went on to say that "Perhaps, as someone has quipped, detente is the cold war pursued by other means - and sometimes by the same." He concluded his testimony by stating "The inability to face the world as it is, and to understand clearly the nature of freedom's enemies everywhere, is really the greatest threat to peace today. That threat is nowhere more clearly posed than in the delusion we call detente" ["Labor and 'Detente'" AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News October 1974 pp. 3-8].

## 2. Effects of the Strategic Arms Limitations Negotiations

The results of strategic arms limitations negotiations (SALT) under the aegis of detente have been a cause of concern to many Americans. Among these are Arthur G.B. Metcalf, Chairman of the United States Strategic Institute, who views the SALT I accords, negotiated in part secretly by Kissinger, as counter to U.S. interests and who states: "...whatever the argument for substituting paper for power as the guarantee of peace, it is the lesson of history that such a course does not reduce but multiplies the changes for war" [Metcalf "SALT II - Some Principles" USSI Report 73-2 p. 14].

The editor of Aviation Week and Space Technology notes numerous Soviet violations of the SALT treaty and believes it is time to "ring the bell" on these violations



and to develop a far tougher, more technically competent, and more realistic stance for continuing arms negotiations [Holtz "U.S. Negotiation Strategy" Strategic Review Winter 1975 p. 61]. Paul H. Nitze, a former member of the SALT negotiating team echoes the comments of both Metcalf and Holtz and adds that before the accords reached at Vladivostak are ratified, the Senate should resolve ambiguities in missile throw-weight, the definition of what is a heavy bomber, and straighten out the difficult problem of cruise missiles ["Nitze Delineates U.S. - Soviet Differences" Aviation Week and Space Technology 24 February 1975 p. 63].

In 1957 Dr. Kissinger made a statement reminiscent of the sentiments of Alexander Solzhenitsyn quoted in Chapter Two and Arthur Metcalf above: "Whenever peace - conceived as the avoidance of war - has been the primary objective of a power or a group of powers, the international system has been at the mercy of the most ruthless member of the international community" [Kissinger A World Restored 1957 as quoted in Strategic Review Winter 1975 i.b.c.].

Isaac Don Levine's closing words in his book Eyewitness to History express a theme that is interspersed throughout this thesis:

Only a world of freemen can insure America's sure defense and promote lasting peace on earth. Not the money-changers on the international trading mart nor the professional politicians trafficking in peace slogans can deliver divided humanity, half free and half in chains, from its agonized condition. That is the message that the little band of martyred prophets, from Boris Pasternak and Alexander Solzhenitsyn



to Andrei Skaharov, have been transmitting to us from behind the Iron Curtain. The cries of these eagles have for some years been echoing among the conscience-inspired citizens of the West. But they have so far found no response in the high quarters where power over man is being wielded by the overlords of our age. Yet such a response cannot be long delayed, bringing the statesmanship of vision and courage that alone can guide humanity out of the wilderness [Levine 1973 pp. 284-285].

### 3. Naval Considerations in the Western Pacific

Admiral Gaylor sees the Pacific as the area of the future because that is where the rate of change is the greatest. He believes the consequence of allowing Russia to become the dominant power there would be "...very unfortunate. Security is not something we can give away to save money and enjoy something else, because without security there is nothing else. Many an unfortunate nation has learned that too late" ["U.S. Strategy for Staying No. 1 Power in Asia" U.S. News and World Report 25 March 1974 pp. 42-43].

As the United States lowers its military profile in Asia, it is vital that a new defense line in the region be established. In his farewell address to Congress on 19 April 1951, General MacArthur warned that: "...under no circumstances must Formosa fall under communist control. Such an eventuality would at once threaten the freedom of the Philippines and the loss of Japan, and might well force our western frontier back to the coasts of California, Oregon, and Washington" [Collines 1973 p. 145]. More recently Admiral John McCain has updated this concept by stating that





if the Marianas are not kept under the immediate control of the United States "the next fallback position is Honolulu, and that's a long way back." [Marianas Set to Join the U.S." Christian Science Monitor 6 February 1975 p. 5]. A clear military fact is that for the United States Navy to guarantee control of the seas in the Western Pacific, it must rely on a network of overseas bases in the area for staging and operating purposes. Continued good relations with Japan (especially), Australia, the Philippines, and Taiwan are essential to U.S. security interests in the Pacific and a maximum effort should be made to cement strong relations with the people of the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall islands to provide the fleet with the flexibility in the form of operating bases and to provide the nation with a forward line of defense in the Pacific.

#### D. CONCLUSION

This thesis has traced the Sino-Soviet territorial conflict spectrum from its inception to the present. The main hypothesis that Peking will increasingly emphasize international negotiations with Moscow as the People's Republic of China improves its nuclear capability, defensive preparations, and logistical capabilities vis a vis the Soviet Union has proven valid. Peking can be expected to use diplomatic negotiations to settle the territorial conflict during the next decade. A settlement is possible as early as 1980 given China's present rate of development in all



aspects of national power and given that Mao Tse-tung either dies or ceases to be an active participant in the ruling elite of Communist China. The national interests of the Soviet Union will also be served by a limited rapprochement with China and Moscow can be expected to make some territorial concessions to settle the dispute by 1980 in order to renew the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance.

The alternative hypothesis that the People's Republic of China will use all means short of general war to regain "lost territories" from the Soviet Union has proven invalid. As of early 1975, the "moderate" faction of the Chinese Communist Party headed by Chou En-lai is in firm control of national policy and can be expected to pursue a low-risk profile in dealing with the Soviet leadership for the return of China's lost territories. Still, the possibility of a Sino-Soviet war cannot be discounted because of the massive defense preparations and military buildup by both sides. Russia would not have mobilized such an extensive military force along the Chinese border nor would China have built a new and expensive "Underground China Wall" in the form of extensive nuclear defense tunnels if no real threat of war existed. Even if the Sino-Soviet conflict worsens in the near future, the possibility for a negotiated settlement still exists and such a settlement would be the cause of greater communist unity, especially after the death of Mao.



The United States would be wise to judge the conflict less by what the Russians and Chinese say about each other and more by the quality of their actions as these actions tend to threaten or serve United States interests. The political consequences of the concept of military parity under the guise of detente could prove disastrous for the United States. The costs of national security and freedom have never been cheap in the past and can be expected to increase in the future. These costs, however, have purchased the avoidance of world war since 1945 and are worth the investment for future international stability and for the survival of this nation. If either Russia (now) or the People's Republic of China (in the future) is allowed to develop a clear military advantage vis a vis the United States, it can be expected to use that advantage to back up its demands in any future bilateral negotiations, especially if it believes that the United States lacks the will to act. The United States should remain aloof and neutral in the event of a Sino-Soviet war. If drawn into such a war, however, it must be prepared for a long and exhaustive world war.

This thesis has dealt with change — change in the Chinese perception of the world and change in the rate of national power growth in the People's Republic of China. If the second generation ruling elite in China can sustain and continue to increase the present rate of growth without alienating large segments of the population, specifically





the young, it is within the realm of possibility that China could become the most powerful nation on earth by the 21st century. Because of this possibility alone, it behooves the United States to grant diplomatic recognition to China and to seek multiple interactions and linkages with the most populous nation in the world. A corollary is that Congress should reconsider recognizing Mongolia. Diplomatic recognition to both would tend to lessen international tension and to provide much needed hard intelligence on the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Peking's most recent statements regarding Russia seem reminiscent of the ancient Chinese ploy of playing one barbarian against the other cited in Chapters I and II. By stating that war between the United States and Russia is inevitable, that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance should be strengthened, and that the United States should keep some military forces in the Far East, Peking's leaders seek to balance Russian and American power while they continue to improve China's industrial base and military power. Russian and Chinese uncertainty as to the American response to a Sino-Soviet war tends to lessen the chances for war. This observation is predicated upon the United States maintaining a credible military presence in the Western Pacific and in Europe. The present diplomatic stalemate between Peking and Moscow can be expected to change soon after the demise of Mao. The author views the ultimate goal of communism



to be absolute political control. Because of this, other long range goals, interests, and ambitions of China and Russia will be difficult to reconcile, if not impossible. In the near term of the next few decades, however, some form of limited detente would serve the national interests of both. Should a Sino-Soviet war occur for any reason, Soviet military doctrine dictates the use of massive force and firepower, the element of surprise, and short-decisive campaigns. China is well equipped to thwart the later strategy in general war making the risks to Russia outweigh the possible gains for the foreseeable future. Russian strategists are well aware of their traditionally vulnerable logistical support capability in sustained war. The huge Russian build-up on the Chinese frontier suggests they have also learned the value of defensive mobilization from the lesson of Hitler's invasion in 1941. Russia is in an excellent position to apply pressure against China in the form of a show of naval force off China's coast. In general war, the Soviet fleet could eliminate the People's Liberation Army's Navy rapidly; a direct application by Russian strategists of the historical tradition of success of Russian gunboat diplomacy against China. China is aware of this weakness and has commenced building a modern fleet, but will pose no bonified naval threat to Russia in the near future. The results of Mao's Cultural Revolution will be measured more accurately during the next decade, however, its effect



may prove detrimental to China's rate of development in the area of education. Industrial growth requires a base of managerial and scientific expertise which China's present educational system is unlikely to produce. It can be expected to be one of the first changes made by the ruling elite after Mao's death. Mao's last public appearance was in January of 1975. Other evidence presented in this thesis suggests that it may have been his last. In any case, it is believed his dogma will be of decreasing importance to China's pragmatic new leaders. Hopefully, international trade between the Free World and Communist nations can improve international cooperation, stability, and integration. However, to allow the unrestrained export of superior Western strategic goods and technology is irresponsible and detrimental to the national security of the United States. The American people are by nature optimistic, but it would be wise to temper that optimism with a healthy amount of skepticism regarding detente with either Russia or China. It is essential that this nation maintain a strong and responsive Department of Defense. Should detente fail, the Department of Defense cannot guarantee to salvage the situation from a position of military inferiority. As for the United States Navy, the words spoken by Admiral King thirty years ago have special application to the dangerous waters of the Western Pacific today: "Gentleman, while I cannot guarantee victory if we maintain control of the sea, I can absolutely guarantee defeat if we lose that control!" [from a sign in a classroom of the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps at the University of Missouri].





## APPENDIX A

### CURRENT SINO-SOVIET POLEMICS

The trend toward a high degree of strident polemics, hostile propaganda, and bitter recriminations which began with Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February of 1956, has continued to the present with little chance of future abatement until the present "new tsars" and/or "sons of heaven" are replaced by death, serious illness, or loss of power and party control. The sheer amount of verbiage in this cold war of words along with the incessant recantation of the same recurrent themes taxes the most patient student of Chinese and Soviet affairs and precludes its inclusion in this thesis. Moreover, the important ideological themes have been well-documented, repeatedly quoted at length, and laboriously analyzed in the majority of the works on the Sino-Soviet conflict contained in the list of references to this thesis. Therefore, this appendix will briefly sample some of the most recent polemics contained in Chinese and Soviet books and periodicals in an attempt to provide the reader with the opportunity of making his own side-by-side comparison to discern emerging new themes in national policy.

#### 1. On the Sino-Soviet Territorial Conflict

##### a. Chinese View

The heads of some self-styled 'successors to Marxism-Leninism' in the 20th century are stuffed with the old-line colonialists' dream of territorial expansion.



In its article 'For the Honour of the Motherland,' the journal Ogonyok published by the Brezhnev clique has glibly talked about the so-called 'important geographical discovery' of 80 to 90 years ago by a group of colonialist 'explorers' led by tsarist officer M. Prezhevalsky while gathering information in the western part of China. What did they discover? According to the article, Lop Nor in China's Sinkiang was 'discovered by him (Prezhevalsky) as early as 1876' and the Yellow River sources of Oring Nor and Tsaring Nor also were allegedly 'first explored' in 1884 by this 'exploring team,' and the leader of the team named one of the lakes the 'Russians Lake' and the other the 'exploring team lake' by right of being the first explorer.'

...In 1704, the Chinese Government set officials to make another survey of the river's sources. In the book Ho Yuan Chi (The Record of the Yellow River Sources) written on the basis of the survey, the names of the two lakes were recorded as 'Oring' and 'Tsaring.' These geographical entities had been recorded in Chinese history books 1,000 to 2,000 years before the title of the Russian emperors, the tsar, appeared.

...In a 1969 government statement, the Brezhnev clique alleged that prior to the Ching Dynasty, 'in the west, the Chinese border had not extended beyond Kansu and Szechuan Provinces.' Now, they claim that many places in western China were 'discovered' by their predecessors, the old tsars, and talk glibly about so-called 'rights of the first investigators.' The evil intentions contained in these statements by the Brezhnev clique are clear to all and need no explanation.

...But so obsessed with world hegemony are Brezhnev and company that they are raving the same and dreaming the same fond dream of occupying the territories of other countries as the old-line colonialists did. We would like to tell the Soviet revisionist gentlemen in all seriousness: The old road of colonialism is a blind alley, you'd better stop raving! [Peking Review 29 November 1974 pp. 15-16].

#### b. Russian View

Territorial claims founded on the thesis of 'detached territories' occupy a prominent place in the Mao group's chauvinistic plans. The fanning of passions and the creation of tension round territorial issues are part of the Chinese leadership's foreign policy. The Mao group is using the territorial question to aggravate relations between countries and stir up nationalistic feelings among the Chinese people. Peking propaganda and the Chinese leaders constantly remind the Chinese and other peoples of the





Chinese frontiers that once ran across the territories of many neighbouring countries. At this point it would be appropriate to note that these 'reminders' of China's present leaders are extremely reminiscent of the statements by the reactionaries of old China.

A textbook on modern history with a map of China of the period before the Opium Wars was published in China in 1954. The authors showed China as including Burma, Vietnam, Korea, Thailand, Malaya, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and other territories. They called these lands 'state territory of China' that were 'wrested' from her.

At the time it seemed that the published maps were the result of some oversight. But developments demonstrated that the appearance of maps with 'detached territories' was not accidental. In the early 1960s the Maoists began going to all lengths in extolling the Chinese emperors and their policy of aggrandizement. The historical journal Lishih Yenchiu paid a tribute to Genghis Khan for restoring 'our multinational state to its size under the Han and Tang dynasties' and to the Emperor Kang-hsi for creating an empire with frontiers 'up to the Pacific in the East, the South Sea Islands in the South, the spurs of the Himalayas in the West and Siberia in the North'.\*

\*Lishih Yenchiu, No. 3, 1961; No. 3, 1962  
[Maoism Unmasked 1972 pp. 218-219].

## 2. On Expansionism

### a. Chinese View

Referring to the expansionist policy of tsarist Russia, the revolutionary teacher of the proletariat Marx pointed out: 'Its methods, its tactics, its manoeuvres may change, but the Polar Star of its policy - world domination - is a fixed star.' Is there any difference between the Soviet social-imperialists and the old tsars in their bid for world domination? No. One can say they are tweedledum and tweedledee, entirely at one with each other.

...The Soviet revisionists have not only tried by might and main to lay their hands on what the old tsars attempted to grab. In regard to expansionist ambitions, they have far outstripped their predecessors. Apart from attempts to control the Middle East, the Brezhnev clique sets its mind on gaining a foothold in Africa, Latin America and Oceania. Apart from expansion on the land, it seeks 'unlimited control on the seas.' It is locked in a fierce global scramble with U.S. imperialism for gaining control over the whole world.





...Another important method of tsarist Russia in carrying out aggression was to send spies abroad and recruit agents to engineer subversive and sabotage activities. Marx and Engels pointed out in their time that Russia had recruited a large number of highly-paid agents, that Russian diplomatic organs always had agents of various kinds at their disposal and that the history of the Balkan Peninsula in the last hundred years provided sufficient examples to show what the official circles in Russia could do to remove with poison, daggers, etc. those in their way. The Soviet revisionists outdo the old tsars in this regard. Press reports say Soviet spying activities have spread to some 90 countries and half of the Soviet revisionist diplomats abroad are engaged in espionage activities. The Soviet revisionists have also 'bought over traitors whom they put in use.' Well known too are their despicable acts of plotting coup d'etats and carrying out subversion in other countries through spies and agents [Peking Review 30 August 1974 pp. 16-17].

#### b. Russian View

The actions of the Maoists have shown the world that the policy of adventures and expansion which they are turning into the pivot of China's international policy as a whole is seriously menacing world peace and, above all, the security of the peoples of Asia.

In order to disguise this policy and give it the appearance of a 'struggle for the restoration of historical justice' the Maoists hysterically allege that the present frontier between the Soviet Union and China had been delineated on the basis of unequal treaties. This frontier, as the whole world knows, took shape many generations ago and follows natural boundaries demarcating the territories of the Soviet Union and China. It was established on the basis of a series of treaties, whose territorial provisions remain in full force to this day. In evaluating Peking propaganda's outcry over the so-called territorial issue, a Statement issued by the Soviet Government on March 29, 1969 stressed that the purpose of this outcry 'is to sow among the Chinese people hate and hostility for our country and the Soviet people.\*

If one analyzes the 'arguments' which the Peking leaders are advancing in substantiation of their 'right' to foreign territory, one will see that the only motive is the desire to restore to China almost the entire territory of the Celestial Empire. Anybody conversant with history knows that the Chinese emperors, particularly of the Yuan (1280-1368) and Ching (1644-1911) dynasties, pursued a policy of conquest in the north, south, west and east, seeking to subject neighboring peoples and territories. The claims to territories which the Chinese emperors seized or tried to seize centuries



ago demonstrate that the Chinese leaders are evidently aspiring to the doubtful honour of being regarded as the heirs of the former dynasties.

...It is quite evident that the expansionist claims of the Maoists are absurd and untenable from both the historical and international legal points of view.

\*Pravda, March 30, 1969 [Maoism Unmasked 1972 pp. 193-194].

### 3. On Disarmament

#### a. Chinese View

It is the custom for the Soviet revisionist clique to play the 'disarmament' game at the annual session of the United Nations General Assembly.

...In 1971, it proposed at the United Nations the convocation of a world disarmament conference and since then has peddled this at every U.N. General Assembly session. However, the clique has never reduced its military force by a single military vessel, a single tank or a single missile. On the contrary, it has accelerated the tempo of its arms expansion from sea to land and from conventional to nuclear arms. Out of the need for foreign expansion, it has greatly enlarged its navy. Today the strength of Soviet revisionist armoured units in Europe is one-third more than in 1972.

...In 1973, the Soviet revisionists proposed in the United Nations that all permanent member states of the Security Council cut their military expenditures by 10 per cent to assist the developing countries. This was a double fraud. The fact is that the more they propose military expenditure cuts, the higher their military budget goes. In recent years, the Soviet Union's military spending has been increased 5 per cent annually, according to Western news agency reports. The Soviet revisionists' talk about 'assistance' is simply a cock and bull story for they are even unwilling to cancel the debts owed them by some developing countries for munitions used in the struggle against aggression. How can they 'assist' the developing countries with money saved from reductions? [Peking Review 29 November 1974 pp. 16-17].

#### b. Russian View

...The talks on a reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe aroused the undisguised animosity of the Chinese leaders. At first they opposed the very idea of talks on that question. But their 'advice' had no effect. Now they are trying to discredit the proposals of the socialist countries at the Vienna negotiations.





...In distorting the essence of the proposals of the socialist countries, Chinese propaganda alleges that a reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe will be prejudicial to the Western countries on the specious grounds that their 'defence potential is inadequate'. At the 28th UN General Assembly the head of the Chinese delegation declared that the 'real problem' facing countries is 'not disarmament but the strengthening of their independent defence potential'.\* Such statements by Chinese leaders can be understood only as attempts at urging West European countries to step up the arms race.

...Peking is endeavouring to conceal the unprincipled character of its policy by stepping up its anti-Soviet campaign, in particular, by spreading the fabrication about the 'threat to China from the North'. The 'Soviet threat' theme is invariably brought up in all the talks of the Chinese leaders with representatives of Western countries and is depicted by them as China's central problem today. In January 1974 the Turkish News Agency reported that the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Ho Ying used this pretext when he said Peking had to 'prepare for war' [International Affairs April 1974 pp. 26-27].

#### 4. On Foreign Aid

##### a. Chinese View

...China has established economic and technical co-operation relations with more than 50 countries, providing them with aid to the best of her ability. The magnitude of her foreign aid has registered a marked increase since the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Supporting each other politically and economically, China and the friendly countries of the Third World have thus promoted their respective independent development and constantly enhanced their friendship.

...In providing economic and technical aid to other countries, China abides by the eight principles made known by Premier Chou En-lai in late 1963 and early 1964 during his visit to Africa; these principles epitomize the basic policies of China's foreign aid in the spirit of internationalism.

##### ...Eight Principles of China's Foreign Aid

1. The Chinese Government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but as something mutual.





2. In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges.

3. China provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and extends the time limit for the repayment when necessary so as to lighten the burden of the recipient countries as far as possible.

4. In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese Government is not to make the recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark step by step on the road of self-reliance and independent economic development.

5. The Chinese Government tries its best to help the recipient countries build projects which require less investment while yielding quicker results, so that the recipient governments may increase their income and accumulate capital.

6. The Chinese Government provides the best-quality equipment and material of its own manufacture at international market prices. If the equipment and material provided by the Chinese Government are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the Chinese Government undertakes to replace them.

7. In giving any particular technical assistance, the Chinese Government will see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master such technique.

8. The experts dispatched by China to help in construction in the recipient countries will have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient countries. The Chinese experts are not allowed to make special demands or enjoy any special amenities.

...China's aid to foreign countries is either gratis or loans on favourable terms, a form of co-operation between friends...As a socialist country, China neither exports capital nor practices usury. Before 1964 most of her loans to foreign countries were interest-free, with the rest of them at low interest. All her loans to foreign countries extended after that year have been interest-free.

...China's economic development is still at a rather low level and her material strength is not equal to her will [Peking Review 25 October 1974 pp. 16-18].



## b. Russian View

. The Peking leaders have widely advertised their economic assistance to developing countries. However, a closer look shows that Chinese assistance fails to promote the establishment of a powerful industrial base or to resolve the cardinal problems of their economic progress. This is so, because it orients the 'Third World' countries on the primary development of light industry and agriculture. This, in effect, dooms these countries to continued economic dependence on the developed capitalist states, and to continued and even increased lagging behind with the advance of the scientific and technical revolution. That is why the Maoists' attempts to disrupt the ties of the developing countries with the USSR and other socialist states and to pressure the 'Third World' to set up closed economic groups, where the law would be laid down by Peking, are especially dangerous.

The Maoists have worked diligently to present their economic ties with the developing countries as being exceptionally advantageous to the latter. Actually, this is a far cry from the truth. China's foreign-exchange receipts from trade with the 'Third World' countries — over \$1,000 million in 1972 — are well in excess of its aid commitments to these countries.

It should be noted that Peking would like to establish a kind of division of labour with the developed capitalist states for the exploitation of the 'Third World' countries. In a conversation with Japan's Minister of Foreign Trade and Industry, Nakasone, in January 1973, Chou En-lai declared: 'Let's help Southeast Asia: China in the sphere of agriculture and the light industry, and Japan in the sphere of the heavy industry.'\* There is no need to specify the kind of aid this involves.

\*Asahi, January 22, 1973 [International Affairs July 1974 p. 40].

## 5. On Ideology

### a. Chinese View

...The outrages committed by the Soviet revisionist clique during the year are too numerous to list. A few salient examples are enough to bring to light its obnoxious features and sordid behaviour; they at the same time speak for the daily awakening of the world's people and their in-depth struggle against hegemony.

...1. Soviet revisionism was in desperate straits and isolation as its acts of clinging to hegemony and making troubles at international conferences were scathingly denounced by many third world countries.





...2. As Soviet revisionism steps up contention with U.S. imperialism for hegemony in Europe and as its tactics of 'making a feint to the east while attacking in the west' become more evident, more and more European countries are heightening their vigilance against it.

...3. Soviet revisionism exploits Soviet Jewish emigration in pursuit of its own interests and thus undermines the Arab people's struggle. This has further exposed the ugly features of social-imperialism.

...4. In the Cyprus event, Soviet revisionism added fuel to the fire, seeking to fish in troubled waters. Its sinister designs were all too clear.

...5. Soviet revisionism continues to create turmoil, maintains tension in the South Asian subcontinent and steps up contention in the Indian Ocean with U.S. imperialism.

...6. Soviet revisionism has not only seized Japanese territories with no intention of returning them but has posed repeated military threats against that country, arousing the Japanese people's indignation and protest.

...7. Soviet revisionism has made huge profits by speculating in the international market, doing many things detrimental to the interests of the third world countries.

...8. Soviet revisionism's cloak-and-dagger activities in all parts of the world which repeatedly were exposed and saw its spies expelled have aroused close attention and vigilance in many countries.

...The outward bluster and swaggering posture of the Breshnev clique cannot conceal its essential weakness of being beset with internal and external problems. As the contention between Soviet revisionism and U.S. imperialism further intensifies, the storm of the struggle against hegemonism launched by the people of all lands will rage still more fiercely. It is a certainty that social-imperialism will suffer heavier defeats than the old-time expansionists [Peking Review 31 January 1975 pp. 16-18].

#### b. Russian View

The 10th C.P.C. Congress accelerated the Maoist policy of all-embracing militarization. Preparations for war are being carried out under the cover of propaganda furor about the fictitious threat of a 'sudden attack' by the U.S.S.R. on China. On the other hand, in talks with





representatives of NATO countries the Maoists assert that the U.S.S.R. is creating the semblance of a threat in the East but is actually preparing for a sudden strike in the West.

Chinese mass propaganda singles out as the greatest of the country's achievements the fact that the C.P.R. 'has manufactured an atom bomb, a hydrogen bomb and an artificial earth satellite.' But it is totally silent about the fact that militarization is draining China's limited resources: In 1973 direct military expenditures took up more than 40% of budget appropriations and a vast amount of human labor. The Peking leadership justifies this by citing the Soviet 'threat.'

...At present, Mao Tse-tung and a small group of political and military leaders chosen by him wield absolute power. However, it should be emphasized the (sic) Mao's inner circle is not monolithic; various groups within it are struggling for power. The main groups in Peking's ruling clique are the 'leftists' or extremists — active proponents of the 'cultural revolution' — and so-called pragmatists, who sometimes advance 'leftist' positions for tactical reasons. The military is also an independent power [The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 23 October 1974 p. 7].

## 6. On Hitler

### a. Chinese View

Recently, the Brezhnev renegade clique has talked a lot of nonsense on Sino-Soviet relations. It alleges that China is against relaxation of world tension and unwilling to improve Sino-Soviet relations, etc. These words are directed to the Soviet people and the people of other countries in a vain attempt to alienate their friendly feelings for the Chinese people and disguise the true features of the new Czar. These words are above all meant for the monopoly capitalists in the hope of getting more money in reward for services in opposing China and communism. This was an old trick of Hitler's, only Brezhnev is playing it more clumsily. If you are so anxious to relax world tension, why don't you show your good faith by doing a thing or two — for instance, withdraw your armed forces from Czechoslovakia or the People's Republic of Mongolia and return the four northern islands to Japan? China has not occupied any foreign countries' territory. Must China give away all the territory north of the Great Wall to the Soviet revisionists in order to show that we favour relaxation of world tension and are willing to improve Sino-Soviet relations? The Chinese people are not to be deceived or cowed. The Sino-Soviet controversy on matters of principle should not hinder the normalization of relations between the two states on the basis of the Five



Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The Sino-Soviet boundary question should be settled peacefully through negotiations free from any threat. 'We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack' - this is our consistent principle. And we mean what we say [The Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Documents) 1973 pp. 26-27].

• b. Russian View

...As is known, the Nazis put forth the winning of 'Lebensraum' as one of their main chauvinist slogans. They categorically refused to recognize the principle of the inviolability of existing borders. 'Nature does not recognize political boundaries,' Hitler stated. 'It gives life to human beings on our planet and then quietly observes the free play of forces.' The National Socialists made their goal the transformation of the 'Third Reich' into a state equal to the Roman Empire and, in order to 'return to the nation territory that had been wrested from it,' unleashed a predatory war. Since the time of the war against Japan, Mao Tse-tung has repeatedly declared that it is necessary to reunite with China territory that allegedly belonged to China or was under its suzerainty during the era of the 'great Han, Tang, Ming and Ching empires.' The thought automatically arises that he has decided to create a fifth empire. Since the 1960s, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai have emphasized that they consider it their task to 'restore Chinese territory to the dimensions it had under the Ching Empire of the Manchus before the Opium Wars,' i.e., as of the middle of the 19th century. Indeed, it was not without reason that even Liu Shao-chi, when asked in the mid-1950s 'Could Mao Tse-tung be called an emperor?' answered: 'He could, only he would be called a "Red Emperor."' Now the word 'Red' is probably superfluous. ...

In an interview with a delegation of Japanese Socialists in June, 1964, Mao stated: 'The Soviet Union occupies too much space.\*\*\*The Soviet Union's area is 22,000,000 square kilometers, but its population is only 200,000,000.\*\*\*The region east of Lake Baikal became Russian territory approximately 100 years ago, and since then Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Kamchatka and other areas have been territories of the Soviet Union. We have still not presented them with a bill for this.' It was as if he said this as Goebbels and Rosenberg dictated the words.

Following the recipe of the National Socialists, the Maoists have stated their claims to territories that have historically belonged to Japan, Vietnam, Burma, the Philippines and other states. China has published geographic maps on which China's boundaries, which have been set by a





number of international treaties, are marked 'undetermined.' These areas include parts of the borders with India, Burma and the Korean People's Democratic Republic, as well as the Soviet-Chinese border along the Amur and Ussuri Rivers and in the Pamirs area [The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 4 September 1974 pp. 2-3].

## 7. On the State of the World

### a. Chinese View

...The numerous Third World countries have become the main force in the revolutionary struggle against the two hegemonic powers. More and more people have seen through the so-called 'detente' played up by the superpowers. All the basic contradictions in the world are further sharpening, particularly the contradiction between the two superpowers on the one hand and the people of all countries on the other and the contradiction between the two superpowers themselves.

...Overestimation of the strength of the superpowers does not square with the fact. In the final analysis, it is not the one or two superpowers but the people of the world in their thousands of millions who determine the destiny of the world.

...China consistently supports the liberation struggles of all oppressed nations and oppressed peoples and considers this to be her bounden internationalist duty.

...We hold that the colonial peoples can win national liberation only by relying mainly on their own efforts to wage a tit-for-tat struggle against colonialism.

...Armed struggle is fundamental, but negotiations are not excluded. Sometimes, going to negotiations is tit-for-tat; and sometimes, not going to negotiations is also tit-for-tat. Even in negotiations one must base himself on fighting. In the course of negotiations, the fundamental interests of the people must be protected. The armed forces of the people must be strengthened, and not weakened.

...There can be no settlement of the Middle East question, so long as the lost Arab territories are not recovered and Palestinian national rights not restored. Whatever manoeuvres they may engage in, the two superpowers will never succeed in their attempt to sacrifice the Palestinian national rights and undermine the militant unity of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples.





...In May India exploded a nuclear device allegedly for peaceful purposes. In June the Indian Government imposed on the people of Sikkim the so-called 'Government of Sikkim bill,' which it had concocted single-handed (sic). And, more recently, the Indian Parliament adopted a constitutional amendment, making Sikkim a so-called 'associate state' of India. To put it bluntly, this is the annexation of Sikkim. It is another naked act of expansionism perpetrated by the Indian Government after dismembering Pakistan by armed force.

...The Soviet Union is unscrupulous in its efforts to interfere in, subvert, divide and control the South Asian countries. It is conspiring to engineer another dismemberment of Pakistan. It dreams of opening a corridor to the Indian Ocean to serve its interests in its contention with the other superpower for hegemony in the South Asian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean.

...The proposal put forward by Pakistan for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia is entirely reasonable. China gives it her firm support.

...The Chinese Government has solemnly declared on many occasions that at no time and in no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons. It consistently holds that the nuclear countries should undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries or nuclear-free zones.

...the two superpowers are fiercely contending with each other on a global scale. And their arms expansion and war preparations serve their policy of hegemonism. ...the superpowers, when faced with increasingly acute economic troubles, inevitably turn to the further militarization of the national economy as the way out. In this regard, the present situation resembles that of the 30s in many ways [Peking Review 11 October 1974 pp. 9-14].

#### b. Russian View

The 10th Congress and subsequent occurrences have exposed still more Maoist foreign policy's direct opposition to world socialism, as well as the Maoists' attempts to form blocs with imperialist forces and their opposition to détente. Peking's foreign policy is aimed at achieving the complete supremacy of Maoism within the country and the transformation of China into a state dictating its will to the peoples of the world. To accomplish this, the Maoist leadership seeks to play on the contradictions between the two world systems, to effect closer ties with states varying widely in their class makeup, and to use 'third world' countries in their own interests.



The congress advanced the concept of 'necessary compromises by revolutionary countries (i.e., China - Ed.) with imperialist states.' It is clear that the Peking leadership regards anti-Sovietism as the basis of such compromises. Under the slogan of opposition to the hegemony of 'superpowers,' the 10th Congress switched from a policy of anti-imperialism to one of anti-Sovietism, from a 'struggle on two fronts' (against the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.) to a concentrated struggle against the Soviet Union.

The 10th Congress documents depict the U.S.A. as a decrepit opponent that is vastly less dangerous than 'enemy number one' - the Soviet Union. The Maoists now consider the U.S.A. to be a potential partner with whom 'necessary compromises' can be made to combat the 'main adversary' - the socialist commonwealth.

...After the 10th Congress, the Maoists advanced a new 'theory' of the alignment of forces in the world - the 'concept of three worlds.' The 'first world' is the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., the two 'superpowers'; the 'second world' is the developed countries; the 'third world' is the developing countries. The distribution of states among these 'worlds' is made without regard to their social structures and without any class (sic) approach or realistic appraisal of the present international situation.

Peking's actions in the international arena are designed to weaken world socialism, the main force in the struggle for social progress and international security, by undermining the unity of the socialist countries, discrediting their policies and focusing attacks on the Council for Economic Aid and the Warsaw Treaty [The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 23 October 1974 pp. 8-11].

## 8. On Mongolia

### a. Chinese View

While often begging for loans from the West to make up for their capital shortage, the Soviet revisionists have strengthened control and plunder of Mongolia and some other countries by making investments in and lending money to them. Statistics show that in the decade since the Brezhnev clique came to power in 1964, the Soviet revisionists have given Mongolia loans worth 1,365 million rubles (some 1,810 million U.S. dollars). In other words, each Mongolian owes a debt of more than 1,600 rubles to the Soviet Union and consequently Mongolia has become one of the countries with the world's heaviest per capita debt.





...The Soviet revisionists' plunder and exploitation are the root cause of Mongolia's economic backwardness today.

The neo-colonialist acts by the Soviet revisionists enable people to see more clearly their ugly features — socialists in words but imperialists in deeds [Peking Review 6 December 1974 pp. 14-15].

#### b. Russian View

...The Maoists also attempt to use border and territorial questions to inflame nationalistic passions. Having made territorial claims against the Soviet Union and shown annexationist designs against the Mongolian People's Republic, the Chinese leaders are also provoking border disputes between other countries.

...The Maoist leadership is in practice pursuing a tougher foreign-policy course, laced with extremism, that opposes the ideas of collective security and disarmament, but it is also trying to avoid armed clashes with large states, while showing no compunctions about using force against weak adversaries.

Peking's foreign policy is particularly dangerous to contiguous states, especially in times of domestic political crises in China. The C.P.R. creates constant tension in the areas closest to it by demonstrations of armed strength along its borders, nuclear tests in the atmosphere, the use of force to solve territorial disputes, and intervention in the internal affairs of its neighbors [The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 23 October 1974 p. 11].

### 9. On Maritime Law

#### a. Chinese View

The Soviet Government recently raised in collusion with the reactionary Sato government of Japan the absurdity that the Straits of Malacca should be 'internationalized'. This attempt aimed at interfering in the affairs of the straits and encroaching upon the sovereignty of the states on both sides of the straits, has met with opposition from the governments of Malaysia and Indonesia....

...Of late, quite a number of Soviet warships entered into the Indian Ocean through the Straits of Malacca and carried out furtive activities there, thus severely threatening the security of various countries in that area.

At present, Soviet revisionist social-imperialism is colluding with the Japanese reactionaries who claim that 'the Straits of Malacca is the lifeline of Japan' to peddle





the 'internationalization' of the straits. This has further laid bare its ambitions for expansion and aggression...  
[International Negotiation: Chinese Comment on Soviet Foreign Policy 1972 pp. 5-6].

#### b. Russian View

...Long before the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea was convened, Maoist propagandists, the Hsinhua News Agency in particular, launched a far-reaching campaign against existing standards of international maritime law\* and criticized the universally recognized international legal concept of the 'open sea,' declaring it 'reactionary.' Peking's diplomatic representatives and Maoist propaganda have come out in favor of revising the existing system of laws governing ocean space and of re-examining boundaries. They are trying to score a political victory in 'third world' countries and are opposing sensible solutions to the pressing problems of maritime law. Cloaked in 'revolutionary' phraseology, the Maoists are openly supporting attempts by certain countries to seize vast expanses of the open sea and declare sovereignty over them. Peking's representatives at the Conference on the Law of the Sea are trying to disrupt efforts to settle the pressing problems of maritime law. They have made slanderous accusations against the Soviet Union, asserting that the latter is trying to make the conference adopt decisions on maritime law that will benefit only the Soviet Union [The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 18 September 1974 pp. 15].

### 10. On Sino-Soviet Border Security

#### a. Chinese View

...To put it plainly, the 'borders' and 'security' alleged by the Soviet Government mean that wherever it attempts to commit aggression and expansion will become its 'borders' and where its 'security' is threatened. The Soviet Government has consistently carried out expansion and aggression abroad in accordance with this gangster theory. There are many examples of this. Under the pretext of 'defending the security of the socialist community,' the Soviet Government once flagrantly sent several hundred thousand troops to occupy Czechoslovakia by force. Raising the banner of defending 'Soviet territory' and 'Soviet borders,' the Soviet Government launched armed aggression against the Chinese territory of Chenpao Island, and repeatedly created incidents of armed provocation along the border. In order to introduce its warships into the Mediterranean Sea and commit expansion in this region, the Soviet Government wasted no time in extending its 'borders' to that area and shamelessly declared that 'since the USSR is a major power in the Black Sea, she is also a major power in the Mediterranean Sea.'



In order to expand in all parts of the world, the Soviet Government has even gone so far as to advocate cosmopolitanism and shouted that the USSR is a 'major world power'; so long as 'it involves our security or that of our friends,' the Soviet Government 'will not remain passive,' no matter how distant the 'geographic location' may be. This is out-and-out theory of aggression and expansion of social-imperialism which has nothing to do with 'border security.' [International Negotiation: Chinese Comment on Soviet Foreign Policy 1972 p. 3].

b. Russian View

...One of the main allegations made at the Tenth Congress of the CPC was 'the threat of a surprise attack' on China by the Soviet Union. Some facts should be recalled in this connection.

For many years now the Chinese leaders have been making much noise about the 'threat from the north', by referring to the 'concentration of Soviet troops along the Soviet-Chinese border'. Yet, it was the Chinese leadership who, in the early sixties, ordered troops and people's volunteer units to be deployed along the whole frontier with the USSR. Since then, local inhabitants from among the national minorities have been resettled to the hinterland of China, military settlements have been established along the border, and the construction of strategic roads, communications lines and airfields has been conducted on a wide scale. The Chinese leaders have deliberately made the northern frontier - one of friendship and brotherhood of the two great peoples in the past - an area in which they staged thousands of small and big provocations and even armed conflicts. This is how matters stand in reality. And after all that Peking is shouting about the 'threat from the north'!

Imperialist propagandists and anti-Communists of various hues have readily caught up Peking's inventions, spreading rumours about the imminent 'preventive nuclear strike by the USSR against China' [Where is Peking Heading? 1973 pp. 67-68].



## APPENDIX B

### ROBINSON'S MODEL

#### A. 1949-1953: SOVIET DOMINANCE AND CHINESE SUBMISSION

##### I. Identical Interests

1. Against re-emergence of a strong Japan.
2. For bloc unity under Soviet leadership.
3. For mutual increases in power and industrialization.
4. Against American take-over of North Korea.
5. Defense against attack from the United States.
6. For expansion by peaceful and violent means of communist influence throughout the world.
7. Against thermonuclear war with the United States.
8. For end of the colonial era and conversion of newly independent countries to socialism.
9. For Chinese representation on world councils, especially the United Nations.

##### II. Complementary Interests

| <u>Soviet Union</u>                                                                                                     | <u>China</u>                                              |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. Against United States influence in Europe.                                                                           | 1. Against United States influence in Taiwan.             |
| 2. Control of regimes abroad, especially East Europe.                                                                   | 2. Control of land abroad, especially Taiwan and Vietnam. |
| 3. Protection from attack from the rear (Sino-Soviet border) so as not to be engaged on too many fronts simultaneously. |                                                           |
| 4. Control over Chinese resources and over political direction of China.                                                | 4. For large amounts of Soviet aid.                       |

##### III. Conflicting Interests

| <u>Soviet Union</u>                                            | <u>China</u>                                                             |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. Direct control of China, especially Sinkiang and Manchuria. | 1. Freedom from such control, i.e., territorial and political integrity. |
| 2. Keep Korea out of Chinese hands.                            | 2. Keep Korea out of Russian hands.                                      |
| 3. Continual "independence" of Mongolia.                       | 3. Reincorporation of Mongolia as a Chinese province.                    |





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Soviet Union

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China

4. Giving China as little aid as possible to keep her under control and satisfied.
5. Continuation of voice in the management of Chinese Eastern Railroad
6. A Soviet Far Eastern warm water port on Chinese territory.
7. Emplanting regimes abroad whose domestic institutions, political philosophy, and societal organization are as similar as possible to Soviet Union's own.

4. Obtaining as much aid as possible from Soviet Union with as little control as possible.
5. Reimposition of exclusive Chinese control over the Chinese Eastern Railroad.
6. Removal of Soviet naval base at Dairen with end of Korean War
7. Emplanting regimes abroad whose domestic institutions, political philosophy, and societal organization are as similar as possible to China's own. [Robinson 1966 pp. 7-8]

B. 1960-1964 (NOVEMBER): OPEN POLEMICS AND BEGINNINGS OF DIRECT OPPOSITION

I. Identical Interests

1. Against a strong Japan allied with the United States.
2. Against American take-over of North Korea and North Vietnam.
3. Defense against attack from United States.
4. For Chinese presentation in world councils, especially the United Nations.
5. Against thermonuclear war with the United States.
6. Against 'neocolonialism' and for conversion of newly independent countries to socialism.
7. Overcoming Western strategic superiority (Soviet Union: to 1962; China: to 1964).

II. Complementary Interest

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Soviet Union

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China

1. Protection from attack from the rear (Sino-Soviet border so as not to be engaged on too many fronts simultaneously).

III. Conflicting Interests

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Soviet Union

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China

1. Desire to settle outstanding conflicts with United States
1. Desire to see United States continue as enemy No. 1.



2. Peace as the chief environment for transition to socialism.  
3. Against even small, indirect wars with United States (e.g. Vietnam) for fear of nuclear escalation.  
4. Opposition to transfer of any territory to China.

5. No support to violent 'national liberation movements' if United States is involved.

6. Difference on how to overcome United States strategic superiority.

7. Preventing China from further industrialization.

8. Continual 'independence' of Mongolia.

9. Against domination of North Korea by China.

10. Against domination of North Vietnam.

11. Reassertion of Soviet ideological primacy as a claim to be the legitimate center of the world communist movement.

12. Desire to settle outstanding world issues, Chinese presence at conferences or not.

13. Unwillingness to confront United States in supporting Chinese irredenta policy over Taiwan.

14. Emplanting regimes abroad whose institutions, political philosophy, and societal organization are as similar as possible to Soviet Union's own.

15. Support of India as a block to China.

2. War or peace as alternative environments for transition to socialism.

3. Not against small, localized wars with United States (believes nuclear escalation will not occur).

4. Recovery of certain Siberian and Soviet Far Eastern provinces as Chinese irredenta.

5. Support for violent 'national liberation movements' even if United States is involved.

7. For industrialization and nuclearization as quickly as possible.

8. Reincorporation of Mongolia as a Chinese province.

9. Against domination of North Korea by Soviet Union.

10. Against domination of North Vietnam by Soviet Union.

11. Imposition of Chinese (especially Mao's) ideological primacy as a claim to be the legitimate center of the world communist movement.

12. Insistence on necessity of Chinese presence at world conferences before any issues can be settled.

13. Use of Soviet power to forward Chinese irredenta interests in Taiwan.

14. Emplanting regimes abroad whose domestic institutions, political philosophy, and societal organization are as similar as possible to China's own.

15. Discrediting India as a worthy rival for 'third' world leadership and weakening her structurally.



Soviet Union

China

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16. Emerging interest in 'welfare' of brother Central Asian nationalities across Chinese border.

17. For expansion by peaceful means of communist influence throughout the world, especially the 'third' world.

16. Protection of Sinkiang from Soviet penetration.

17. For expansion by peaceful and violent means of communist influence throughout the world, especially the 'third' world [Robinson 1966 pp. 13-15].





## APPENDIX C

### SOVIET COMPUTER HARDWARE

Below is a listing of all known Soviet Unified Systems (ES) Computers and their specifications. The data was taken from the final issue of the Soviet Cybernetics Review (May/June, 1974) published by the RAND Corporation. Additional information on all known Soviet peripheral equipment such as processors, core units, card readers, etc., is also contained in the 58 pages of that issue.

A. 1010 Computer built in Hungary. The ES-1010 is the smallest system in the ES family. The prototype was successfully tested in 1972 according to a report in December of that year. Series production began in the same year at the Videotron Factory in Hungary. It was reported that the operating system, OS-10, was available simultaneously with production. It is a small, modular, microprogrammed system, with a hierarchical interrupt system. It is intended for limited-size scientific and technical calculations for processing accumulated measurement data; for small process control systems; for teaching systems; and in "hardened" environments. It can also be used as an "intellectual" terminal. The Hungarians have mounted an ES-1010 in a mobile van, which can be used to bring computational capabilities to schools and to perform computations anywhere that on-site



capabilities of this sort are needed. Specifications are: 10,000 opns/sec; MTBF (continuous round-the-clock operations): 1000 hrs; Minimum floor space: 12 sq m.

B. 1020 Computer built in USSR and Bulgaria. The ES-1020 has been described both as a small and as a medium productivity computer. It is intended for scientific and technical, economics, management, and special tasks; for small control systems; and for teaching systems. A prototype unit underwent successful tests in 1971. An October 1973 report stated that production "will be" started in the Soviet Union and Bulgaria. However, it was known in July 1972 that 1020 units were in production under assembly-line conditions in Brest (Belorussian SSR) at the Brest Electro-mechanical Plant. The first known and verified installation of a 1020 was at the Institute of Cybernetics, Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, in Kiev during the first half of 1973. In May 1973, it was reported that "several dozen" units were in operation in the USSR, and the Minsk Ordzhonikidze Plant was accepting orders for delivery in 90 days. A 1020 was delivered to the Tesla enterprise in Czechoslovakia in December 1972, and was operational by the following February. The 1020 was officially announced in Minsk in January 1972, at which time it was said that the first units had already been delivered to purchasers. The most reliable information identifies November 1972 as the date of approval of the 1020 for production.



Control in the 1020 is broadly based on microprogramming techniques, and it features a flexible logical interrupt and branching system. The 1020 can be incorporated into multimachine systems, in addition to operation in an autonomous mode and as part of a users' network. Specifications are: 20,000 opns/sec; Core capacity: 256 Kbytes maximum in 4 blocks; MTBF: 1000 hrs; Minimum floor space: 100 sq m; Maximum mass of inseparable elements and nodes: 500 kg; Maximum of 1 multiplexor and 2 selector channels; Maximum channel throughput: 0.7 Mbytes/sec.

C. 1021 Computer built by the Czechs. The ES-1021 system, also called the ES-1020A, is a specialized medium productivity unit oriented towards single-processor and single-program operations. It is to be used for economics, scientific and technical, and data-processing problems. Its instruction set is oriented towards small management systems. The 1021 was developed at the Czech Research Institute of Mathematical Machines. The chief designer was Jiri Podzimek. A prototype was successfully tested in 1972, according to a December 1972 report. The 1021 is not known to be in production, nor have any installed units been reported. Specifications are: 40,000 opns/sec; MTBF: 1000 hrs; Minimum floor space: 50 sq m; Operating systems: MOS (small operating system).

D. 1030 Computer built in USSR and Poland. The ES-1030 is one of the middle-of-the-line members of the ES series,





intended principally for scientific and technical, planning and economics, and data processing computations. There are both Soviet and Polish versions of the system, although reports continue to be received of problems with getting the Polish unit into production. The Soviet 1030 was designed in Erevan, Armenia, at the Erevan Scientific Research Institute of Mathematical Machines. It was approved for production in April 1972. The Polish version is to be produced by the MERA Association, which anticipated having several units ready for testing in 1972. In May 1973, it was reported that "several dozen" 1030 machines were in operation in the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia anticipates delivery of several 1030 units in 1975, and plans to standardize on the 1030 for commercial and trade computations. The Czech machines are to be purchased from Poland. The 1030 utilizes the full set of 143 ES instructions, and can operate in multiprocessor systems, and also in dual-processor systems wherein the total core store of both machines is commonly accessible. The 1030 uses DOS, the disc operating system, although sources have varied as to whether or not the OS operating system can also be used. Specifications: 100,000 opns/sec; Minimum floor space: 110 sq m; MTBF: 1000 hrs.

E. 1040 Computer built in the German Democratic Republic. The 1040 is the largest ES computer to be manufactured exclusively outside the Soviet Union; its design, development, and production were assigned to East Germany. It was



reportedly in production in 1973. One unit was scheduled for installation in a Czech chemicals plant (together with a 1020) during 1973, with a second unit on order for delivery to Czechoslovakia in 1974. The Novosibirsk Science City in the USSR was expecting two 1040's in 1973. The 1040 is at the high end of the medium productivity ES systems, and uses both the DOS and OS operating systems. It is manufactured by the East German Robotron enterprise. Specifications: 300,000 opns/sec; MTBF: 300 hrs; Minimum floor space: 100 sq m.

F. 1050 Computer built in the USSR. The ES-1050 is the largest member of the series developed so far. It is manufactured at the Penza Calculating Machines Plant in the Urals, and is described as equivalent to an IBM 360/65. The 1050 displayed in Moscow bore the serial number 1. It is intended for scientific and technical computations, economic work, for use in large computer centers, in large-scale data processing systems, and in multimachine complexes. It is a highly productive machine, operating with both the DOS and OS operating systems. One American observer notes that it has 14-pin package circuits with four gates per chip mounted on 6-layer boards. Delay times for ECL gates are 6 nanosec. The unit displayed used the same disc units as were observed in Novosibirsk on the Besm-6. Production of five units was projected in 1973. A 1050 was delivered to the Institute of Cybernetics, Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, in Kiev during the summer of 1973; at the time it was seen there by



foreign guests, it was not yet operational. Projections for the current five-year plan (through 1975) anticipated 10 units a year for export, although fewer than that would be available in 1973. The cost of the minimum configuration was given at 3.5 million rubles, including basic software but not applications programs. Specifications: 1.5 million opns/sec (arithmetic); 500,000 logical opns/sec; MTBF: 500 hrs; Minimum floor space: 200 sq m; Maximum channel throughput: 8 Mbytes/sec.

G. 1060 Computer built in the USSR. The 1060 is the largest of the ES systems, although information on it is vague since it has not yet been announced. Original projections called for an operating speed of 3 million opns/sec. Some sources, both Russian and Polish, have indicated privately that the actual speed will be around 1.5 million opns/sec. The 1060 is being developed in the Soviet Union and will be produced there exclusively. It is to be equipped with card reading equipment operating at speeds of 500 and 2000 cards/min, with a 250-card/min output punch. The unit will occupy a minimum of 250 sq m.





## 2. CHINESE COMPUTER CHARACTERISTICS

| Year                                      | Name  | Circuit type | Speed (1000 operations per second) | Core memory        |                   |                   | Magnetic drums |                   |                  | Equipment and features                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|-------------------------------------------|-------|--------------|------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------|-------------------|------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                           |       |              |                                    | Word length (bits) | Size (1000 words) | Cycle time (μsec) | Num-ber        | Size (1000 words) | Word time (μsec) |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| Shanghai Computing Research Institute     |       |              |                                    |                    |                   |                   |                |                   |                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 1968                                      | C2    | Transistor   | 25                                 | 42                 | ?                 | ?                 | 2              | ?                 | ?                | Two 50-column line printers                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 1971                                      | 709   | Integrated   | 110                                | 48                 | 32                | 2.4               | 4              | 15                | 10               | 800-character-per-second paper tape reader two instructions per word                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| Shanghai Radio Factory No. 13             |       |              |                                    |                    |                   |                   |                |                   |                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| ?                                         | TQ-3  | ?            | 100                                | 24                 | 8                 | 3                 | 2              | 40                | 100(?)           | Line printer and high-speed paper tape reader; eight in-out channels with analog-digital conversion at 100 samples per second; live priority interrupt levels; used for process control                                                                                                                                                 |
| ?                                         | TQ-11 | Integrated   | 50                                 | 36                 | 16                | ?                 | ?              | ?                 | ?                | Two 5-bit-per-millimeter, 1 m-sec, three-channel magnetic tapes; 80-column, 10-line-per-second printer; two high-speed paper tape readers; double indexing used in addressing memory                                                                                                                                                    |
| Shanghai Metallurgical Research Institute |       |              |                                    |                    |                   |                   |                |                   |                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| ?                                         | ?     | ?            | 50                                 | 18                 | 8                 | 8                 |                |                   |                  | Cathode-ray tube unit, used to display masks for integrated circuit manufacture                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| Peking Institute of Computing Technology  |       |              |                                    |                    |                   |                   |                |                   |                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 1965                                      | 109C  | Transistor   | 115                                | 48                 | 36                | 6                 | 4              | 32                | 18.4             | Four 260,000-word, 150-μsec-per-word magnetic tapes; two 72-column, 7.5-line-per-second printers; four 1000-character-per-second paper tape readers; two instructions per word; 128 19-bit index register memory (2-μsec core); 6000-word magnetic rod read-only memory for fixed Algol routines                                        |
| 1970                                      | 111   | Integrated   | 180                                | 48                 | 32                | 2                 | 1              | 64                | 9.2              | Two 20-bit-per-millimeter, 300-μsec-per-word, 16-channel magnetic tapes; two 10-line-per-second printers; two 1000-character-per-second paper tape readers; cathode-ray tube scope shares 4000-word buffer with drum; 118 in-out channels; 30 priority interrupt levels; 256-word, 0.66-μsec cycle time; 5-μsec floating point addition |
| Peking Telecommunications Factory         |       |              |                                    |                    |                   |                   |                |                   |                  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 1965                                      | DJS-7 | Transistor   | 3                                  | 21                 | 4                 | 15                |                |                   |                  | Variant has 32,000-word memory, 5.4-μsec cycle time; complement of in-out equipment not recorded                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 1966                                      | DJS-6 | ?            | ?                                  | 48                 | 16                | 5.2               | ?              | ?                 | ?                | Line printer, paper tape reader, XY-recorder; described as a "mini computer"                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |

[SOURCE: CHEATHAM, T.E., JR., "COMPUTING IN CHINA" SCIENCE 12 OCTOBER 1973 p. 137]



## APPENDIX D

### I. THE SOVIET UNION

Population: 252,530,000.

Military service: Army and Air Force, 2 years; Navy and Border Guards, 2-3 years.

Total armed forces: 3,525,000.

Estimated GNP 1973: 441 billion roubles.<sup>1</sup>

Estimated defense expenditure 1974: 23.8 billion roubles (approximately \$96 billion).<sup>2</sup>

Strategic Nuclear Forces:<sup>3</sup>

#### OFFENSIVE

- (A) Navy: 720 SLBM in 70 submarines. -  
9 SSBN (D-class), each with 12 SS-N-8 missiles.  
33 SSBN (Y-class), each with 16 SS-N-6 missiles.  
8 SSBN (H-class) each with 3 SS-N-5 missiles.  
11 diesel submarines (G-11-class), each with 3 SS-N-5  
Sarb missiles.<sup>4</sup>  
9 diesel (G-1-class) each with 3 SS-N-4 Sark missiles.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>See the Readers' Notes on pp. vi-vii for the method of estimating GNP and the problems of conversion to dollars. The 1973 official exchange rate was \$1 = 0.72 roubles. An American study gave \$1 = 0.59 as a suitable 1970 GNP conversion rate, compared with the then ruling official exchange rate of \$1 = 0.9.

<sup>2</sup>This dollar estimate is only a valuation of the Soviet defense effort at US prices measured in dollars. The method of arriving at the figure is described in The Military Balance 1973-1974, pp. 8-9.

<sup>3</sup>Characteristics of nuclear delivery vehicles and notes on numbers and types under construction and test are given in Table I on pp. 73-7.

<sup>4</sup>These 60 launchers are not considered strategic missiles under the terms of the Strategic Arms Limitation (Interim) Agreement.



(B) Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF)<sup>5</sup>: 350,000.

ICBM: 1,575

209 SS-7 Saddler and SS-8 Sasin.

288 SS-9 Scarp.

1,018 SS-11 (including about 100 IRBM/MRBM).

60 SS-13 Savage.

IRBM and MRBM: about 600.

100 SS-5 Slean IRBM.

500 SS-4 Sandal MRBM.

The majority are sited near the western border of the USSR, the remainder east of the Urals.

(C) Air Force

Long Range Air Force (LRAF): 840 combat aircraft.<sup>6</sup>

100 Tu-95 Bear and 40 Mya-4 Bison.

Tankers: 50 Mya-4 Bison.

Medium range bombers: 700

500 Tu-16 Badger and 200 Tu-22 Blinder.

#### DEFENSIVE

Air Defence Forces (PVO-Strany) 500,000: early-warning and control system, fighter-interceptor squadrons and SAM units.<sup>7</sup>  
Aircraft: about 2,650.

Interceptors: include about 650 MIG-17 and MIG-19,

750 Su-9, 1,250 Yak-28P Firebar, Tu-28P Fiddler,

Su-11, Su-15 Flagon A and MIG-25 Foxbat.

AEW aircraft: 10 modified Tu-114 Moss.

Anti-ballistic Missiles (ABM):

64 Galosh long-range missile launchers are deployed in four sites around Moscow, each with Try Add engagement radars (another radar of this type is under construction). Target acquisition and tracking is by a phased-array Dog House radar, and early warning is given by phased-array Hen House radar on the Soviet borders. The range of Galosh is believed to be over 200 miles, and its warheads are nuclear, presumably in the megaton range.

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<sup>5</sup>The SRF, a separate service, have their own manpower.

<sup>6</sup>About 75 per cent is based on the European USSR, with most of the remainder in the Far East; in addition there are staging and dispersal points in the Arctic.

<sup>7</sup>The Air Defence Forces are a separate service with their own manpower.





SAM: 9,800 launchers at about 1,650 sites.

SA-2 Guideline: about 4,500; Fan Song radar: high-explosive warhead; slant range (launcher to target) about 25 miles; effective between 1,000 and 80,000 feet.

SA-3 Goa: Two-stage, low-level missile; slant range about 15 miles.

SA-4 Ganef: Twin-mounted (on tracked carrier), air-transportable, long-range missile with solid fuel boosters and ram-jet sustainer.

SA-5 Griffon: Two-stage, boosted high-level missile; slant range about 50 miles, with a limited capability against missiles.

SA-6 Gainful: Triple-mounted (on tracked carrier), low-level missile; slant range about 17 miles.

Army: 1,800,000<sup>8</sup>

110 mechanized divisions.

50 tank divisions.

7 airborne divisions.

SSM: (nuclear capable): about 1,000 launchers (units are organic to formations), including:

(1) FROG-1-7, range 10-45 miles.

(2) Scud A, range 50 miles.

(3) Scud B, range 185 miles.

(4) Scaleboard, range 500 miles.

SAM: SA-2, SA-4, SA-6 and SA-7 Grail (man-portable or vehicle mounted).

Tanks:

JS2/3, T-10, T-10M hy, T-62 and T-54/55 med. PT-76 amphibious recce lt tks (most Soviet tanks are equipped for amphibious crossing by deep wading).

AFV: BTR-50P, -60, -152; BMP APC; BRDM scout car, and BMD airborne AFV.

Artillery:

100mm, 122mm, 130mm, 152mm and 203mm field and SP guns and how; 122mm multiple RL; 140mm RL; ASU-57 and ASU-85 SP and 85mm and 100mm ATK guns; Sagger, Snapper, Swatter ATGW.

Anti-Aircraft Artillery:

14.5mm, 23mm, 57mm towed guns and ZSU-57-2 57mm twin-barrelled and ZSU-23-4 23mm four-barrelled tracked SP guns; 85mm, 100mm and 130mm guns.

DEPLOYMENT AND STRENGTH:

Central and Eastern Europe: 31 divs; 20 divs (10 tank) in East Germany; 2 tank divs in Poland; 4 divs (2 tank) in Hungary; and 5 divs (2 tank) in Czechoslovakia; 9,025 medium tanks.

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<sup>8</sup>Excluding Air Defence Forces



European USSR: 63 divs (about 22 tank).

Central USSR: 5 divs (1 tank).

Southern USSR: 23 divs (3 tank).

Sino-Soviet border: 45 divs, incl 2 in Mongolia (about 8 tank).

Soviet divisions have three degrees of combat readiness:

Category 1, between three-quarters and full strength, with complete equipment; Category 2, between half and three-quarters strength with complete fighting vehicles;

Category 3, about one-third strength, possibly with complete fighting vehicles (though some may be obsolescent). The 31 divs in Eastern Europe are Category 1, as

are a small number of those in the European USSR and the Far East and a few in the Southern USSR. The remaining divisions in European USSR, Southern USSR and the Far East are probably evenly divided between Categories 2 and 3.

The divisions in Central USSR are likely to be in Category 3. At full strength, tk divs have 325 med tks; mech divs 255.

Outside the Warsaw Pact area:

Afghanistan 150, Algeria 600, Cuba 1,000, Egypt 500, Iraq 600, North Vietnam 1,000, Somali Republic 1,000, Syria 2-3,000, People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen 200.

Navy: 475,000 (incl Naval Air Force, 75,000; Naval Infantry, 17,000, and Coast Artillery and Rocket Troops, 10,000); 221 major surface combat ships, 245 attack and cruise missile submarines, 70 nuclear, 175 diesel.

Submarines:

Attack: 30 nuclear (10 N-, 15 V-, 3 E-I-, 1 U-1 A-class); 140 diesel (50 F-, 10 R-, 20 Z-, 59 W-, 1 T-class).

Cruise missile: 40 nuclear (1 P-, 10 C-, 29 E-class); 25 diesel (15 J-, 10 W-class), with SS-N-3 and SS-N-7.

Coastal: 10 diesel (5 B-, 5 Q-class).

Surface ships:

2 Moskva-class ASW helicopter cruisers, each with 2 twin SAM and about 20 Ka-25 hel.

3 Kara-class ASW cruisers with SSM and SAM.

4 Kresta-class ASW cruisers with SSM and SAM.

6 Kresta II-class ASW cruisers with SSM and SAM.

4 Kynda-class cruisers with SSM and SAM.

13 Sverdlov-class cruisers (3 with SAM, 2 with hel), and 1 older cruiser.

6 Krivak-class destroyers with SSM and SAM.

6 Kanin-class ASW destroyers with SAM.

3 Krupny-class destroyers with SSM.

19 Kashin-class ASW destroyers with SAM.

8 modified Kotlin-class destroyers with SAM.

36 Kotlin- and Skory-class destroyers.

110 other ocean-going escorts.

8 Nanuchka-class coastal escorts with SSM and SAM.

150 submarine chasers.



130 Osa- and Komar-class FPB with Styx SSM.

300 patrol and torpedo boats.

260 minesweepers (125 coastal).

100 amphibious ships.

100 landing craft.

25 hydrofoils.

(1 40,000-ton Kuril-class aircraft carrier, apparently designed to operate with a combined total of perhaps 25 S/VTOL ac and 36 hel, may be in service in late 1975. A second is building.)

In addition to the above there are 50 intelligence collection vessels (AGI) and a number of trawlers used for electronic intelligence.

A proportion of the destroyers and smaller vessels may not be fully manned.

NAVAL AIR FORCE: about 715 combat aircraft.

(Most shore-based near the north-west and Black Sea coasts, organized generally into 3 regiments of 3 sqns each at each base.)

280 Tu-16 Badger with one Kipper or two Kelt ASM.

55 Tu-22 Blinder strike and reconnaissance ac.

20 Il-28 Beagle torpedo-equipped light bombers.

50 Tu-95 Bear long-range naval reconnaissance ac.

150 Tu-16 Badger reconnaissance and tanker ac.

100 Be-2 Mail ASW amphibians.

60 Il-38 May ASW aircraft.

270 Mi-4 and Ka-25 ASW helicopters.

200 miscellaneous transports.

NAVAL INFANTRY (Marines).

Organized in brigades and assigned to fleets. Equipped with standard infantry weapons, T-54/55 med tks, PT-76 It tks and BTR-60P/PB APC.

COASTAL ARTILLERY AND ROCKET TROOPS

Heavy coastal guns and SS-N-3 Shaddock SSM to protect approaches to naval bases and major ports. Coasts are covered by a coast watch radar and visual reporting system.

DEPLOYMENT (average strengths only)

Northern Fleet: 160 submarines, about 80 of them nuclear;

56 major surface combat ships.

Baltic Fleet: 30 submarines, 50 major surface combat ships.

Black Sea Fleet: 20 submarines, 60 major surface combat ships.

Pacific Fleet: 100 submarines, about 40 of them nuclear;

55 major surface combat ships.





Air Force: 400,000; about 5,350 combat aircraft.<sup>9</sup>  
Long Range Air Force (see p. 8).  
Tactical Air Force: about 4,500 aircraft, incl Yak-28,  
Il-28, 800 MIG-17, 500 Su-7, 300 MIG-23 Flogger, more than  
1,350 MIG-21; Su-20, improved Fitter B, Fencer A.  
Air Transport Force: about 1,700 aircraft; 870 Il-14,  
An-8, An-24, some 800 An-12 and Il-18 tpts and 30 An-22  
hy tpts.  
2,500 hel (about 500 Mi-1, Mi-2; Mi-4, 1,000 Mi-6, Mi-8,  
Mi-10; Mi-12 and Mi-24).

DEPLOYMENT:

About half the Tactical Air Force is oriented towards Western Europe and a quarter towards China. Some 1,250 aircraft are actually deployed in Eastern Europe. There is a Tu-22 sqn in Iraq.

RESERVES: about 3,000,000 (500,000 with recent training earmarked for divisional reinforcements).

Para-Military Forces: 310,000

180,000 KGB border troops; 130,000 MVD security troops. The border troops are equipped with tks, AFV, ac and ships: MVD have tks and AFV. There is a part-time military training organization (DOSAAF) which takes part in such recreational activities as athletics, shooting and parachuting. It assists in pre-military training given in schools, colleges and workers' centres to those of 15 and over. The membership is perhaps 9 million but the number of effectives is likely to be much smaller.

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<sup>9</sup>Excluding Air Defence Forces (PVO-Strany).



## II. CHINA

Population: 800-900,000,000.

Military service: Army, 2-4 years; Air Force, 3-5 years;  
Navy, 4-6 years.

Total regular forces: 3,000,000.

GNP and defence expenditure — see note on p. 50.

### Strategic Forces:

IRBM: 20-30

MRBM: about 50.

Aircraft: about 100 Tu-16 medium bombers.

Army: 2,500,000.

7 armoured divisions.

119 infantry divisions.

4 cavalry divisions.

6 airborne divisions (under Air Force).

20 artillery divisions.

41 railway and construction engineer divisions.

Soviet JS-2 hy, T-34 and T-54, Chinese-produced T-59 med,

T-60 (PT-76 type) amphibious and T-62 It tks; APC:

130mm and 152mm guns; SU-76, SU-100 and JSU-122 SP ARTY;

RL up to 140mm; 37mm, 57mm, 85mm, 100mm AA guns.

### DEPLOYMENT:

China is divided into 11 Military Regions (MR), in turn divided into Military Districts (MD) with usually two or three Districts to a Region. Divisions are grouped into some 36 Armies, generally of three infantry divisions, three artillery regiments and, in some cases, three armoured regiments. One Army appears to be assigned to each MD but some formations are centrally controlled.

The geographical distribution of the divisions (excluding artillery) is believed to be:

North and North-East China (Shenyang and Peking MR<sup>10</sup>):  
50 divisions.

East and South-East China (Tsinan, Nanking and Foochow MR):  
25 divisions.

South-Central China (Canton<sup>11</sup> and Wuhan MR): 20 divisions.

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<sup>10</sup>2-3 divs of border troops also in each of these MR.

<sup>11</sup>Includes Hainan island.



Mid-West China (Lanchow MR): 15 divisions.  
West and South-West China (Sinkiang, Chengtu and Kunming MR<sup>12</sup>):  
26 divisions.

Navy: 230,000 (including Naval Air Force and 28,000 Marines).  
1 G-class submarine (with ballistic missile tubes).<sup>13</sup>  
50 fleet submarines (26 Soviet R-, 21 W-class).<sup>14</sup>  
6 SSM destroyers with Styx (more building).  
1 ex-Soviet Gordy-class destroyer.  
10 destroyer escorts (some with SSM).  
15 patrol escorts.  
20 submarine chasers (Soviet Kronstadt-type).  
100 Osa- and Komar-type FPB with Styx SSM (more building).  
27 minesweepers (20 Soviet T-43 type).  
46 landing ships (ex-US).  
230 MTB and Hydrofoils (less than 100 tons).  
315 MGB (Shanghai-, Swatow-, Whampoa-types).  
225 armed motor junks and motor launches.  
180 supply and miscellaneous vessels.

#### DEPLOYMENT:

North Sea Fleet: about 150 vessels; deployed from the mouth  
of the Yalu river to Lienyunkang; major bases at Tsingtao  
and Lushun.

East Sea Fleet: about 500 vessels; deployed from Lienyunkang  
to Chaoan Wan; major bases at Shanghai and Chou Shan.

South Sea Fleet: about 200 vessels; deployed from Chaoan Wan  
to the North Vietnamese frontier; major bases at Huangpu  
and Chanchiang.

NAVAL AIR FORCE: 30,000; over 600 shore-based combat aircraft,  
including about 100 Il-28 torpedo-carrying and some Tu-2  
light bombers and some 500 fighters, incl MIG-17 and  
MIG-19/F-6 and some F-9; Be-6 Madge MR aircraft, Mi-4  
Hound helicopters. Naval fighters are integrated into  
the air defence system.

Air Force: 220,000 (including strategic forces and 85,000  
air defence personnel); about 3,800 combat aircraft.

At least 50 Tu-16 and a few Tu-4 medium bombers.

At least 200 Il-28 and 100 Tu-2 light bombers.

Some MIG-15, about 1,700 MIG-17, at least 1,300 MIG-19, about  
50 MIG-21 and up to 400 F-9 fighters.

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<sup>12</sup>2-3 divs of border troops also in each of these MR.

<sup>13</sup>China is not known to have any missiles for this boat.

<sup>14</sup>Including older training vessels.





About 400 transport aircraft and 300 helicopters, including 200 An-2, Il-14 and Il-18 transports and Mi-4 and 10 SA-321JA Super Frelon helicopters. (These could be supplemented by about 400 aircraft of the Civil Air Bureau.)

There is an air defence system, capable of providing a limited point defence of key urban and industrial areas, military installations and advanced weapons complexes. Some 3,000 naval and Air Force fighters are assigned to the AD role together with several hundred CSA-1 (SA-2) SAM and antiaircraft artillery.

#### Para-Military Forces:

About 300,000 security and border troops (including 20 infantry-type divisions and 40 independent regiments) are stationed in the frontier areas. In addition to a public security force, there is a civilian militia with an effective element of probably not more than 5 million organized into divisions and regiments; some of its urban elements have some heavy AA weapons. There are civilian production and construction corps in a number of Military Regions, including those adjoining the northern frontier.



# APPENDIX E

## SOVIET POLITICAL SUCCESSION CANDIDATES

| PERSONALITY                   | AGE | CPSU Positions<br>Politburo Secretariate | SUPREME<br>SOVIET | COUNCIL OF MINISTERS  |
|-------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Kosygin, Aleksei N.        | 70  | Full                                     | National          | Chairman, COM Presid  |
| 2. Podgorny, Nikolai V.       | 71  | Full                                     | Chairman          |                       |
| 3. Andropov, Yuri V.          | 60  | Full                                     | Union             | Chairman, State Secty |
| 4. Grechko, Andrei A.         | 70  | Full                                     | Union             | Minister of Defense   |
| 5. Grishin, Viktor V.         | 59  | Full                                     | Union             |                       |
| 6. Gromyko, Andrei A.         | 65  | Full                                     | Union             | Minister Foreign Aff  |
| 7. Kirilenko, Andrei P.       | 68  | Full                                     | Union             |                       |
| 8. Kulakov, Fyodor D.         | 56  | Full                                     | Union             |                       |
| 9. Kunayev, Dinmukhamed       | 62  | Full                                     | Union             |                       |
| 10. Mazurov, Kirill T.        | 60  | Full                                     | Union             | 1st Vice Chm COM      |
| 11. Pelse, Arvids J.          | 75  | Full                                     | National          |                       |
| 12. Polyansky, Dmitry S.      | 56  | Full                                     | National          | Minister of Agricult. |
| 13. Shcherbitsky, Vladimir V. | 56  | Full                                     | Union             |                       |
| 14. Schelepin, Aleksandr N.   | 56  | Full                                     | National          | Chair, Trade Unions   |
| 15. Suslov, Mikhail A.        | 71  | Full                                     | Union             |                       |
| 16. Demichev, Pyotr N.        | 56  | Candidate                                | Union             | Minister of Culture   |
| 17. Masharov, Pyotr M.        | 56  | Candidate                                | National          |                       |
| 18. Ponomarev, Boris N.       | 69  | Candidate                                | National          |                       |
| 19. Rashidov, Sharaf R.       | 56  | Candidate                                | National          |                       |
| 20. Romanov, Grigory V.       | 51  | Candidate                                | Union             |                       |
| 21. Solomentsev, Mikhail S.   | 60  | Candidate                                | Union             | Chairman, PSFSR Com   |
| 22. Ustinov, Dmitry F.        | 65  | Candidate                                | National          |                       |
| 23. Dolgikh, Vladimir I.      | 50  |                                          | Union             |                       |
| 24. Kapitonov, I. V.          | 59  |                                          |                   |                       |
| 25. Katushev, Konstantin F.   | 46  |                                          | Union             |                       |



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